Knowledge that Transforms

I uncover heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policy on GDP growth distribution by bringing together the literature on the impact of macroprudential policy and recent developments on the use of quantile regressions. I identify important benefits of macroprudential policy on the left-tail of the GDP growth distribution which contrast with the negative effects found in previous studies using conditional mean models. These benefits may offset the deterioration on growth-at-risk produced by the build-up of cyclical vulnerabilities and the materialization of financial crises. I also find that the impact of macroprudential policy is dependent on the position in the financial cycle, the type of instrument, and the time elapsed since its implementation. In particular, tightening capital measures during expansions may take up to two years to show evidence of benefits on growth-at-risk, while the positive impact of borrower-based measures is rapidly observed. Conversely, in downturns the benefits of loosening capital measures are more immediate, while those of borrower-based measures are limited. This suggests the importance of timing in macroprudential policy. Overall, this study provides a useful framework to assess the impact of macroprudential policy in terms of GDP growth and to identify the term-structure of specific instruments.

This article examines how competition between banks and a digital PSP impacts the lending rate and the consumers’ use of payment instruments. The digital PSP offers a digital wallet and payment services, but does not offer credit. In contrast, banks invest their deposits in lending activities, which implies that they may incur some costs of adjusting their liquidity needs when consumers make payments. I show that the adoption of the digital wallet for payments may sometimes increase the volume of payments by bank deposit transfers and the lending rate. This results from banks’ trade-off between lowering their costs of liquidity when consumers pay from their digital wallet and reducing the revenues they receive from bank transfer fees.

We show how external credit market development can affect corporate social responsibility. Using a sample of US public firms over the period 1991–2010, we find that bank deregulation negatively affects CSR performance. We argue that deregulation-induced banking competition enhances credit accessibility, thereby reducing firms’ incentives to pursue CSR as a means of securing stakeholder rewards. Empirical evidence shows that firms increase their use of debt financing in response to the intensified banking competition, and these firms experience a more pronounced decline in CSR performance. We alleviate the potential concern that the observed decline in CSR could be attributed to changes in bank monitoring following deregulation. Further analyses find that firms reduce CSR regardless of their material nature, suggesting that the primary driver of CSR could be the trade-off between costs and returns. Overall, our findings shed light on the strategic motives of CSR, which exhibits adaptability in response to business dynamism.

This paper compares the predictive power of credit scoring models based on machine learning techniques with that of traditional loss and default models. Using proprietary transaction-level data from a leading fintech company in China, we test the performance of different models to predict losses and defaults both in normal times and when the economy is subject to a shock. In particular, we analyse the case of an (exogenous) change in regulation policy on shadow banking in China that caused credit conditions to deteriorate. We find that the model based on machine learning and non-traditional data is better able to predict losses and defaults than traditional models in the presence of a negative shock to the aggregate credit supply. This result reflects a higher capacity of non-traditional data to capture relevant borrower characteristics and of machine learning techniques to better mine the non-linear relationship between variables in a period of stress.

This paper explores the dynamic effects of counterparty risk on stock liquidity using data on unsecured creditors after a debtor has declared bankruptcy. Through matched pair fixed effect panel regressions, we find that liquidity for unsecured creditors reduces after such declarations but only in the short term. This is evidenced by increases in various spread measures and Kyle's (1985) lambda and decreases in the bid depth differentials between the stocks of the unsecured creditors and the matched firms. Additionally, we find the greater the credit exposure, the greater the decline in liquidity. In the long term, debtor bankruptcies appear to have no effect on spread measures. Rather, the market depth for unsecured creditor stocks improves.

We examine the impact of fire sales on the UK financial system through commonly held assets across different financial sectors. In particular, we model indirect contagion via fire sales across UK banks and non-banks subject to different types of constraints. We find that performing a stress simulation that does not account for common asset holdings across multiple sectors can severely underestimate the fire sale losses in the financial system. In addition, pro-rata liquidation strategy would result in a higher level of fire sale losses in the system as whole, but a waterfall strategy may produce a higher spillover effect for a passive institution (or a passive sector) that chooses not to promptly liquidate any of its assets during distress while other institutions decide to do so.

This study examines the role of independent directors’ network centrality in bank risk-taking. Following the shareholder-incentive hypothesis and social-network theory, we predict and find that independent directors’ connectedness is positively associated with bank risk-taking. The results hold after a battery of robustness checks and endogeneity tests. Furthermore, consistent with the influence channel of networks, we show that connectedness empowers independent directors, whereas influential independent directors facilitate aggressive investment. We also find that the risk-taking effects are more pronounced for complex banks and banks with higher equity capital, higher income diversity, and lower cost-efficiency.

We find evidence consistent with risk mispricing in the eurozone sovereign credit market for crisis and non-crisis countries alike, using a novel variable of sovereign debt expansion (DE) that we construct. DE predicts increased default probability, but panel regressions from 2002 to 2017 show a negative association with risk premia, even when controlling for risk appetite and the known determinants of sovereign risk premia. As expected, the negative association was only briefly interrupted by the 2010 Deauville Summit, but it resumed by the onset of the 2011 eurozone crisis. The introduction of quantitative easing in 2015 mutes the negative association, raising the concern of what will happen once quantitative easing ends. Our finding is robust to several model specifications.

A simple macroeconomic model with banking, financial frictions, and flexible exchange rates is used to study the performance of fiscal, monetary and macroprudential policy combinations in response to domestic and external shocks. After characterizing the transmission process of each instrument, a diagrammatic analysis of how these policies should be used, either individually or jointly, to promote economic and financial stability, is provided. The analysis shows that whether a policy should be assigned to internal or external balance, and whether it should be contractionary or expansionary, depends not only on the nature of the shocks impinging on the economy but also on the range of tools available to policymakers and the strength of financial frictions. In particular, in response to an external financial shock, monetary policy should be assigned to external balance, and fiscal policy or macroprudential regulation to internal balance. These two policies are substitutes when used in combination with monetary policy.

Financial institutions, especially in Europe, hold a disproportionate amount of domestic sovereign debt. We examine the extent to which this home bias leads to capital misallocation in a real business cycle model with imperfect information and fiscal stress. We assume banks can hold sovereign debt according to a zero-risk weight policy and contrast this scenario to one in which banks weight the sovereign debt according to default probabilities. Banks are assumed to miscalculate the probability of a disaster state due to moral hazard and imperfect monitoring. This distortion pushes the economy away from the first-best allocation. We show that the zero risk weight policy exacerbates these distortions while a non-zero risk-weight improves allocations. The welfare costs associated with zero-risk weight policies are large. Households are willing to give up 3.2 percent of their consumption to move to the first-best allocation, whereas in the economy with non-zero risk-weights households are willing to give up only 1.2 percent of their consumption to move to the first-best allocation.