Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate debt maturity structure. We find that elevated levels of policy uncertainty lead firms to shorten debt maturity, indicating that firms become more cautious to committing to long-term debt obligations and is suggestive of increased risk aversion during high policy uncertainty periods. However, not all firms react similarly. In contrast to Myers' (1977) prediction, high growth firms lengthen debt maturity during high policy uncertainty periods. The evidence regarding the relationship between debt maturity and credit quality is not non-monotonic as firms with highest and lowest credit quality diverge in terms of debt maturity when policy uncertainty is elevated. Further, larger firms increase their debt maturity, while financially-constrained firms and firms with greater exposure to domicile political environment obtain short-term debt. The results are robust to a battery of tests including the use of instrument variable and placebo analysis.

This paper incorporates endogenous money creation into the liquidity mismatch problem of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We characterize a nominal economy where demandable deposits are created through lending. Depositors use sight deposits to buy consumption goods and the banks manage reserves to clear payments and to offset liquidity risk. We show that deposit contracts are suboptimal in terms of liquidity risk-sharing. We also observe that self-fulfilling runs depend on the refinancing rate of the central bank. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of effective lender of last resort policies to prevent expectational banking panics.

We investigate whether or not monetary aggregates are important in determining output. In addition to the official Simple Sum measure of money, we employ the sophisticated weighted Divisia aggregate. We also investigate whether or not the influence of money on output is time varying using data-driven procedures to identify breaks in the data and conduct estimations for the different segments defined by these breaks. We find that structural breaks do exist in some of the variables under investigation and these do influence the relationship between monetary aggregates and output. However, the official Simple Sum aggregate appears to be more affected by the breaks than the theoretically superior Divisia aggregate. In particular, our results show that in some segments of our data, the Simple Sum aggregate does not influence output significantly whereas the Divisia aggregate maintains a significant relationship with output in all segments. We conclude that Divisia money is still influencing output in spite of the diminished role played in monetary policy. Our investigation also suggests that the recovery from the financial crisis using quantitative easing would have been faster if money was not being hoarded.

We construct Monetary Services (Divisia) Indexes at various levels of aggregation (the broadest of which is M4) from the late 1940s through 1967 employing methods designed to permit these historical series to be spliced to corresponding series currently published by the Center for Financial Stability (CFS), which begin in 1967. The annualized growth rate of our MSI M2 during 1947 to 1967 generally lies between the growth rates of conventional M1 and M2, while the growth rate of MSI M3 is below that of conventional M3 over the same period. Using spliced series, we find that the velocities of the MSI exhibit gradual upward trends from the late 1940s through 1978, with distinct upward shifts in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, while the velocity of conventional M3 trends downward between 1953 and 1982. Using a Fourier demand model, we find elastic substitution between M1 and the non-M1 components of MSI M3 up to 1967, but inelastic substitution between bank and thrift deposits.

Firms have greatly increased their cash holdings since the mid-1990s. These holdings have an opportunity cost; i.e., allocating firm financial capital into monetary deposits means that investment in real assets is reduced. Traditional measures of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) do not take into account these holdings of monetary assets. Given the recent large increases in these holdings in the U.S. and other advanced economies, it is expected that adding these monetary assets to the list of traditional sources of capital services will reduce the TFP of the business sector. We measure this effect for the U.S. corporate and non-corporate business sectors.

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.

We propose a distress measure for national banking systems that incorporates not only banks’ CDS spreads, but also how they interact with the rest of the global financial system via multiple linkage types. The measure is based on a tensor decomposition method that extracts an adjacency matrix from a multi-layer network, measured using banks’ foreign exposures obtained from the BIS international banking statistics. Based on this adjacency matrix, we develop a new network centrality measure that can be interpreted in terms of a banking system's credit risk or funding risk.

This paper studies the incentives of large, sophisticated creditors to withdraw funds during a run on a systemically important financial institution—specifically the famous run on Continental Illinois in 1984. Surprisingly, we find that creditors with relatively liquid balance sheets initially withdrew more than other creditors. As time went on, institutions with relative large exposures were more likely to withdraw, despite government support which included a broad guarantee of all creditors. These findings have important implications for the design of facilities to resolve systemically important institutions in the future.

This paper investigates the optimal monetary instrument in a New-Keynesian model with multiple monetary assets. We compare a standard interest rate rule to a k-percent rule for three alternative monetary aggregates determined within our model: the monetary base, the simple sum measure of money, and the Divisia measure. Welfare results are striking. While the interest rate dominates the other two monetary aggregate k-percent rules, the Divisia k-percent rule outperforms the interest rate rule. Next we study the ability of Granger Causality tests – in the context of data generated from our model – to correctly identify welfare improving instruments. We find the interest rate Granger Causes both output and prices at extremely high significance levels. The same result is obtained for monetary base and the simple-sum monetary aggregate. The test results for Divisia are the weakest as Divisia fails to Granger Cause prices. We conclude that if the choice of instrument is based solely on its propensity to Granger Cause macroeconomic targets, a central bank may choose an inferior policy instrument.