Knowledge that Transforms

We propose a model in which banks are exposed to the risk of contagion through their portfolio of loans. We show that a solvency problem in one bank can be transmitted to another if they lend to the same borrower. The novelty is that the channel for the transmission involves banks’ monitoring incentives. The intensity with which all banks monitor a common borrower is reduced when one of the banks suffers a solvency shock. The reduced effort intensity affects the borrower's probability of success and creates a contagion (endogenous correlation) from the balance-sheet of the affected bank to the balance-sheet of the other banks lending to the same borrower. Banks hit by a solvency shock have lower incentives to monitor borrowers because less is left after paying depositors. Banks not hit by a solvency shock face borrowers’ risks entirely on their own, which increases the expected cost of lending. As a consequence, they respond by reducing the monitoring intensity for the common borrower. Bank equity can mitigate the risk of contagion.

International audience

Using data on bank holding companies in the United States and Europe, this paper analyses the impact of capital and liquidity on bank-lending-growth following the 2008 financial crisis, and the new measures inspired by the Basel III regulatory framework. We find that U.S. banks reinforce their risk absorption capacities when expanding their credit activities. Capital ratios have significant, negative impacts on bank-retail-and-other-lending-growth for large European banks in the context of deleveraging and the “credit crunch” in Europe over the post-2008 financial crisis period. Additionally, liquidity indicators have positive but perverse effects on bank-lending-growth, which supports the need to consider heterogeneous banks’ characteristics and behaviors when implementing new regulatory policies.

Syndication increases the overlap of bank loan portfolios and makes them more vulnerable to contagious effects. We develop a novel measure of bank interconnectedness using syndicated corporate loan portfolios, overlap based on industry and region, and different weights such as equal weights, size and relationships. We find that interconnectedness is driven mainly by bank diversification, less by bank size or overall loan market size. Interconnectedness is positively correlated with different bank-level systemic risk measures including SRISK, DIP and CoVaR, and such a positive correlation mainly arises from an elevated effect of interconnectedness on systemic risk during recessions. Overall, our results highlight that institution-level risk reduction through diversification ignores the negative externalities of an interconnected financial system.

We investigate how shocks to the reputation of credit rating agencies and the subsequent introduction of stricter regulation affect investors’ reaction to rating signals. We focus on three major episodes of reputational distress: the Enron/WorldCom scandals, the subprime crisis and the lawsuit against Standard & Poor’s. We document a stronger response of stock investors to downgrades in the aftermath of reputational shocks, which is not, however, accompanied by an improvement in rating quality. Our results are consistent with a scenario where, following evidence of misrating, market investors conclude that ratings are generally overstated and infer greater negative information from downgrades. The effect is stronger for the investment-grade segment, where rating errors have a wider reputational impact. The introduction of new regulatory measures such the SOX Act, the CRA Reform Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, seems instead to improve rating quality and soften investors’ response.

Building on the literature on systemic risk and financial contagion, the paper introduces estimated network linkages into an early-warning model to predict bank distress among European banks. We use multivariate extreme value theory to estimate equity-based tail-dependence networks, whose links proxy for the markets’ view of bank interconnectedness in case of elevated financial stress. The paper finds that early warning models including estimated tail dependencies consistently outperform bank-specific benchmark models without networks. The results are robust to variation in model specification and also hold in relation to simpler benchmarks of contagion. Generally, this paper gives direct support for measures of interconnectedness in early-warning models, and moves toward a unified representation of cyclical and cross-sectional dimensions of systemic risk.

We examine the effect of competition and business cycles on bank capital buffers around the world. We use a dataset of 3461 banks from 25 developed and 54 developing countries over the 2001–2013 period. Banks tend on average to exhibit pro-cyclical behavior. But capital buffers seem to be more pro-cyclical in developing countries. Our results show that more competition leads to higher buffers in developed countries but to lower buffers in developing ones. This evidence suggests that the “competition-stability” thesis adheres in developed economies, whereas “competition-fragility” makes more sense in developing countries. This asymmetric result may have important policy implications, particularly with regard to new, globally-negotiated capital adequacy standards.

We measure systemic risk in the network of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) as the probability that two or more FMIs have a large credit risk exposure to a common FMI participant. We construct indicators of credit risk exposures in three main Canadian FMIs and use multivariate extreme value methods to estimate this probability. We find large differences in the levels of systemic risk across participants. Conditional on the participant being distressed, we re-estimate these probabilities and find that some participants create large exposures to FMIs, resulting in a larger level of systemic risk than the rest of the participants. Our results suggest that an appropriate oversight of FMIs may benefit from an in-depth system-wide analysis, which may have useful implications for the macroprudential regulation of the financial system.

We analyze the link between banking sector quality and sovereign risk in the whole European Union over 1999–2014. We employ four different indicators of sovereign risk (including market- and opinion-based assessments), a rich set of theoretically and empirically motivated banking sector characteristics, and a Bayesian inference in panel estimation as a methodology. We show that a higher proportion of non-performing loans is the single most influential sector-specific variable that is associated with increased sovereign risk. The sector’s depth provides mixed results. The stability (capital adequacy ratio) and size (TBA) of the industry are linked to lower sovereign risk in general. Foreign bank penetration and competition (a more diversified structure of the industry) are linked to lower sovereign risk. Our results also support the wake-up call hypothesis in that markets re-appraised a number of banking sector-related issues in the pricing of sovereign risk after the onset of the sovereign crisis in Europe.

We study the association between daily changes in short selling activity and financial stock prices during extreme events using TailCoR, a measure of tail correlation. For the largest European and US banks, as well as European insurers, we uncover a strong relation during exceptional (extreme) days and a weak relation during normal (average) days. Examining days with large increases in short positions and large downfalls in stock prices, we find evidence of both momentum and contrarian short selling taking place. For North American bank stocks, contrarian short selling appears more practiced than for European bank and insurance stocks. We find that the uncovered relationship decreases with firm size and increases during ban periods, which is in line with short selling becoming more informative when constrained.