Short sellers are routinely blamed for destabilizing stock markets by exacerbating deviations from fundamental values. In response, regulators periodically impose short sale constraints aimed at preventing excessive stock market declines. One explanation is that policy makers regard short sellers as behaving like positive feedback traders. Relying on the theoretical model put forward by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), which stresses the conditional nature of returns’ persistence, bans on selected financial stocks in six countries during the 2008/2009 global financial crisis are examined. These provide us with a setting to analyze the impact of short sale restrictions on feedback trading. Our findings suggest that, in the majority of markets examined, restrictions of this kind amplify positive feedback trading during periods of high volatility and, hence, contribute to stock market downturns. On balance then, short selling bans do not contribute to enhancing financial stability.

Most discussions of the Greek debt overhang have focussed on the implications for Greece. We show that when additional funds released to the debtor (Greece), via debt restructuring, are used efficiently in pursuit of a practicable business plan, then both debtor and creditor can benefit. We examine a dynamic two country model calibrated to Greek and German economies and support two-steady states, one with endogenous default and one without, depending on creditors’ expectations. In the default steady state, debt forgiveness lowers the volatility of both German and Greek consumption whereas demanding higher recovery rates has the opposite effect. In a second order approximation of the model, conditional welfare analysis shows that a policy of immediate leniency followed by harsher terms as the economy grows is beneficial to both creditors and debtors.

We find that dividend paying firms demonstrate superior corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance in the subsequent year than non-paying firms. This effect can be explained by stakeholder relationship management through CSR, as dividend payout reflects the inherent conflict between shareholders and stakeholders. Specifically, for dividend payers, we find an increase in CSR performance after states adopt constituency statutes which encourage board’s attention on stakeholders, supporting a causal inference of the stakeholder relationship management’s effect on CSR. The increase in dividend payers’ CSR around the constituency statute adoption is more pronounced when management is friendlier to CSR, which lends further support for the stakeholder relationship management channel. We find no support for the short-termism view of dividends or the notion that CSR is solely an outcome of agency problems within firms. In conclusion, our findings suggest that dividend payout serves as a mechanism for balancing shareholder and stakeholder interests, leading to improved CSR performance among dividend-paying firms.

Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) increases the cost of raising equity capital, especially when the economy is weak. A one standard deviation increase in the EPU index developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) is associated with a 43 basis point increase in the price discount of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) during the 2000−2014 period. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the EPU effect on SEO discounts is stronger for firms with greater dependence on government spending, less informative stock price, or a smaller EPU beta. Moreover, there are fewer SEO activities in periods when there is a high degree of policy uncertainty.

By examining the impact of capital regulation on bank risk-taking using a local estimation technique, this paper attempts to quantify for the first time the heterogeneous response of banks towards this type of regulation in banking sectors of western-type economies. Subsequently, using this information, we examine the sources of heterogeneity. The findings suggest that the impact of capital regulation on bank risk is very heterogeneous across banks and the sources of this heterogeneity can be traced into both bank and industry characteristics, as well as into macroeconomic conditions. An important implication of the findings is that common capital regulatory umbrellas are not sufficient to promote financial stability, especially if they are not accompanied by supervisory effectiveness. On the basis of our findings, we contend that more focus should be placed on the actions needed to restrain excessive risk-taking of banks.

We study whether floods can affect financial stability through a credit risk channel. Our focus is onthe Netherlands, a country situated partly below sea level, where insurance policies exclude property damages caused by some types of floods. Using geocoded data for close to EUR 650 billion in real estate exposures, we consider possible implications of such floods for bank capital. For a set of 38 adverse scenarios, we estimate that flood-related property damages lead to capital declines that mostly range between 30 and 50 basis points. We highlight how starting-point loan-to-value ratios are one important driver of capital impacts. Our estimates focus on property damages as the main transmission channel and are also subject to a number of assumptions. If climate change continues, more frequent floods or flood-related macrofinancial disruptions may have stronger implications for financial stability than our estimates so far indicate.

We investigate a simple dynamical model for the systemic risk caused by the use of Value-at-Risk, as mandated by Basel II. The model consists of a bank with a leverage target and an unleveraged fundamentalist investor subject to exogenous noise with clustered volatility. The parameter space has three regions: (i) a stable region, where the system has a fixed point equilibrium; (ii) a locally unstable region, characterized by cycles with chaotic behavior; and (iii) a globally unstable region. A calibration of parameters to data puts the model in region (ii). In this region there is a slowly building price bubble, resembling the period prior to the Global Financial Crisis, followed by a crash resembling the crisis, with a period of approximately 10–15 years. We dub this the Basel leverage cycle. To search for an optimal leverage control policy we propose a criterion based on the ability to minimize risk for a given average leverage. Our model allows us to vary from the procyclical policies of Basel II or III, in which leverage decreases when volatility increases, to countercyclical policies in which leverage increases when volatility increases. We find the best policy depends on the market impact of the bank. Basel II is optimal when the exogenous noise is high, the bank is small and leverage is low; in the opposite limit where the bank is large and leverage is high the optimal policy is closer to constant leverage. In the latter regime systemic risk can be dramatically decreased by lowering the leverage target adjustment speed of the banks. While our model does not show that the financial crisis and the period leading up to it were due to VaR risk management policies, it does suggest that it could have been caused by VaR risk management, and that the housing bubble may have just been the spark that triggered the crisis.