Knowledge that Transforms

We explore the impact of low and negative monetary policy rates in core world economies on bank lending in four small open economies – Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic and Norway – using confidential bank-level data. We show that the impact on lending in these small open economies depends on the interest rate level in the core. During normal times, monetary policy cuts in the core can reduce credit supply in small open economies. In contrast, when interest rates in the core are low, further expansionary monetary policy increases lending in small open economies, consistent with an international bank lending channel. These results have important policy implications, suggesting that central banks in small open economies should watch for the impact of potential regime switches in core economies’ monetary policy when rates shift to and from the very low end of the distribution.

In this paper, we analyze the effect of a policy recommendation on the performance of an artificial interbank market. Financial institutions stipulate lending agreements following a public recommendation and their individual information. The former is modeled by a reinforcement learning optimal policy that maximizes the system’s fitness and gathers information on the economic environment. The policy recommendation directs economic actors to create credit relationships through the optimal choice between a low interest rate or a high liquidity supply. The latter, based on the agents’ balance sheet, allows determining the liquidity supply and interest rate that the banks optimally offer their clients within the market. Thanks to the combination between the public and the private signal, financial institutions create or cut their credit connections over time via a preferential attachment evolving procedure able to generate a dynamic network. Our results show that the emergence of a core–periphery interbank network, combined with a certain level of homogeneity in the size of lenders and borrowers, is essential to ensure the system’s resilience. Moreover, the optimal policy recommendation obtained through reinforcement learning is crucial in mitigating systemic risk.

The paper studies the effectiveness of bank resolutions using a comprehensive database on banks headquartered in 18 European countries over the period 2000–19. By means of difference-in-differences methodology, we find that impaired asset segregations – otherwise known as bad banks – have been more effective than state-funded recapitalisations of distressed banks. While recapitalised banks seem to have used the injected funds mainly to clean up their balance sheets by reducing problem loans and cutting down on lending, banks that segregated assets increased progressively their lending after the creation of the bad bank. For both types of banking crisis interventions, we find a significant ex-post reduction in the cost of bank funding and shift towards deposit funding.

This paper examines the effects of macroprudential policy (MaPP) on wealth inequality using a large dataset of 171 countries. I find that, after the adoption of MaPP, wealth concentration in the treated countries increases by 3.4 percentage points in a decade. This finding is explained by a rise in the wealth share of the top 1% combined with a sharp decline in the wealth share of the bottom 50%. These effects are stronger for prudential rules based on income, particularly in advanced economies.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) misconduct often negatively impacts firms and damages their reputation. Using data on U.S. listed firms from 2002 to 2018, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to establish board interlocks with firms that have better CSR performance after a CSR-related violation than with other firms. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced in violating firms that have a greater incentive to maintain their reputation than in other firms. We also find that the capital market and the media react positively to board interlock announcements by violating firms. However, we find no improvement in future CSR performance or a reduced likelihood of future CSR misconduct after the formation of such board interlocks. Altogether, our findings suggest that establishing board interlocks with firms that have better CSR performance is an effective signaling strategy for reputation management for firms engaging in CSR misconduct.

In this paper, we gauge the degree of interconnectedness and quantify the linkages between global and other systemically important institutions, and the global financial system. We document that the two groups and the financial system become more interconnected during the global financial crisis when linkages across groups grow. In contrast, during tranquil times linkages within groups prevail. Global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) contribute most to system-wide distress but are also most exposed. There are more links coming from G-SIBs to other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) than the other way around, confirming the role of G-SIBs as major risk transmitters in the financial system. The two groups and the global financial system tend to co-vary for periods up to 60 days Prior to their official designation as G-SIBs or O-SIIs, the prevalent news sentiment about these institutions (we measure with a textual analysis) was negative. Importantly, the systemic importance and exposure of G-SIBs and O-SIIs is perceived differently by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the European Banking Authority (EBA).

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.

We examine how community banks respond to liquidity shocks created by natural disasters. We address community banks’ responses to liquidity shocks due to their focused geographic and economic presence, which coincide with their communities’ exposure to the disasters and the ability of the local banks to meet their needs. We find that community banks respond to liquidity shocks by managing their balance sheet, rather than any single balance sheet account. In particular, we find that they respond to the liquidity needs of their communities by increasing loans as deposits are withdrawn.

In addition to tail macroeconomic events (e.g. wars, financial crises and pandemics), climate change poses a threat to financial stability — with extreme climatic events increasing in frequency and intensity and policy risks putting pressure on asset valuations. We study the effect of a changing climate on asset prices and interest rates through the lens of a dynamic CAPM with rare disasters, time-varying risk and recursive preferences. In our model, a changing climate makes tail events more frequent and less predictable, increasing the premium of climate risk; interestingly, this change may not be fully reflected in the overall market risk premium that includes both components of risk: macroeconomic and environmental. Our results also support the hypothesis of a declining real rate of interest as the planet warms, while the increasing risk of climate policy reduces the participation of brown assets in the market portfolio.

We exploit an exogenous change in the coverage of insured deposits following the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008) to investigate the impact of deposit insurance on the volume, composition and quality of credit union lending. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find changes in the volume, composition and riskiness of credit union lending. Specifically, we find that affected credit unions increase total and unsecured lending, leading to a decline in loan quality. Overall, our results suggest that an increase in the maximum coverage of insured deposits induces credit unions to lend more at the expense of loan quality.