Knowledge that Transforms

We study the impact of the recent government bailout, called Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP), on bank accounting quality. By adopting a difference-in-difference (DID) method, we find a significantly positive impact of TARP on earnings management of recipient banks, compared with their non-recipient peers. Further, we observe that TARP-recipient banks engage more in earnings-decreasing manipulation rather than earnings-increasing manipulation. This behavior is more obvious for those banks that voluntarily request for TARP funds. Also, participant banks change their accounting strategy to manipulate earnings upwards after TARP funds are paid back. Our findings confirm our hypothesis that TARP-recipient banks are motivated to manipulate downwards (or hide some earnings) to obtain further favorable treatment by the program administrators.

Using a sample of banks from 36 countries, we document that accounting enforcement is negatively related to bank risk-taking. We also provide evidence that accounting enforcement enhances bank stability during the crisis. In addition, we show that banks assume less risk through more conservative lending decisions and a reduction in complexity in jurisdictions with higher accounting enforcement. Our results show that formal institutions such as accounting enforcement are associated with bank financial decisions and risk-taking behavior.

We investigate the linkages between cultural factors and financial exclusion using detailed data from the 2013 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Controlling for a large number of demographic characteristics and background factors, we find that Catholics are more likely to be excluded from basic banking services. In contrast, Jewish and religiously unaffiliated individuals are more likely to participate in retirement plans and the stock market. More importantly, we obtain economically important effects of social participation on financial exclusion. In particular, we document that individuals exhibiting a pro-social religious behavior, proxied by charitable giving, are less likely to be financially excluded. This effect remains robust to the use of earlier waves of the PSID, as well as to alternative estimation techniques which account for endogeneity of charitable giving and unobserved households’ heterogeneity. Our findings highlight the need for the development of initiatives which promote social participation as a means of combating financial exclusion.

We investigate whether or not monetary aggregates are important in determining output. In addition to the official Simple Sum measure of money, we employ the sophisticated weighted Divisia aggregate. We also investigate whether or not the influence of money on output is time varying using data-driven procedures to identify breaks in the data and conduct estimations for the different segments defined by these breaks. We find that structural breaks do exist in some of the variables under investigation and these do influence the relationship between monetary aggregates and output. However, the official Simple Sum aggregate appears to be more affected by the breaks than the theoretically superior Divisia aggregate. In particular, our results show that in some segments of our data, the Simple Sum aggregate does not influence output significantly whereas the Divisia aggregate maintains a significant relationship with output in all segments. We conclude that Divisia money is still influencing output in spite of the diminished role played in monetary policy. Our investigation also suggests that the recovery from the financial crisis using quantitative easing would have been faster if money was not being hoarded.

Firms have greatly increased their cash holdings since the mid-1990s. These holdings have an opportunity cost; i.e., allocating firm financial capital into monetary deposits means that investment in real assets is reduced. Traditional measures of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) do not take into account these holdings of monetary assets. Given the recent large increases in these holdings in the U.S. and other advanced economies, it is expected that adding these monetary assets to the list of traditional sources of capital services will reduce the TFP of the business sector. We measure this effect for the U.S. corporate and non-corporate business sectors.

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.

This paper provides evidence of the impact of the new European bank resolution regime on the sovereign-bank nexus. The implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) is considered as an exogenous shock which provides the setting for a natural experiment. This investigation tests the financial markets’ perception of the effectiveness of the new rules in weakening the tight interconnectedness between sovereign and bank risk. A Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach is adopted, building evidence from the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market for banks and non-financial corporates over the period 2011-18. The main findings do not indicate a significant weakening in the interaction between bank and sovereign CDS spreads, compared to the corresponding evidence for the non-financial corporate sector. An overall narrowing of the gap between bank and sovereign risk occurs, which initially implies a lack of credibility of the BRRD in financial markets. However, substantial cross-country variations are identified, particularly for Italy and non-euro area countries. These insights make a significant contribution to the policy debate on effective regulation of the sovereign-bank nexus, in the light of recent developments in the EU post-crisis reform agenda.

We investigate the relation between national cultural values and bank risk. Despite the rigid transnational regulatory oversight of systemic European banks, we find evidence of an economically significant association between cultural values and domestic bank risk. Specifically, we report a positive (negative) association between the cultural values of individualism and hierarchy (trust) and domestic bank risk-taking. Consistent with our predictions, this relation weakened during the recent financial crisis and does not hold for global banks, regardless of the period under investigation. Our findings are robust to endogeneity tests that mitigate concerns regarding reverse causality and confounding effects affecting our conclusions.

This paper analyses the impact of credit information sharing on financial stability, drawing special attention to its interactions with credit booms. A probit estimation of financial vulnerability episodes—identified by jumps in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans—is run for a sample of 159 countries divided into two sub-samples according to their level of development: 80 advanced or emerging economies and 79 less developed countries. The results show that: i) credit information sharing reduces financial fragility for both groups of countries; ii) for less developed countries, the main effect is the direct effect (reduction of NPL ratio once credit boom is controlled), suggesting a portfolio quality effect; iii) credit information sharing also mitigates the detrimental impact of a credit boom on financial fragility but this result holds only for advanced and emerging countries and for household credit booms; and iv) the depth of information sharing has a negative impact on the likelihood of credit booms (but not the coverage of IS).

We assess the role of banks to the transmission of optimal and exogenous changes in fiscal policy to the economy. We built-up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with patient and impatient agents, banks and a government to find that banks and their associated capital-adequacy constraint mitigate the negative spill-over effects to the economy from higher taxes. Specifically, we confirm that labour income tax is the most distortionary fiscal instrument. The optimal choice of a housing tax is the most favorable funding source to a temporary increase in public spending. The combination of housing and labour taxes is the most preferred tax bundle to be optimally chosen under negative output shocks. Moreover, a permanent increase in housing tax is beneficial if it is welfare enhancing and the existence of banks benefits mainly impatient households under permanently higher consumption taxes. Finally, these results remain robust to various robustness checks.