Knowledge that Transforms

The global financial crisis that started from 2007 onwards spread around the world and impacted the performance of banks in major economies. Many governments have used a variety of intervention policies to recover their financial systems. By examining the dynamic changes in bank performance before and after government intervention, this study demonstrates the use of the piecewise latent trajectory model. We used the data collected from Bloomberg for banks of five major Asian economies, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, over the eleven-quarter period from the 4th quarter of 2007 to the 2nd quarter of 2010 on six financial performance indicators reflecting solvency, credit risk and profitability. The change patterns of bank performance before/after government intervention during the global financial crisis have been compared among the five economies. Our empirical results indicate that, on average, the bank performance in terms of solvency, credit risk, and profitability improves after government intervention. Moreover, the influence of government intervention on bank performance depends on the evaluative financial indicator, the economy, and whether banks are internationalized. South Korea and Hong Kong have been identified to be the economies with stronger bank performance after government intervention. Policies demonstrated useful in South Korea and Hong Kong have been summarized and discussed.

Against the background of the acknowledged importance of off-balance-sheet exposures in the sub prime crisis, we seek to investigate whether this was a new phenomenon or common to earlier crises. Using a logit approach to predicting banking crises in 14 OECD countries we find a significant impact of a proxy for the ratio of banks’ off-balance-sheet activity to total (off and on balance sheet) activity, as well as capital and liquidity ratios, the current account balance and GDP growth. These results are robust to the exclusion of the most crisis prone countries in our model. For early warning purposes we show that real house price growth is a good proxy for off balance sheet activity prior to the sub-prime episode. Variables capturing off-balance sheet activity have been neglected in most early warning models to date. We consider it essential that regulators take into account the results for crisis prediction in regulating banks and their off-balance sheet exposures, and thus controlling their contribution to systemic risk.

We find that increases in implied market volatility (a proxy for market fear) have a significant impact on returns of bank stocks, above and beyond systematic risk proxied by the expected excess market return during a bad economic regime. Large bank returns are favorably affected by increases in implied market volatility during the crisis, while small banks are adversely affected by increases in implied market volatility. We attribute the different effects among the size-categorized bank portfolios to the perception that large banks are protected by too-big-to-fail policies. Within the sample of small banks, the adverse share price response to increased implied market volatility is more pronounced for banks that rely more heavily on non-traditional sources of funds, use a high proportion of loans in their assets, have a higher level of non-performing assets, and have a relatively low provision for loan losses. The adverse effect of negative innovations in implied market volatility on small bank returns during the crisis is primarily driven by exposure of their loan portfolio to weak economic conditions.

Despite the manifold utilities of monitoring credit default rates, little attention is usually devoted to the underlying default definition. This paper proposes working simultaneously with different default severities, related to several past-due ranges, by means of transition matrices (to be named default matrices). In this way, default, as well as recovery, is depicted in a multidimensional flow, with the purpose of avoiding missing relevant information. The challenge lies on performing comparisons between default matrices, for which new metrics are proposed. In this paper, default matrices are built to measure consumer credit delinquency at four large Brazilian banks, allowing a detailed comparison of their credit migration experiences. The study is also able to draw relevant information from comparisons between estimations techniques (discrete and survival approaches) and between default criteria.

In this paper we present a model of executive compensation to analyze the link between incentive compensation and risk taking. Our model takes into account the loss in the value of an executive's expected wealth from employment if the firm becomes insolvent during a bad state of the economy. We illustrate that a given compensation package may lead to different levels of asset risk under different economic states. More specifically, we show that the positive relationship between equity-based compensation and risk taking may weaken and possibly disappear during systemic financial crises. An important policy implication from our analysis is that similar regulations may have different effects on risk taking depending on the state of the economy.

Bank Resolution Plans (Living Wills) should help with the resolution of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) in distress. They should be used to clarify and simplify the legal structure and make it commensurate with the functional business lines of the institution. Living Wills could also prove the right regulatory instrument to achieve two further innovations in the resolution of SIFIs with cross-border presence. First, they could incorporate burden sharing arrangements between countries enabling burden sharing on an institution by institution basis. However, there would remain problems arising from the incompatibility of the laws governing cross-border bank insolvencies. Many countries are currently introducing special laws covering the resolution of SIFIs. This creates a window of opportunity to use Living Wills to introduce a second innovation: a consistent legal regime for the resolution of SIFIs across the G20 countries.

We analyse UK monetary policy using monthly data for 1992–2010. We have two main findings. First, the Taylor rule breaks down after 2007 as the estimated response to inflation falls markedly and becomes insignificant. Second, policy is best described as a weighted average of a “financial crisis” regime in which policy rates respond strongly to financial stress and a “no-crisis” Taylor rule regime. Our analysis provides a clear explanation for the deep cuts in policy rates beginning in late 2008 and highlights the dilemma faced by policymakers in 2010–11.

We examine whether and how selected central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. We employ a recently developed monetary-policy rule estimation methodology which allows for time-varying response coefficients and corrects for endogeneity. This flexible framework applied to the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada, and Sweden, together with a new financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund, not only allows testing of whether central banks responded to financial stress, but also detects the periods and types of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and quantifies the intensity of the policy response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy rates, mainly decreasing them in the face of high financial stress. However, the size of the policy response varies substantially over time as well as across countries, with the 2008–2009 financial crisis being the period of the most severe and generalized response. With regard to the specific components of financial stress, most central banks seemed to respond to stock-market stress and bank stress, while exchange-rate stress is found to drive the reaction of central banks only in more open economies.

This paper studies institutional structures of prudential and business conduct supervision of financial services in 98 high and middle income countries over the past decade. It identifies possible drivers of changes in these supervisory structures using the panel ordered probit analysis. The results show that (i) more developed, small open economies with better public governance tend to integrate their supervision, especially the prudential one; (ii) more financially developed countries integrate more their supervision; however, greater development of the non-bank financial system leads to less integrated prudential supervision but not business conduct supervision; (iii) the lobbying power of concentrated and highly profitable banking sectors significant hinders business conduct integration; (vi) countries that experienced financial crises integrate their supervisory structure relatively more and (v) greater central bank independence could cause less integration of prudential supervision, but not necessarily of business conduct supervision.

We study whether central bank independence (CBI) and monetary policy arrangements can jointly influence the likelihood of policymakers assigning banking supervision to central banks. Our empirical analysis shows that, assuming a benevolent government, a higher degree of central bank operational (economic) independence is associated with a lower probability of supervisory powers being entrusted to the monetary authority. We interpret this result as deriving from governments’ fear of the risk of excessively discretionary monetary policy. However, there is evidence that – conditional on operational independence – central banks are more involved in supervision when they pursue tighter monetary policy goals (a specific aspect of political independence). Our interpretation is that the latter may represent a commitment to mitigate central banks’ discretion in the monetization of financial distress. Our study suggests that CBI can be relevant, not only for its alleged effects on macroeconomic variables, but also in influencing policymakers’ decisions on the allocation of banking supervisory powers.