Knowledge that Transforms

We analyse the role of house prices in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Norway, Sweden and the UK, using structural VARs. A solution is proposed to the endogeneity problem of identifying shocks to interest rates and house prices by using a combination of short-run and long-run (neutrality) restrictions. By allowing the interest rate and house prices to react simultaneously to news, we find the role of house prices in the monetary transmission mechanism to increase considerably. In particular, house prices react immediately and strongly to a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, the fall in house prices enhances the negative response in output and consumer price inflation that has traditionally been found in the conventional literature. Moreover, we find that the interest rate responds systematically to a change in house prices. However, the strength and timing of response varies between the countries, suggesting that housing may play a different role in the monetary policy setting.

This study shows how the misconception of the option value of deposit insurance by Merton (1977) and its later misuse by Keeley and Furlong (1990), among others, have led some literature supporting the adoption of binding non-risk-based capital requirements to derive incorrect conclusions about their efficacy. This study further shows that what Merton defines as the option value of deposit insurance is actually a component of a bank's limited liability option under a third-party deposit guarantee. As such, it is already included in the value of the bank's equity capital, and the flawed definition makes the Keeley–Furlong model internally incoherent.

We find evidence of a bank lending channel operating in the euro area via bank risk. Financial innovation and the wider use of new ways of transferring credit risk have tended to diminish the informational content of standard bank balance sheet indicators. We show that bank risk conditions, as perceived by financial market investors, need to be considered, together with the other indicators (i.e., size, liquidity and capitalization), traditionally used in the bank lending channel literature to assess banks’ ability and willingness to supply new loans. Using a large sample of European banks, we find that banks characterized by lower expected default frequency are able to offer a larger amount of credit and to better insulate their loan supply from monetary policy changes.

We survey the theories on why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence on the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature is divided into four strands: liquidity provision; asymmetric information; legal restrictions; and a medium of exchange. We assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations why banks promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct, payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par if the deposits are used in transactions. We examine the history of banking in several countries in different eras: fourth century Athens, medieval Italy, Tokugawa Japan, and free banking and money market mutual funds in the United States. Each of the theories explains some of the observed banking arrangements and none explains all of them.

This paper develops a new methodology for allowing researchers outside central banks to test the extent of payment system risk, and applies this methodology to an investigation of the impact that the introduction of real time gross settlement (RTGS) had on systemic risk in the Australian payments system. System-specific ratios are first developed to extract bilateral payment obligations from aggregate payments data in the Australian RTGS system. This synthetic data is then used to generate a deferred net settlement (DNS) system of similar dimensions to those the Australian system would have had, had RTGS not been introduced. Standard default simulation methodology is then applied to test the levels of systemic risk in both this system and the corresponding RTGS system to ascertain the degree to which the introduction of RTGS is likely to have reduced the level of risk. We find that while the level of systemic risk is likely to have been reduced in the Australian case, the size of the effect is small, a finding consistent with the results of payments system studies in other countries.

The recent boom in the housing markets of most developed economies has spurred criticism that inflation targeting central banks may have neglected the build-up of financial imbalances. This paper provides a formal empirical test of such claims, using a standard program evaluation methodology to control for a possible bias due to self-selection into inflation targeting. We consider 17 industrial economies over the period 1980–2007, among which nine countries have targeted inflation at some point. We find robust evidence of a significant positive effect of inflation targeting on real house price growth and on the house price-to-rent ratio.

We analyze the competitive effects of government bail-out policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that bail-outs lead to higher risk-taking among the protected bank’s competitors, independently of transparency. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, which intensifies competition in the deposit market, depresses other banks’ margins, and thereby increases risk-taking incentives. Contrary to conventional wisdom, protected banks may take lower risks when transparency in the banking sector is low and the deposit supply is sufficiently elastic.

We analyse the optimal response of monetary policy to house prices in a New Keynesian framework. A positive wealth effect from housing is derived from liquidity constrained consumers. Housing equity withdrawal allows them to convert an increase in housing value into consumption and we show that monetary policy should react to house prices due to their effect on consumption by constrained agents. Moreover, we allow the share of liquidity constrained consumers to vary with house prices. Consequently, the optimal weights on expected inflation, the output gap and house prices in the optimal interest rate rule vary over time too.