Knowledge that Transforms

This paper analyzes how different types of bank funding affect the extent to which banks ration credit to borrowers, and the impact that capital requirements have on that rationing. Using an extension of the standard Stiglitz–Weiss model of credit rationing, unsecured wholesale finance is shown to amplify the credit market impact of capital requirements as compared to funding by retail depositors. Unsecured finance surged in the pre-crisis years, but is increasingly replaced by secured funding. The collateralization of wholesale funding is found to expand the extent of credit rationing.

Using a vector-autoregression (VAR) model and data from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers, we provide evidence on the importance of news and consumers’ beliefs for housing-market dynamics and aggregate fluctuations. We document that innovations to News on Business Conditions generate hump-shaped responses in house prices and other macroeconomic variables. We also show that innovations to Expectations of Rising House Prices are particularly important in explaining the path of macroeconomic variables during housing booms. To disentangle the effects of News on Business Conditions from other sources of expectation-driven cycles, we estimate a VAR where the News variable is ordered first. Innovations to News on Business Conditions generate Expectations of Rising House Prices. However, during housing booms, innovations to Expectations of Rising House Prices unrelated to News on Business Conditions account for a large part of macroeconomic fluctuations. Shocks to News and Expectations account together for more than half of the forecast error variance of house prices, and other macroeconomic variables, during periods of booms in house prices.

Although state-owned banks are expected to promote the growth of less-developed regions, especially in developing economies, several cross-country studies report that lending by state banks is associated with the inefficient allocation of credit and low levels of development. Further, state banks have been found to lend to their cronies, especially around elections. In this paper, we study the lending activities of state-owned and private banks during the period 1992–2010 and analyze the relationship between the credit these banks provide and local economic growth in Turkey during crisis periods and in election years. We find that the share of state-owned banks in the credit market in crisis periods and local election years is significantly higher than their share in non-crisis and non-election periods. The per capita real credit that state-owned banks provide during crisis years is found to be positively associated with local growth in all provinces. Our results suggest that although state-owned banks might issue loans for political reasons in election periods, they also seem to play an important role in offsetting the adverse effects of economic shocks, especially in developed provinces.

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995–2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at bank holding company (BHC)-affiliated banks, where subordinated debt holders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.

This study constructs a financial stress index for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia and examines the relationship between financial stress and economic activity. The financial stress index incorporates banking sector fragility, time varying stock market return volatility, sovereign debt spreads, an exchange market pressure index, and trade credit. These variables seem to capture key aspects of financial stress in sample countries as the index peaks at known financial crises in these countries. We then examine the relationship between financial stress and economic activity. Impulse response functions based on bivariate VARs show a significant relationship between financial stress and some measures of economic activity. Overall, the constructed financial stress index provides valuable information on the state of the economy and economic activity.

Few areas of monetary economics have been studied as extensively as the transmission mechanism. The literature on this topic has evolved substantially over the years, following the waxing and waning of conceptual frameworks and the changing characteristics of the financial system. In this paper, taking as a starting point a brief overview of the extant work on the interaction between capital regulation, the business cycle and the transmission mechanism, we offer some broader reflections on the characteristics of the transmission mechanism in light of the evolution of the financial system. We argue that insufficient attention has so far been paid to the link between monetary policy and the perception and pricing of risk by economic agents—what might be termed the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy. We develop the concept, compare it with current views of the transmission mechanism, explore its mutually reinforcing link with “liquidity” and analyse its interaction with monetary policy reaction functions. We argue that changes in the financial system and prudential regulation may have increased the importance of the risk-taking channel and that prevailing macroeconomic paradigms and associated models are not well suited to capturing it, thereby also reducing their effectiveness as guides to monetary policy.

This paper measures the systemic risk of a banking sector as a hypothetical distress insurance premium, identifies various sources of financial instability, and allocates systemic risk to individual financial institutions. The systemic risk measure, defined as the insurance cost to protect against distressed losses in a banking system, is a summary indicator of market perceived risk that reflects expected default risk of individual banks, risk premia as well as correlated defaults. An application of our methodology to a portfolio of twenty-two major banks in Asia and the Pacific illustrates the dynamics of the spillover effects of the global financial crisis to the region. The increase in the perceived systemic risk, particularly after the failure of Lehman Brothers, was mainly driven by the heightened risk aversion and the squeezed liquidity. Further analysis, which is based on our proposed approach to quantifying the marginal contribution of individual banks to the systemic risk, suggests that “too-big-to-fail” is a valid concern from a macro-prudential perspective of bank regulation.

In the wake of the subprime crisis of 2007 which uncovered shortfalls in capital levels of most financial institutions, the Basel Committee planned to strengthen current regulations contained in Basel II. While maintaining the Internal Model Approach based on Value-at-Risk, a stressed VaR calculated over highly strung periods is to be added to present directives to constitute Minimum Capital Requirements. Consequently, the adoption of the appropriate VaR specification remains a subject of paramount importance as it determines the financial condition of the firm. In this article I explore the performance of several models to compute MCR in the context of Emerging and Frontier stock markets within the present and proposed capital structures. Considering the evidence gathered, two major contributions arise: (a) heavy-tailed distributions – particularly Extreme Value (EV) ones-, reveal as the most accurate technique to model market risks, hence preventing huge capital deficits under current measures; (b) the application of such methods could allow slight modifications to present mandate and simultaneously avoid sVaR or at least reduce its scope, thus mitigating the impact regarding the enhancement of capital base. Therefore, I suggest that the inclusion of EV in planned supervisory accords should reduce development costs and foster healthier financial structures.

This paper investigates macro stress testing of system-wide credit risk with special focus on the tails of the credit risk distributions conditional on adverse macroeconomic scenarios. These tails determine the ex-post solvency probabilities derived from the scenarios. This paper estimates the macro-credit risk link by the traditional Wilson, 1997a, Wilson, 1997b model as well as by an alternative proposed quantile regression (QR) method (Koenker and Xiao, 2002), in which the relative importance of the macro variables can vary along the credit risk distribution, conceptually incorporating uncertainty in default correlations. Stress-testing exercises on the Brazilian household sector at the one-quarter horizon indicate that unemployment rate distress produces the most harmful effect, whereas distressed inflation and distressed interest rate show higher impacts at longer periods. Determining which of the two stress-testing approaches perceives the scenarios more severely depends on the type of comparison employed. The QR approach is revealed more conservative based on a suggested comparison of vertical distances between the tails of the conditional and unconditional credit risk cumulative distributions.

This paper investigates the dynamics between key regulatory and supervisory policies and various aspects of commercial bank efficiency and performance for a sample of 22 EU countries over 2000–2008. In the first stage of the analysis we measure efficiency by employing the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique. In addition, we employ two distinct accounting ratios to capture the costs of intermediation (net interest margin) and cost effectiveness (cost-to-income ratio). Our regression framework includes truncated regressions and generalized linear models. Moreover, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for robustness using a fractional logit estimator. Our results show that strengthening capital restrictions and official supervisory powers can improve the efficient operations of banks. Evidence also indicates that interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies such as private sector monitoring and restricting bank activities can result in higher bank inefficiency levels. Finally, the evidence produced suggests that the beneficial effects of capital restrictions and official supervisory powers (interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies) on bank efficiency are more pronounced in countries with higher quality institutions.