Knowledge that Transforms

We critically review the state of the art in macro stress testing, assessing its strengths and weaknesses. We argue that, given current technology, macro stress tests are ill-suited as early warning devices, i.e. as tools for identifying vulnerabilities during seemingly tranquil times and for triggering remedial action. By contrast, as long as properly designed, stress tests can be quite effective as crisis management and resolution tools. We also see additional side benefits, stemming largely from the way such tests can discipline thinking about financial stability. We suggest possible ways to improve their performance.

To mitigate potential contagion from future banking crises, the European Commission recently proposed a framework which would provide for the bail-in of bank creditors in the event of failure. In this study, we examine this framework retrospectively in the context of failed European banks during the global financial crisis. Empirical findings suggest that equity and subordinated bond holders would have been the main losers from the €535 billion impairment losses realized by failed European banks. Losses attributed to senior debt holders would, on aggregate, have been proportionally small, while no losses would have been imposed on depositors. Cross-country analysis, incorporating stress-tests, reveals a divergence of outcomes with subordinated debt holders wiped out in a number of countries, while senior debt holders of Greek, Austrian and Irish banks would have required bail-in.

The global financial crisis brought government guarantees to the forefront of the debate. Based on a review of frictions that hinder financial contracting, this paper concludes that the common justifications for government guarantees—i.e., principal-agent frictions or un-internalized externalities in an environment of risk neutrality—are flawed. Even where risk is purely idiosyncratic—and thus diversifiable in principle—government guarantees (typically granted via development banks/agencies) can be justified if private lenders are risk averse and because of the state's comparative advantage over markets in resolving the collective action frictions that hinder risk spreading. To exploit this advantage while keeping moral hazard in check, however, development banks/agencies have to price their guarantees fairly, crowd in the private sector, and reduce their excessive risk aversion. The latter requires overcoming agency frictions between managers and owner (the state), which would likely entail a significant reshaping of development banks’ mandates, governance, and risk management systems.

This paper presents a new view on the gold price of greenbacks during and after the American Civil War by analyzing exchange-rate volatility rather than exchange-rate levels. Our empirical investigation detects regimes of high and low volatility alternating in a way that is consistent with a theoretical exchange-rate model in which the rate is primarily driven by investors’ expectations and not by fundamentals. We interpret these findings as evidence that monetary policy makers were surprisingly able to credibly announce the resumption to gold half a year before it actually took place on January 1, 1879. Given the intense political debate about the appropriate design of the United States’ financial system, this is a remarkable result. It indicates that the policy makers’ ability to anchor investors’ expectations is relevant to achieving asset-price stability as well as effectiveness of financial market regulation. The insights from this historical episode should therefore be of interest to policy makers and regulators combating financial crises like the ongoing current debt crises worldwide.

This paper studies the impact of the subprime crisis on the ratings issued by the rating agencies in evaluating the solvency of banks. After ascertaining a significant worsening of ratings after the crisis, the paper hypothesises the possibility that this worsening is due not exclusively to a deterioration in the banks’ credit quality, but also to a change in the behaviour of the rating agencies. The study designs a methodology to separate the observed change in ratings into two multiplicative components: one associated with the deterioration of the banks’ solvency itself and another associated with the change in the agencies’ valuation criteria. The methodology is applied to the Spanish Banking System during the period 2000–2009. The results obtained show that the observed lowering of ratings (10.88%) is explained (75%) by the deterioration in the solvency of the banks, but also (25%) by the hardening of the valuation criteria adopted by the agencies. This shows the procyclical character of ratings.

We explore one channel through which interest-rate derivatives usage affects loan growth positively in bank holding companies (BHCs). If interest-rate derivatives usage allows a BHC to substitute more freely among sources of funds, then its reliance on less interest-rate-sensitive sources such as core deposits should be lower. We test the hypothesis that if BHCs use interest-rate derivatives to reduce the adverse effects of interest-rate uncertainty on lending, then their loan growth should be less sensitive to core deposit growth. We find that loan growth is less sensitive to core deposit growth for interest-rate derivatives users than for non-users and that this sensitivity is lower when the extent of derivatives usage is higher. One important implication is that the funding flexibility enjoyed by BHCs using interest-rate derivatives should allow these BHCs to provide a smoother and higher level of intermediation, leading to more stable loan growth and greater economic stability.

We examine the evolution of credit risk co-dependence in the banking sectors of over 65 countries. We find that there has been a significant increase in default risk co-dependence over the 3-year period leading up to the financial crisis. We also find that countries that are more integrated with liberalized financial systems have seen a greater rise in co-dependence in their banking sectors. This negative effect of financial openness is mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.

We examine the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on lending relationships and credit market efficiency. CDS insulate lenders against losses from forcing borrowers into default and liquidation. This improves the credibility of foreclosure threats, which can have positive implications for borrower incentives and credit availability ex ante. However, lenders may also abuse their enhanced bargaining power vis-à-vis borrowers and extract excessive rents in debt renegotiations. If this hold up threat becomes severe, borrowers will be reluctant to agree to debt maturity designs or control rights transfers that would have been optimal in the absence of CDS markets. The introduction of CDS markets may then ultimately tighten credit constraints and be detrimental to welfare. Our analysis yields a number of empirical implications, some of which have been tested.

This paper uses Eurobarometer survey data from 26 EU countries to evaluate whether the general public cares about financial stability and imbalances over and above their effects on macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and inflation. I confirm previous results in the literature that life satisfaction – a widely used measure of household welfare – negatively depends on the unemployment rate. In addition to previous results in the literature, I establish a strong empirical link between life satisfaction and consumer confidence as measured by the European Commission consumer survey. The main result of the paper is that life satisfaction generally does not systematically depend on a number of measures of financial imbalance based on credit and asset prices once the other macroeconomic controls are included.

This paper analyzes the channels through which financial liberalization affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4333 banks in 83 countries. Our results indicate that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Financial liberalization promotes stronger bank competition that increases risk-taking incentives in developed countries, whereas in developing countries it increases bank risk by expanding opportunities to take risk. Capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalization on financial stability in both developed and developing countries. However, official supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries.