Knowledge that Transforms

We examine various implementation issues related to the calibration of output floors in setting minimum bank capital requirements under the finalized version of the Basel III capital accord. The main raison d’être of output floors is to limit the capital savings enjoyed by large banks due to regulatory arbitrage under the internal model paradigm. We consider regulatory arbitrage through the bank’s incentive to optimize its grading system in order to lower as much as possible the capital requirement given the structure of its asset portfolio in terms of internal ratings and default probabilities. Based on a fictional portfolio of SME loans observed over a full business cycle, we conduct a counterfactual analysis in order to compare the effect of the output floor implemented with respect to two benchmarks: ( i ) a standardized approach calibrated from credit ratings assigned by external rating agencies, as proposed in the finalized version of the Basel III capital accord; and ( ii ) an alternative, more granular, and comprehensive standardized approach benchmark, based on an external grading system that mimics the in-house credit assessment systems used by certain national central banks. Our results show that a more granular, risk-sensitive, benchmark is likely to reduce the effect of the output floor on the minimum capital requirement. We also reveal that output floors exhibit a countercyclical pattern, which is an interesting feature of the mechanism from a macroprudential point of view.

Stablecoins seek to address the high price fluctuations of unbacked cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and Ether. However, recent studies as well as the collapse of stablecoin USTC (Terra) cast doubt on the stability of stablecoins. Using well-known Markowitz portfolio optimization methods, we combine five leading stablecoins into a global minimum variance portfolio that represents a stable aggregate stablecoin (SAS). We find that SAS is much more stable than its constituent stablecoins. Also, in a stress test adding USTC to the portfolio, SAS remains stable with a narrow price range over time. Importantly, the construction of SAS using modern diversification methods has practical implications for the ongoing development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).

We introduce digital currency into a macro model with a banking sector in which financial frictions generate endogenous systemic risk and instability. In the model, digital currency is fully integrated into the financial system . Stablecoin issuance significantly increases the probability of a banking-sector crisis because it depresses bank deposit spreads, particularly during crises, which limits banks’ ability to recapitalize following losses. While banking-sector stability suffers, household welfare can still improve significantly. Financial frictions nevertheless limit the potential benefits of digital currencies. The optimal level of digital currency could be below what would be issued in a competitive environment. In contrast to stablecoins, which are backed by debt, tokenized deposits backed by traditional bank assets improve welfare without harming financial stability . The scope for welfare gains from stablecoins or tokenized deposits depends on how households value the liquidity services of digital currency relative to traditional deposits and on the cost of issuing stablecoins.

We employ a structural model endowed with a banking system in which assets of different qualities, occasionally binding credit restrictions, and regulatory requirements coexist, to analyze the effectiveness of various macroprudential policies that cope with the level of due loans in the economy. We analyze how policy designs influencing impairment recognition by banks affect output and welfare, both in the steady state and across business cycles driven by financial risk. The cost of managing due loans, credit constraints, dividend strategies, and the cure rate, are key components of the driveshaft propelling policies to outcomes. Our findings suggest that “less is more,” i.e. policies emphasizing greater leniency in impairment recognition outperform stricter approaches, when management costs are sufficiently low, especially when combined with high cure rates that enhance the benefits of delaying recognition. However, reducing penalties for banks that violate regulatory requirements proves largely ineffective and exacerbates incentives for non-compliance. The presence of binding credit constraints enhances the effectiveness of lenient impairment policies when management costs are low and diminishes it otherwise.

How do banks react to firms’ climate risks? Using almost 80,000 global syndicated loans originated from 2001 to 2021, we study bank lending to fossil fuel firms vis-à-vis other firms. We find that loans to fossil fuel firms are at least 7 % more costly compared to other firms, and even more so toward the end of our sample. However, loan amounts to fossil fuel firms are approximately 22 % larger, implying heavy financing of brown activities. We show that the pricing effects are even stronger for banks with higher reliance on ESG considerations, consistent with the shifts driven by the supply side (bank behaviour). Overall, our findings corroborate the view that banks price in climate risks but continue to heavily lend to polluting firms in the medium term (with an average maturity of four and one quarter years).

Despite the rising number of green finance policies, the socioeconomic determinants shaping them remain largely unexamined. Drawing from the literature analysing the relationship between regulation, market development and institutional economics , we contend that green finance policy adoption is driven by both market-based and institutional factors. Using a survival analysis approach to understand the levers influencing green finance policy adoption across 188 countries from 2000 to 2019, we find that exposure to the fossil fuel industry predominantly drives the initial issuance of green finance policies. The positive effect of fossil fuel commercial financing on the adoption of green finance policies exists in countries with high and medium climate change awareness levels. Meanwhile, in countries with a low climate change awareness level, fossil fuel government subsidies drive green finance policy adoption. Our study also highlights the role of the financial industry as one of the key actors in the policy cycle of green finance policies via two pathways: (i) affecting financial stability through financing oil and gas companies on primary financial markets and (ii) developing a market for sustainable finance products.

This paper examines the return spillovers between Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) and stocks. While traditional approaches focus on proportional relationships between ETFs and their underlying assets, we develop a high-dimensional network framework that captures spillover effects between any ETF-stock pair, regardless of their compositional relationship. By separating idiosyncratic and systematic risks, we investigate potential drivers of contagion. We document substantial heterogeneity in spillover patterns across sectors, which is previously unaddressed in the literature. Sectors such as Utilities and Real Estate exhibit robust spillovers to both their component stocks and assets in other sectors. Conversely, in sectors such as Consumer Discretionary and Finance , cross-sector influences dominate intra-sector ETF-constituent linkages. Our results also highlight that during periods of high market volatility, sources of idiosyncratic contagion become more diverse, suggesting the need for broader market surveillance beyond the few most influential ETFs.

Using VAR and Local Projections models, enhanced with macroeconomic factors and monetary policy shocks, we investigate the underlying mechanisms through which the Fed’s and ECB’s react to bank reactions of geopolitical risks between January 1994 and March 2024. Our findings reveal that central banks react to geopolitical risk events by tightening monetary policy to fend off potential inflationary pressures. However, the effect is often temporary, as policymakers typically adopt accommodative measures during economic expansions and shift to tighter policies during contractions. Analyzing reactions based on central bank presidents' tenures, we find that while earlier responses were limited, in recent years, both central banks have reacted more strongly and immediately, reflecting their growing concern over geopolitical risks. Furthermore, we document that the Fed adopted a more accommodative stance in response to bilateral geopolitical risk shocks between the US and China, driven by changes in capital flows and trade activities. In contrast, the ECB’s responses were more consistently contractionary, particularly in periods of heightened inflation concerns or when geopolitical tensions threatened price stability within the euro area.

We study how regulation shapes the interaction between financial fragility and bank liquidity management, and propose a rationale for the complementarity between bank recovery and resolution planning. To this end, we analyze an economy in which a resolution authority arranges a bank resolution plan to suspend deposit withdrawals and create a “good bank” at a cost in the event of a depositors’ run. In such a framework, banks find it optimal to establish recovery plans in advance, specifying how to manage liquidity during runs. However, such plans are time inconsistent, and resolution authorities need powers to force their implementation at times of financial fragility .

This study examines the effects of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance on bond return volatility. After controlling for bond characteristics and firm fundamentals, we find a robust positive relationship between ESG performance and bond return volatility. The empirical results demonstrate that the impact on bond return volatility is primarily driven by ESG strengths rather than concerns. The results are robust to alternative measures, sample periods, and endogeneity controls. Furthermore, the effect of ESG performance is more pronounced for firms with opportunistic managers and poor information environments.