Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a general equilibrium model that highlights the trade-offs between physical and digital forms of retail central bank money. The key differences between cash and central bank digital currency (CBDC) include transaction efficiency, possibilities for tax evasion, and, potentially, nominal rates of return. We establish conditions under which cash and CBDC can co-exist and show how government policies can influence relative holdings of cash, CBDC, and other assets. We illustrate how a CBDC can facilitate negative nominal interest rates and helicopter drops, and also how a CBDC can be structured to prevent capital flight from other assets.

This study examines the role of independent directors’ network centrality in bank risk-taking. Following the shareholder-incentive hypothesis and social-network theory, we predict and find that independent directors’ connectedness is positively associated with bank risk-taking. The results hold after a battery of robustness checks and endogeneity tests. Furthermore, consistent with the influence channel of networks, we show that connectedness empowers independent directors, whereas influential independent directors facilitate aggressive investment. We also find that the risk-taking effects are more pronounced for complex banks and banks with higher equity capital, higher income diversity, and lower cost-efficiency.

This paper examines the influence of media freedom restrictions on retail depositor behavior during banking crises. Non-professional, retail depositors are particularly affected due to insufficient access to vital information about the banking industry's vulnerability and broad macroeconomic conditions amidst the crisis. Using data from 85 countries from 2004 to 2019, we found that during crises, higher media restrictions lead to an increase in the rate of household deposit withdrawals. If media restrictions hinder depositors from accurately assessing the banking sector’s exposure, there is a higher likelihood of panic-based response in uncertain times brought on by the banking crisis, potentially triggering bank runs. Furthermore, our results reveal that lower banking sector risk can mitigate the negative effect of media restrictions on retail deposit growth during a banking crisis, especially in middle-income OECD and non-OECD countries, countries with stronger institutional environments, and countries with higher financial literacy. As a policy suggestion, promoting financial literacy could help reduce information asymmetry and prevent panic withdrawals, even in environments with significant media restrictions.

We find evidence consistent with risk mispricing in the eurozone sovereign credit market for crisis and non-crisis countries alike, using a novel variable of sovereign debt expansion (DE) that we construct. DE predicts increased default probability, but panel regressions from 2002 to 2017 show a negative association with risk premia, even when controlling for risk appetite and the known determinants of sovereign risk premia. As expected, the negative association was only briefly interrupted by the 2010 Deauville Summit, but it resumed by the onset of the 2011 eurozone crisis. The introduction of quantitative easing in 2015 mutes the negative association, raising the concern of what will happen once quantitative easing ends. Our finding is robust to several model specifications.

A simple macroeconomic model with banking, financial frictions, and flexible exchange rates is used to study the performance of fiscal, monetary and macroprudential policy combinations in response to domestic and external shocks. After characterizing the transmission process of each instrument, a diagrammatic analysis of how these policies should be used, either individually or jointly, to promote economic and financial stability, is provided. The analysis shows that whether a policy should be assigned to internal or external balance, and whether it should be contractionary or expansionary, depends not only on the nature of the shocks impinging on the economy but also on the range of tools available to policymakers and the strength of financial frictions. In particular, in response to an external financial shock, monetary policy should be assigned to external balance, and fiscal policy or macroprudential regulation to internal balance. These two policies are substitutes when used in combination with monetary policy.

The role of bank regulation and supervision (RS) on financial stability and welfare has been subject to ongoing research, especially since the Great Recession. RS is expected to help eliminate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that are abundant in financial transactions. In this paper, we present a general equilibrium model that is augmented by either a bank regulatory and supervisory agent who chooses the level of RS by maximizing bank profits, or by a macroprudential agent who minimizes non-performing loans (NPL). We compare the long-term outcomes of these scenarios and show that minimizing NPL is feasible for a larger and economically more viable range of parameter values than the alternatives. Moreover, for a comparable set of parameter combinations, the optimal choice of RS that minimizes NPL leads to both higher levels of steady state income and lower interest spreads as compared to RS that maximizes bank profits.

Financial institutions, especially in Europe, hold a disproportionate amount of domestic sovereign debt. We examine the extent to which this home bias leads to capital misallocation in a real business cycle model with imperfect information and fiscal stress. We assume banks can hold sovereign debt according to a zero-risk weight policy and contrast this scenario to one in which banks weight the sovereign debt according to default probabilities. Banks are assumed to miscalculate the probability of a disaster state due to moral hazard and imperfect monitoring. This distortion pushes the economy away from the first-best allocation. We show that the zero risk weight policy exacerbates these distortions while a non-zero risk-weight improves allocations. The welfare costs associated with zero-risk weight policies are large. Households are willing to give up 3.2 percent of their consumption to move to the first-best allocation, whereas in the economy with non-zero risk-weights households are willing to give up only 1.2 percent of their consumption to move to the first-best allocation.

SRISK is a measure of a firms' systemic risk contribution that is computed using its listed stock market price. SRISK measurement is extended and applied to firms that do not have listed equity. A mapping from balance sheet characteristics to SRISK for listed firms is applied to SRISK for unlisted European banks. The mapping is validated by comparing SRISK measures for unlisted banks with their losses in European bank stress-testing.

We examine the transmission of international monetary policy shocks via the bank lending channel. Exploiting a panel of regulatory data on foreign banks operating in Australia, we show that the supply of credit is vulnerable to the international pass-through of monetary policy, with banks headquartered in Asia demonstrating high elasticity. Household and non-financial corporate loans are the most susceptible channels to policy shocks, while higher-margin lending, non-lending assets, and reservable liabilities are insensitive. We demonstrate that although banks curtail lending in the face of tighter monetary policy, they increase their non-reservable borrowing, suggesting an increased reliance on capital markets. Finally, we show that unconventional monetary policies have a muted effect compared to traditional measures. • We study the transmission of monetary policy shocks via the bank lending channel. • We exploit Australian regulatory bank data to test for the presence of the BLC. • Household and corporate loans are found to be the most susceptible channels. • Asian banks demonstrate the highest degree of lending elasticity. • Unconventional policies have a muted effect compared to traditional measures.

Using Facebook’s social network data for the US counties, we examine whether social connectedness reduces the informational disadvantage in lending to small businesses at a distance. We find that for a given distance, there is a pecking order of lending. Banks first lend to more socially connected counties, and later, banks expand credit to socially less connected areas. The probability of loan charge-off decreases in social connectedness and more so for the loans originated by small banks. In the cross-section, the positive effect of social connectedness on loan performance is higher for the loans originated by out of state banks. These findings suggest that loan officers get valuable information through their social networks.