Knowledge that Transforms

Realistic credit risk assessment, the estimation of losses due to a debtors failure, is central for maintaining financial stability. Credit risk models focus on the financial conditions of borrowers and only marginally consider other risks from the real economy, supply chains in particular. Recent pandemics, geopolitical instabilities, and natural disasters demonstrated that supply chain shocks can contribute to financial losses large enough to threaten financial stability. Based on a unique nation-wide micro-dataset, containing practically all supply chain relations of all Hungarian firms, together with their bank loans, we develop a multi-layer shock propagation framework to estimate how economic shocks to firms cascade in the supply chain network (SCN), leading to additional financial losses to firms, additional defaults of loans and, hence, losses to banks’ equity buffers. First, we estimate the financial systemic risk of individual firms, by quantifying the expected financial losses caused by a firm’s own- and all the secondary defaulting loans caused by supply chain network contagion. We find a small fraction of firms carrying substantial financial systemic risk, affecting up to 22% of the banking system’s overall equity (assuming a loss given default of 100%). These losses are predominantly caused by SCN-contagion. Second, we calculate for every bank the expected loss (EL), value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), with and without SCN-contagion. We find that SCN-contagion amplifies EL, VaR, and ES by a factor of 5.2, 6.7 and 4.4, respectively. Third, we showcase how the new framework can be used to assess the risks of a large real economy shock for financial stability. We simulate the financial losses from a COVID-19 inspired shock calibrated from firm-level employment data in the beginning of 2020. Our simulations show that without any interventions, system-wide bank equity would suffer losses of 6%. The framework can be used to design and test targeted policy interventions, e.g., optimally providing firms with enough liquidity-support to avert their default. By supporting selected illiquid (yet solvent) firms with additional liquidity totalling 0.5% of overall bank equity, the losses can be reduced from 6% to 1% of overall bank equity. These findings indicate that for a more complete picture of financial stability and realistic credit risk assessment, SCN contagion needs to be considered. This now quantifiable contagion channel is of relevance for future systemic risk assessments of regulators.

External imbalances played a pivotal role leading to the global financial crisis and were an important cause of turmoil. While current account (flow) imbalances narrowed in the aftermath of the crisis, the net international investment position (NIIP) (stock) imbalances persisted. This study explores the implications of countries’ net foreign positions on systemic risk. Using a sample of 470 banks located in 49 advanced economies, emerging countries, and developing economies over 2000–2020, we find robust empirical evidence that banks can reduce their systemic risk exposure when the countries in which they are incorporated improve their NIIPs and maintain creditor status vis-à-vis the rest of the world. However, only the equity component of the NIIP is responsible for this outcome, whereas debt flows are not significant. Similarly, we find that the mitigating effect of an external balance sheet on systemic risk is derived from valuation gains rather than from the incremental net acquisition of assets or liabilities represented by the current account. Our findings are particularly relevant for policymakers seeking to improve banks’ resilience to adverse shocks and maintain financial stability.

Every financial crisis raises questions about how the banking market structure affects the real economy. Although low bank concentration may reduce markups and foster riskier behavior, concentrated banking systems appear more resilient to financial shocks. We use a nonlinear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to compare the transmissions of shocks under different competition and concentration configurations. The results reveal that oligopolistic competition amplifies the effects of the shocks relative to monopolistic competition. The transmission mechanism works through the markups, which are amplified when banking concentration is increased. The desirable banking market structure is determined according to financial stability and social welfare objectives. Moreover, we find that depending on policymakers’ preferences, a banking concentration of five to eight banks balances social welfare and bank stability objectives in the United States.

We add to the literature on the economic outcomes of government debt and argue that government debt increases crash risk via two channels: (i) hoarding bad news and (ii) tax avoidance. Based on a large international sample, our results indicate that stock crash risk is positively associated with government debt. Our conclusions are robust when we treat endogeneity issues, and our tests confirm the validity of bad news hoarding and tax avoidance as channels through which government debt influences stock price crash risk.

We analyse the double materiality of climate physical and transition risks in the euro area economy and banking sector. First, by tailoring the EIRIN Stock-Flow Consistent behavioural model, we provide a dynamic balance sheet assessment of the Network for Greening the Financial System scenarios. We find that an orderly transition achieves early co-benefits by reducing CO2 emissions (12% less in 2040 than in 2020) while supporting growth in economic output. In contrast, a disorderly transition worsens the economic performance and financial stability of the euro area. Further, in a disorderly transition with higher physical risks, real GDP decreases by 12.5% in 2050 relative to an orderly transition. Second, by extending the concept of climate sentiments, we analyse how firms’ expectations about climate policy credibility affect investment decisions in high or low-carbon goods. Firms that trust an orderly policy introduction and anticipate the carbon tax switch earlier to low-carbon investments. This, in turn, accelerates economic decarbonization and decreases the risk of carbon-stranded assets for investors. Our results highlight the crucial role of early and credible climate policies to signal investment decisions in the low-carbon transition.

In this paper, we examine how employee lawsuits are related to firms’ business decisions. By using union-filed lawsuit data, we document that litigation increases the likelihood of firms downsizing their businesses. Furthermore, cases filed by unions lead to an increase in both the number of store closures and the number of employees affected by these closures. We demonstrate that violations related to labor have a significant negative impact on operating performance. Our findings reveal the fact that the cost of labor, damage to reputation, legal liabilities, and diverted resources resulting from litigation damages firms’ new business opportunities. Overall, our results highlight the importance of employee treatment at the workplace, which affects corporate decisions.

How financial investors may react to policy events related to sustainability and climate change mitigation in particular, is a key question with implications for sustainable finance and financial stability. We address this question by carrying out a multi-period difference-in-difference approach on a confidential database of securities holdings of the European Central Bank, and we provide evidence of several effects related to the Paris Agreement. In aggregate, investors reduced their participation in the equities of high-carbon firms in response to the agreement, and the trend reverted after the US’s announcement of withdrawal from the agreement. However, the reaction varies across categories and geographies of the securities holders, their ownership size, and the emissions of owned firms. In particular, transition risk has been taken up by less regulated financial institutions and the BRIC countries. Our results highlight that the redirection of global financial flows towards climate action requires clear and unanimous signals from the global community of policy makers.

In this study, we examine the trading book of a major dealer in the European unsecured money market, focusing on the impact of a dealer’s own funding liquidity risk on the pricing of his interbank trades pre- and post- the 2007/08 financial crisis. Our analysis reveals two key insights: First, utilizing a panel model, we observe that heightened funding liquidity risks for the dealer generally affect his quoted prices for interbank liquidity. Second, while in tranquil periods this effect is statistically significant but economically less pronounced, the collapse of Lehman Brothers led to a strong liquidity pricing effect: a one standard deviation increase in the funding liquidity risk of the dealer translated to a 11 basis points higher mid-price for overnight liquidity. We thus find evidence that funding liquidity risks exacerbated the overall contraction of money market liquidity during this period.

This paper investigates the pricing of insolvent banks in the U.S. that are sold under the purchase and assumption resolution method of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We consider quarterly data for 444 acquisitions of insolvent U.S. banks between 2009 and 2016. We find that acquirers not only pay higher prices for insolvent banks with larger core deposits, as has been highlighted by the literature (and is consistent with the FDIC’s beliefs), but also for those banks with larger branch networks that are less dispersed geographically. When the acquirers bid (separately) for the assets of the insolvent banks, they place a positive value on the number of branches of the insolvent bank, but appear to be insensitive to geographic dispersion. Acquirers also pay more for banks with a national charter. The results additionally show that failed banks are most likely to be acquired by relatively large and highly capitalized banks whose organic growth is not affected in the years following the acquisition. Overall, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the implications of the purchase and assumption resolution method for the FDIC and for the banking industry.

We explore and summarize the evolution in bank capital regulations and bank risk after the global financial crisis. Using a new survey of bank regulation and supervision covering more than 120 economies, we show that regulatory capital increased, but some elements of capital regulations became laxer. Analyzing bank-level data, we also document the importance of defining bank regulatory capital narrowly as the quality of capital matters in reducing bank risk. This is particularly true for banks that have more discretion in the computation of regulatory capital ratios and are subject to weaker market monitoring.