Knowledge that Transforms

This paper aims at investigating first, the (possibly time-varying) empirical relationship between price and financial stability, and second, the effects of some macro and policy variables on this relationship in the United States and the Eurozone. Three empirical methods are used to examine the relevance of A.J. Schwartz's “conventional wisdom” that price stability would yield financial stability. Using simple correlations and VAR and Dynamic Conditional Correlations, we reject the hypotheses that price stability is positively correlated with financial stability and that the correlation is stable over time. The latter result and the analysis of the determinants of the link between price stability and financial stability cast some doubt on the appropriateness of the “leaning against the wind” monetary policy approach.

Using a unique firm-level sample of approximately 700,000 firm-year observations of German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), this study seeks to identify the effect of bank market power on aggregate growth components. We test for a pre-crisis sample whether bank market power spurs or hinders the reallocation of resources across informationally opaque firms. Identification relies on the dependence on external finance in each industry and the regional demarcation of regional banking markets in Germany. The results show that bank markups spur aggregate SME growth, primarily through technical change and the reallocation of resources. Banks seem to need sufficient markups to generate the necessary private information to allocate financial funds efficiently.

The inability to see and quantify systemic financial risk comes at an immense social cost. Systemic risk in the financial system arises to a large extent as a consequence of the interconnectedness of its institutions, which are linked through networks of different types of financial contracts, such as credit, derivatives, foreign exchange, and securities. The interplay of the various exposure networks can be represented as layers in a financial multi-layer network. In this work we quantify the daily contributions to systemic risk from four layers of the Mexican banking system from 2007 to 2013. We show that focusing on a single layer underestimates the total systemic risk by up to 90%. By assigning systemic risk levels to individual banks we study the systemic risk profile of the Mexican banking system on all market layers. This profile can be used to quantify systemic risk on a national level in terms of nation-wide expected systemic losses. We show that market-based systemic risk indicators systematically underestimate expected systemic losses. We find that expected systemic losses are up to a factor of four higher now than before the financial crisis of 2007–2008. We find that systemic risk contributions of individual transactions can be up to a factor of one thousand higher than the corresponding credit risk, which creates huge risks for the public. We find an intriguing non-linear effect whereby the sum of systemic risk of all layers underestimates the total risk. The method presented here is the first objective data-driven quantification of systemic risk on national scales that reveal its true levels.

Standard banking theory suggests that there exists an optimal level of credit risk that yields maximum bank profit. We identify the optimal level of risk-weighted assets that maximizes banks’ returns in the full sample of US banks over the period 1996–2011. We find that this optimal level is cyclical for the average bank, being higher than the realized credit risk in relatively stable periods with high profit opportunities for banks but quickly decreasing below the realized in periods of turmoil. We place this cyclicality into the nexus between bank risk and monetary policy. We show that a contractionary monetary policy in stable periods, where the optimal credit risk is higher than the realized credit risk, increases the gap between them. An increase in this gap also comes as a result of an expansionary monetary policy in bad economic periods, where the realized risk is higher than the optimal risk.

We assess the role that monetary policy plays in the decision to default using a General Equilibrium model with collateralized loans, trade in fiat money and production. The monetary authority extends long-term credit against risky collateral along with its traditional monetary operations. The value of collateral depends on traditional monetary policy and agents can optimally choose to default depending on the relative value of the collateral to the face value of the loan. Default results in foreclosure, higher borrowing costs, inefficient investment and a decrease in total output. We show that pre-crisis contractionary monetary policy interacts with Fisherian debt-deflation dynamics and can increase the probability that a crisis occurs.

Using data for 48 advanced and emerging market economies during 1985–2008, this paper examines the impact of measures of financial integration and globalization on several dimensions of real activity. We find that both advances in financial integration and globalization are associated with higher growth, lower growth volatility, and lower probabilities of severe declines in real activity, with the positive impact of financial integration on macroeconomic stability enhanced by improvements in corporate governance. Thus, we find no evidence of a trade-off between advances in financial integration, globalization, and growth and macroeconomic stability.

In a model where banks play an active role in monitoring borrowers, we analyze the impact of securitization on bankers’ incentives across different macroeconomic scenarios. We show that securitization can be part of the optimal financing scheme for banks, provided banks retain an equity tranche in the sold loans to maintain proper incentives. In economic downturns however securitization should be restricted. The implementation of the optimal solvency scheme is achieved by setting appropriate capital charges through a form of capital insurance, protecting the value of bank capital in downturns, while providing additional liquidity in upturns.

The excessive increase of leverage, i.e. the abuse of debt financing, is considered one of the primary factors in the default of financial institutions since it amplifies potential investment losses. On the other side, portfolio diversification acts to mitigate these losses. Systemic risk results from correlations between individual default probabilities that cannot be considered independent. Based on the structural framework by Merton (1974), we propose a model in which these correlations arise from overlaps in banks’ portfolios. Our main result is the finding of a critical level of diversification that separates two regimes: (i) a safe regime in which a properly chosen diversification strategy offsets the higher systemic risk engendered by increased leverage and (ii) a risky regime in which an inadequate diversification strategy and/or adverse market conditions, such as market size, market volatility and time horizon, cannot compensate the same increase in leverage. Our results are of relevance for financial regulators especially because the critical level of diversification may not coincide with the one that is individually optimal.

We analyze three databases of banking crises and investigate their consistency in the identification and timing of crises. We find that there are large and statistically significant discrepancies between the datasets. We also compare the dating of banking crises according to these databases using information on the number and size of bank failures for four crises for which the timing strongly differs across these databases. We conclude that information on these variables allows determining the timing of banking crises more precisely. Our dating of the four crises corresponds closely with that of Laeven and Valencia.

We analyze the emergence of systemic risk in a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets. The model incorporates multiple sources of systemic risk, including size of financial institutions, direct exposure from interbank lendings, and asset fire sales. We suggest a new macroprudential risk management approach building on a system wide value at risk (SVaR). Under the SVaR metric, the contribution of individual banks to systemic risk is well defined and can be approximated by a Shapley value-type measure. We show that, in a SVaR regime, a fair systemic risk charge which is proportional to a bank's individual contribution to systemic risk diverges from the optimal macroprudential capitalization of the banks from a planner's perspective. The results have implications for the design of macroprudential capital surcharges.