Knowledge that Transforms

Few areas of monetary economics have been studied as extensively as the transmission mechanism. The literature on this topic has evolved substantially over the years, following the waxing and waning of conceptual frameworks and the changing characteristics of the financial system. In this paper, taking as a starting point a brief overview of the extant work on the interaction between capital regulation, the business cycle and the transmission mechanism, we offer some broader reflections on the characteristics of the transmission mechanism in light of the evolution of the financial system. We argue that insufficient attention has so far been paid to the link between monetary policy and the perception and pricing of risk by economic agents—what might be termed the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy. We develop the concept, compare it with current views of the transmission mechanism, explore its mutually reinforcing link with “liquidity” and analyse its interaction with monetary policy reaction functions. We argue that changes in the financial system and prudential regulation may have increased the importance of the risk-taking channel and that prevailing macroeconomic paradigms and associated models are not well suited to capturing it, thereby also reducing their effectiveness as guides to monetary policy.

This paper measures the systemic risk of a banking sector as a hypothetical distress insurance premium, identifies various sources of financial instability, and allocates systemic risk to individual financial institutions. The systemic risk measure, defined as the insurance cost to protect against distressed losses in a banking system, is a summary indicator of market perceived risk that reflects expected default risk of individual banks, risk premia as well as correlated defaults. An application of our methodology to a portfolio of twenty-two major banks in Asia and the Pacific illustrates the dynamics of the spillover effects of the global financial crisis to the region. The increase in the perceived systemic risk, particularly after the failure of Lehman Brothers, was mainly driven by the heightened risk aversion and the squeezed liquidity. Further analysis, which is based on our proposed approach to quantifying the marginal contribution of individual banks to the systemic risk, suggests that “too-big-to-fail” is a valid concern from a macro-prudential perspective of bank regulation.

In the wake of the subprime crisis of 2007 which uncovered shortfalls in capital levels of most financial institutions, the Basel Committee planned to strengthen current regulations contained in Basel II. While maintaining the Internal Model Approach based on Value-at-Risk, a stressed VaR calculated over highly strung periods is to be added to present directives to constitute Minimum Capital Requirements. Consequently, the adoption of the appropriate VaR specification remains a subject of paramount importance as it determines the financial condition of the firm. In this article I explore the performance of several models to compute MCR in the context of Emerging and Frontier stock markets within the present and proposed capital structures. Considering the evidence gathered, two major contributions arise: (a) heavy-tailed distributions – particularly Extreme Value (EV) ones-, reveal as the most accurate technique to model market risks, hence preventing huge capital deficits under current measures; (b) the application of such methods could allow slight modifications to present mandate and simultaneously avoid sVaR or at least reduce its scope, thus mitigating the impact regarding the enhancement of capital base. Therefore, I suggest that the inclusion of EV in planned supervisory accords should reduce development costs and foster healthier financial structures.

This paper investigates macro stress testing of system-wide credit risk with special focus on the tails of the credit risk distributions conditional on adverse macroeconomic scenarios. These tails determine the ex-post solvency probabilities derived from the scenarios. This paper estimates the macro-credit risk link by the traditional Wilson, 1997a, Wilson, 1997b model as well as by an alternative proposed quantile regression (QR) method (Koenker and Xiao, 2002), in which the relative importance of the macro variables can vary along the credit risk distribution, conceptually incorporating uncertainty in default correlations. Stress-testing exercises on the Brazilian household sector at the one-quarter horizon indicate that unemployment rate distress produces the most harmful effect, whereas distressed inflation and distressed interest rate show higher impacts at longer periods. Determining which of the two stress-testing approaches perceives the scenarios more severely depends on the type of comparison employed. The QR approach is revealed more conservative based on a suggested comparison of vertical distances between the tails of the conditional and unconditional credit risk cumulative distributions.

This paper investigates the dynamics between key regulatory and supervisory policies and various aspects of commercial bank efficiency and performance for a sample of 22 EU countries over 2000–2008. In the first stage of the analysis we measure efficiency by employing the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique. In addition, we employ two distinct accounting ratios to capture the costs of intermediation (net interest margin) and cost effectiveness (cost-to-income ratio). Our regression framework includes truncated regressions and generalized linear models. Moreover, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for robustness using a fractional logit estimator. Our results show that strengthening capital restrictions and official supervisory powers can improve the efficient operations of banks. Evidence also indicates that interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies such as private sector monitoring and restricting bank activities can result in higher bank inefficiency levels. Finally, the evidence produced suggests that the beneficial effects of capital restrictions and official supervisory powers (interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies) on bank efficiency are more pronounced in countries with higher quality institutions.

This article is a review of a 531 page book that in turn is a review and evaluation of the 2319 page Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by Congress on July 16, 2010. The overriding theme of the book is to pose two approaches to attaining financial stability in the future. One approach is to establish a council of wise men and women supported by an army of highly skilled professional financial economists to formulate and implement regulations designed to prevent future financial crises that wreak havoc on the real economy and require financial support from taxpayers. This is the approach of the Dodd–Frank Act. The second approach proposed by the authors of this book is to design a taxing system that taxes systemically important financial institutions on the basis of their contribution to systemic risk. Borrowing ideas from the literature on the taxation of negative externalities their view is that financial institutions that create crises should pay for the clean-up. They also argue that requiring the financial polluters to pay for the creation of systemic risk will reduce the supply of systemic risk. The reader is invited to decide which approach is best.

We explore the dynamics of default cascades in a network of credit interlink-ages in which each agent is at the same time a borrower and a lender. When some counterparties of an agent default, the loss she experiences amounts to her total exposure to those counterparties. A possible conjecture in this context is that individual risk diversification across more numerous counterparties should make also systemic defaults less likely. We show that this view is not always true. In particular, the diversification of credit risk across many borrowers has ambiguous effects on systemic risk in the presence of mechanisms of loss amplifications such as in the presence of potential runs among the short-term lenders of the agents in the network.