Knowledge that Transforms

Although the global financial crisis of 2008 took root in advanced economies, its shocks spread through emerging economies, reflecting the increasingly interconnected global financial system. In this paper, we test the contagion effect at the country level using bilateral data on bank claims between countries. Direct and indirect exposures of emerging economies to crisis countries are empirically measured by using bilateral foreign claims from the Bank for International Settlements, and whether these exposures matter for capital outflows from emerging economies is tested. The findings show that emerging market economies more exposed to banks in the crisis-affected countries, both directly and/or indirectly, suffered more capital outflows during the global financial crisis. We also find that an emerging economy’s financial vulnerability can be influenced by its region’s overall exposure to crisis countries, indicating contagion effects at the regional level. Evidence also suggests that same-region lenders exhibited more favorable behavior toward the regional borrowers during the crisis, with important policy implications.

Shadow insurance is a regulatory loophole exploited by certain insurance groups to increase risk exposure, potentially destabilising the financial system. In this paper, we evaluate the contribution of shadow insurance to systemic risk of the global financial sector using a sample of 215 international insurance entities covering the 2004–2017 period. We detect shadow insurance by examining every reinsurance agreement on the Schedule S filings. Using both ΔCoVaR and SRISK measures, we find that the practice of shadow insurance is a significant driver of global systemic risk.

We study how information disclosure affects financial intermediation when the payoff to the long-term investment is risky. The analysis is based on a business-cycle version of the bank run model wherein a bank provides risk sharing to demand depositors who experience unobservable shocks to their liquidity preferences. The bank pre-commits to the precision of an interim signal regarding the payoff to the long-term investment. We examine the impact of bank disclosure on optimal risk sharing achieved by run-proof, signal-contingent demand-deposit contracts. We show that for utility functions that display non-increasing absolute risk aversion, more informative disclosure improves the ex ante risk sharing provided by financial intermediation.

This study examines the relation between a firm’s supply chain hierarchical position and its information quality. We predict that firms located in a more upstream position within the supply chain network are exposed to greater demand variance, thereby leading to decreased quality of reported earnings and greater uncertainty in the public information available to investors. Consistent with this prediction, we find that firm’s vertical position in the supply chain network is negatively associated with its information quality (i.e., poorer earnings quality and higher stock return synchronicity). Our results are robust to the matched sample analysis, residual analysis, and alternative measures of information quality. We further show that the positive relation between firm’s hierarchical position and stock return synchronicity is more pronounced for firms facing higher information asymmetry. Overall, our findings suggest that a more upstream position in the supply chain network entails not only operational costs associated with amplified demand uncertainty but also costs related to the quality of reported information on which capital providers and other stakeholders rely.

Are government guarantees or financial regulation a more effective way to prevent banking crises? I study this question in the presence of a negative feedback loop between the fiscal position of the government and the health of the banking sector. I construct a model of financial intermediation in which the government issues, and may default on, debt. Banks hold some of this debt, which ties their health to that of the government. The government's tax revenue, in turn, depends on the quantity of investment that banks are able to finance. I compare the effectiveness of government guarantees, liquidity regulation, and a combination of these policies in preventing self-fulfilling bank runs. In some cases, a combination of the two policies is needed to prevent a run. In other cases, liquidity regulation alone is effective and adding guarantees would make the financial system fragile.

While the sovereign-bank loop literature has demonstrated the amplification between sovereign and bank risks in the Euro Area, its econometric identification is vulnerable to reverse causality and omitted variable biases. We address the loop's endogenous nature and isolate the direct bank-to-sovereign distress channel by exploiting the global, non-Eurozone related variation in banks’ stock prices. We instrument banking sector stock returns in the Eurozone with exposure-weighted stock market returns from non-Eurozone countries and take further precautions to remove Eurozone-related variation. We find that the transmission of instrumented bank distress to sovereign distress is around 50% smaller than the corresponding coefficient in the unadjusted OLS framework, confirming concerns on endogeneity. Despite the smaller relative magnitude, increasing instrumented bank distress is found to be an economically and statistically significant cause for rising sovereign fragility in the Eurozone.

This study investigates whether deposit insurance affects bank payout policy. To overcome identification concerns, we use the US Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which increased the maximum limit of deposit insurance coverage, leading to significant changes in the proportion of insured deposits to assets of some banks, while leaving others relatively unaffected. In line with the view that dividends convey information regarding financial health, we find that banks, which experience a substantial increase in insured deposits reduce dividends relative to others with a smaller increase in insured deposits. An extensive battery of further tests confirm that our results are not driven by events (such as capital injections due to participation in the Trouble Asset Relief Program, peer effects, state tax changes, deposit insurance pricing changes) that took place around the time of the increase in the maximum limit of deposit insurance coverage. Overall, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that banks holding fewer uninsured deposits pay less dividends.

This paper investigates the effects of CEO’s social network on bank risk-taking. We document a positive relation between bank CEO’s social connections and bank risks. To address the endogeneity concerns, we use deaths and retirements within networks to perform a difference-in-difference analysis, and find robust results. We also report that well-connected bank CEOs take more risk when more of their social ties are linked to informationally opaque firms and when the labor market offers fewer employment options. In addition, diversity of social ties (professional and educational) helps to mitigate the impact on risk. Finally, this study reveals an inefficient trade-off between bank risk and return, suggesting that executive social networks lead to excessive bank risk.

This paper investigates the link between shocks in the banking sector and aggregate leverage measured by the credit-to-GDP gap. Using a balanced panel of 15 countries for the period 1989–2016, we exploit the approach due to Gabaix (2011) and consider banking granular shocks as an indicator of banking distress. Using methods that account for potential endogeneity, we find that banking shocks Granger-cause aggregate leverage. In particular, banking shocks tend to increase the level of leverage and cause departures of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend.

This paper aims to assess the level of systemic risk of China's financial system along with the main systemic risk contributors over the period from January 2010 to December 2016, a period spanning the deflation of China's property bubble, the banking liquidity crisis, and the stock market crash. To this end we divide the financial system into three sectors, namely: banks, insurance and brokerage industries, and real estate, applying the ΔCoVaR introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) as the measure for systemic risk. Our findings show that the systemic risk level of China's financial system reacted to the main systemic events covered by our sample period, reaching a major peak during the stock market crash of 2015. We further show, through the Wilcoxon signed rank test, that the systemic risk level of the financial system and sectors significantly increased after the main systemic events. In order to provide a formal systemic risk ranking of the financial sectors, we apply the bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov test as developed by Abadie (2002), finding that the banking sector contributed the most, followed by real estate and subsequently insurance and brokerage industries. Finally, comparing banks systemic risk's determinants between China and the US, the reduced level of competition among banks in China is found to increase banks’ systemic risk, contrary to what is found in the US.