The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) is the standard setting body for the Islamic banking industry. The IFSB, while endorsing the Basel III accord, modified the criteria to calculate the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) to cater for the unique aspects of the Islamic banking industry. In this paper, we calculated the modified NSFR of 136 Islamic banks from 30 jurisdictions between 2000 and 2013 and explored the potential impact the requirements of this ratio has on the financial stability of Islamic banks after controlling for bank, country, and market-specific variables. The empirical findings suggest that the modified NSFR has a positive impact on the financial stability of Islamic banks during the sample period. However, the marginal impact of the NSFR on stability diminishes as the size of the bank increases. The results remained robust after applying an alternative measure of stability and using an alternative estimation model based on an instrumental variable approach. These results validate the use of the IFSB’s modified NSFR for Islamic banks as a regulatory measure.

In financial stability, it is essential to know the determinants of interest rates in interbank markets because they are important vehicles for liquidity allocation among banks and are relevant for monetary policy transmission. Recent research indicates that banks with excess liquidity exercise their market power by rationing liquidity during periods of financial stress. This confirms the value of knowing the banks connections and identifying liquidity spreaders in such markets to manage contagion risk, liquidity hoarding and to preserve financial stability. In addition to well studied bank features such as size, liquidity and credit risk, we study which network metrics relate to interest rates during different periods. Using transaction level data on unsecured and secured lending, we apply an approach that employs network theory, econometric models and machine learning to analyze the structural properties of the secured and unsecured interbank markets in Mexico. Our findings support the “too-interconnected-to-fail” hypothesis. In the secured interbank market, PageRank shows a relationship with interest rates, while metrics associated with the notion of influence and systemic risk (Katz and DebtRank) are relevant in the unsecured interbank market. In general, a bank with high centrality lends at higher rates and gets funding at lower rates.

Despite the rising number of green finance policies, the socioeconomic determinants shaping them remain largely unexamined. Drawing from the literature analysing the relationship between regulation, market development and institutional economics , we contend that green finance policy adoption is driven by both market-based and institutional factors. Using a survival analysis approach to understand the levers influencing green finance policy adoption across 188 countries from 2000 to 2019, we find that exposure to the fossil fuel industry predominantly drives the initial issuance of green finance policies. The positive effect of fossil fuel commercial financing on the adoption of green finance policies exists in countries with high and medium climate change awareness levels. Meanwhile, in countries with a low climate change awareness level, fossil fuel government subsidies drive green finance policy adoption. Our study also highlights the role of the financial industry as one of the key actors in the policy cycle of green finance policies via two pathways: (i) affecting financial stability through financing oil and gas companies on primary financial markets and (ii) developing a market for sustainable finance products.

This study investigates whether deposit insurance affects bank payout policy. To overcome identification concerns, we use the US Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which increased the maximum limit of deposit insurance coverage, leading to significant changes in the proportion of insured deposits to assets of some banks, while leaving others relatively unaffected. In line with the view that dividends convey information regarding financial health, we find that banks, which experience a substantial increase in insured deposits reduce dividends relative to others with a smaller increase in insured deposits. An extensive battery of further tests confirm that our results are not driven by events (such as capital injections due to participation in the Trouble Asset Relief Program, peer effects, state tax changes, deposit insurance pricing changes) that took place around the time of the increase in the maximum limit of deposit insurance coverage. Overall, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that banks holding fewer uninsured deposits pay less dividends.