Knowledge that Transforms

We present a new framework combining current methods of bank solvency stress tests with a model of fire sales. We apply the framework to the stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority. Fire sales are described by an equilibrium model balancing leverage improvements and drops in security prices. Additional bank losses caused by fire sales are significant and go beyond the trivial fact that with fire sales we will get bigger losses. Ignoring potential fire sales effects may lead to a false sense of resilience by assuming that institutions, which are in fact fragile, are resilient.

This paper investigates the effects of operational hedging on commodity price risks. It explores a novel type of operational hedging, i.e., the natural operational hedge position between upstream crude oil production and downstream activities in the supply chain. Using hand-collected data from 293 unique oil-producing firms, we find that operational hedging is sufficiently effective in reducing firms’ exposure to oil-price risk. We also find an inverse relationship between operational and financial hedging, suggesting that they can substitute for each other.

In response to the Covid-19 crisis, EU leaders agreed on the creation of a €750bn recovery fund (the Next Generation EU, NGEU). We investigate the short-term impact of this landmark deal on bank stocks, sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) and bank CDS. First, we find that stock market investors firmly welcomed the agreement as we find sizeable positive abnormal returns in bank stocks as a response to the NGEU proposal by the European Commission. Spreads on sovereign and bank CDS significantly declined, with more pronounced movements for heavily indebted countries and those that strongly advocated the creation of the recovery fund and for the banks located in these economies. Second, we show that banks’ sovereign exposures towards other European countries, especially those with weaker financial conditions and limited fiscal capacity, play a key role in driving the strength of the stock market reaction. Overall, financial markets responded positively to the credibility of the NGEU policy as an extraordinary common effort to support the post-Covid-19 recovery and enhance economic growth in the region.

Can countercyclical bank capital buffers reduce the negative effects of global liquidity shocks? We use the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as a natural experiment to document the role of the banking system as a transmission channel of global financial disturbances to the real economy. Using central bank administrative data, our results suggest that in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse the banking channel is responsible for 1.44% of the aggregate drop in investment and 0.58% of the drop in aggregate employment. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of counter-cyclical macroprudential policies, we model an open-economy with a banking sector. We compare the drop in actual GDP during the 2008 financial crisis against the counterfactual GDP had Basel III style counter-cyclical capital buffers (CCyB) been in place. We find that the GDP drop in the counterfactual scenario would have been 6 p.p. lower than in the data. We also demonstrate the beneficial effects of the CCyB in mitigating tail risk (GDP at Risk). We show that, over a 3–5 year horizon, the GDP distribution with an operational CCyB would have a higher mean and a much thinner left tail when compared to an economy without a CCyB.

We develop a behavioral New Keynesian model to analyze optimal monetary policy with heterogeneously myopic households and firms. Five key results are derived. First, our model reflects coherent microeconomic and aggregate myopia due to the consistent transition from subjective to objective expectations. Second, the optimal monetary policy entails implementing inflation targeting in a framework where myopia distorts agents’ inflation expectations. Third, price level targeting emerges as the optimal policy under output gap, revenue, or interest rate myopia. Under price level targeting, rational inflation expectations are a minimal condition for optimality under bounded rationality. Fourth, bounded rationality is not necessarily welfare-decreasing and is even associated with welfare gains for extreme cognitive discounting. Finally, our empirical results point to the behavioral model’s superiority over the rational model.

Government interventions as a solution to systemic banking crises continue to receive wide criticism. The new regulatory frameworks advocate banks’ bail-ins and resolutions that do not require governments’ involvement. However, as the recent events with Credit Suisse and Silicon Valley Bank show, the government still plays an active role in rescuing and resolving the bank's problems. We use the financial stability model of Goodhart et al.’s (2005, 2006a) to analyze the effects of various bank policy interventions on banks’ performance during the crisis rescue phase. We then explore whether those interventions work effectively in facilitating bank recovery and whether they reduce systemic risk in the long run. We use a unique granular bank-level dataset from 22 advanced economies covering the 1992–2017 period. We find that bank recapitalization without debt resolution measures does not resolve bank distress. The empirical results document that “bad-bank” resolution is positively correlated with a bank’s recovery as well as lower systemic risk. Those findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the optimal bank resolution architecture during systemic events.

We examine the impact of stock-price formation process on firms’ dividend smoothing using Regulation SHO. We find that pilot firms are more likely to increase dividends and less likely to omit them during the pilot program; however, they are more likely to decrease dividends after the program ends. These firms also smooth less and have higher adjustment speeds. Our findings are more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry, stronger financials, and weaker governance. In general, this study shows that financial markets tend to have a significant and long-lasting impact on dividend smoothing policy.

Prior literature finds that staggered state-level adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) significantly constrains labor mobility. Using the IDD as an exogenous shock to labor mobility, we find that firms headquartered in states that adopt the IDD gravitate towards issuing short-term debt for external debt financing. We examine three mechanisms—default risk, information asymmetry, and agency cost mitigation—through which labor mobility restrictions affect debt maturity. Our results provide support for the information asymmetry mechanism, which suggests that firms are more inclined to use short-term debt when their information environment deteriorates. We find that in the wake of IDD adoption, firms tend to utilize short-term debt only in corporate bond markets and their debt maturity profiles become more concentrated.

We explore interconnectedness in the interbank overnight lending market and propose the liquidity network and the urgent borrower network which capture the urgency to trade. The liquidity network connects the initiating party in a trade to the passive party, while the urgent borrower network connects passive sellers (lenders) to urgent buyers (borrowers). Along with the buyer/seller trading network, we show these networks complement each other, revealing valuable information that improves short-term forecasts of soft and hard information and country-specific yield spreads. Connectivity increases in these networks during raises volatility and boosts volume, revealing the dual nature of interconnectedness—too much interconnectedness may increase systemic risk, but too little may impede market functioning.

In this paper we estimate the optimal level of capital for banks in the euro area. This optimum is the result of a trade-off between the costs and benefits of more bank capital: although higher capital requirements likely lead to higher lending rates, they also reduce the likelihood of banking crises. Our baseline estimates show an optimal risk-weighted capital ratio of around 23%. By varying the assumptions underlying our analysis we obtain a range of optimal ratios from 16% to 31%. These estimates are higher than the current Basel III minimum requirements. We also estimate optimal rates for individual member states and find substantial differences between them. This is primarily due to variation across countries in the resilience of their economies. For this reason we find lower optimal bank capital ratios in countries with more stable economies. Our results show only a modest dependence on the ease with which banks in different member states are able to raise capital.