Knowledge that Transforms

Partial credit guarantee schemes have experienced renewed interest from governments keen to promote financial access for small enterprises, not least as a response to the credit crunch in advanced economies. While the market can find uses for partial credit guarantees, the attractions for public policy can be illusory: indeed their most attractive feature for myopic politicians may be the ease with which the true cost of guarantees can be understated, at least at the outset. In practice, the actual fiscal cost of existing schemes has varied widely across countries and has represented a high per dollar subsidy in some cases. Despite the recent application of some innovative techniques, the social benefit of such schemes has proved difficult to estimate, not least because their goals have been vague. Operational design has influenced the cost and apparent effectiveness of different schemes and has also varied widely. Clear and precise goals, against which performance is regularly monitored, realistic pricing verified by consistent and transparent accounting, and attention to the incentive features of operational design, especially for the intermediaries, are among the prerequisites for such schemes to have a good chance of truly achieving improvements in social welfare.

This study develops a panel probit model to identify the leading indicators of banking distress and to estimate the banking distress probability for EMEAP economies. Macroeconomic fundamentals, currency crisis vulnerability, credit risks of banks and non-financial companies, asset price gaps, credit growth, and the occurrence of distress in other economies are found to be important leading indicators. The model is applied to stress test the Hong Kong banking sector. Simulation results suggest that compared with the period before the Asian financial crisis, the banking sector is currently more capable of withstanding shocks similar to those that occurred during the crisis.

This paper investigates the ex ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.

This paper presents data on 76 partial credit guarantee schemes across 46 developed and developing countries. Based on theory, we discuss different organizational features of credit guarantee schemes and their variation across countries. We focus on the respective role of government and private sector and different pricing and risk reduction tools and how they are correlated across countries. We find that government has an important role to play in funding and management, but less so in risk assessment and recovery. There is a surprisingly low use of risk-based pricing and limited use of risk management mechanisms.

This paper casts the debate regarding the role of asset prices and financial imbalances in the formulation of monetary policy from the perspective of theoretically optimal policy responses. Within the context of a standard model of the transmission mechanism, several possible motivations for responding to financial imbalances are highlighted. However, preventative policy actions against the build-up of financial imbalances cannot be easily understood within such a framework without fundamental modification to the underlying model. It is argued that a more practical way to evaluate such actions is through the inclusion of concerns for financial imbalances explicitly in the central bank's objective function.