Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the commonality in liquidity measures in two stock markets at different stage of development, the Deutsche Börse and the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Using daily data from 2001 to 2016 we show that for the stocks listed on the developed market there exists a strong interaction between Amihud illiquidity and high-low spreads within the whole sample. On the emerging market the interdependency between these measures strengthen as the stock market matures. Since 2008 the aggregate liquidity measures from both markets behave similarly suggesting that commonality in liquidity is strongly affected by the global risk factors. Although the transaction costs on both markets show similar dynamics, on the emerging market they are significantly higher. Both volatility and spreads induce an increase in trading activity. Higher volatility influences spreads.

We investigate the relation between national cultural values and bank risk. Despite the rigid transnational regulatory oversight of systemic European banks, we find evidence of an economically significant association between cultural values and domestic bank risk. Specifically, we report a positive (negative) association between the cultural values of individualism and hierarchy (trust) and domestic bank risk-taking. Consistent with our predictions, this relation weakened during the recent financial crisis and does not hold for global banks, regardless of the period under investigation. Our findings are robust to endogeneity tests that mitigate concerns regarding reverse causality and confounding effects affecting our conclusions.

This paper uses tools from the classical theory of inflation for UK Consumer Price Inflation from 1970Q1 to 2017Q4. In particular, we adopt augmented Phillips curve type equations within a linear and regime-switching framework where regimes are governed by previous inflation rates. Our non-linear models show that a monetary explanation of inflation is prominent during periods of high inflation. However our models imply that during periods of high inflation, The Bank of England should monitor monetary conditions in conjunction with monetary policy stance; as these can help dampen inflation persistence.

This paper analyses the impact of credit information sharing on financial stability, drawing special attention to its interactions with credit booms. A probit estimation of financial vulnerability episodes—identified by jumps in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans—is run for a sample of 159 countries divided into two sub-samples according to their level of development: 80 advanced or emerging economies and 79 less developed countries. The results show that: i) credit information sharing reduces financial fragility for both groups of countries; ii) for less developed countries, the main effect is the direct effect (reduction of NPL ratio once credit boom is controlled), suggesting a portfolio quality effect; iii) credit information sharing also mitigates the detrimental impact of a credit boom on financial fragility but this result holds only for advanced and emerging countries and for household credit booms; and iv) the depth of information sharing has a negative impact on the likelihood of credit booms (but not the coverage of IS).

We assess the role of banks to the transmission of optimal and exogenous changes in fiscal policy to the economy. We built-up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with patient and impatient agents, banks and a government to find that banks and their associated capital-adequacy constraint mitigate the negative spill-over effects to the economy from higher taxes. Specifically, we confirm that labour income tax is the most distortionary fiscal instrument. The optimal choice of a housing tax is the most favorable funding source to a temporary increase in public spending. The combination of housing and labour taxes is the most preferred tax bundle to be optimally chosen under negative output shocks. Moreover, a permanent increase in housing tax is beneficial if it is welfare enhancing and the existence of banks benefits mainly impatient households under permanently higher consumption taxes. Finally, these results remain robust to various robustness checks.

This paper derives the user cost of monetary assets and credit card services with interest rate risk under the assumption of intertemporal non-separability. Barnett and Su (2016) derived theory permitting inclusion of credit card transaction services into Divisia monetary aggregates. The risk adjustment in their theory is based on consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) under intertemporal separability. The equity premium puzzle focusses on downward bias in the CCAPM risk adjustment to common stock returns. Despite the high risk of credit card interest rates, the risk adjustment under the CCAPM assumption of intertemporal separability might nevertheless be similarly small. While the known downward bias of CCAPM risk adjustments are of little concern with Divisia monetary aggregates containing only low risk monetary assets, that downward bias cannot be ignored, once high risk credit card services are included. We believe that extending to intertemporal non-separability could provide a non-negligible risk adjustment, as has been emphasized by Barnett and Wu (2015). In this paper, we extend the credit-card-augmented Divisia monetary quantity aggregates to the case of risk aversion and intertemporal non-separability in consumption. Our results are for the “representative consumer” aggregated over all consumers. While credit-card interest-rate risk may be low for some consumers, the volatility of credit card interest rates for the representative consumer is high, as reflected by the high volatility of the Federal Reserve’s data on credit card interest rates aggregated over consumers. One method of introducing intertemporal non-separability is to assume habit formation. We explore that possibility.

We formulate and test hypotheses about how lead banks of syndicated loans use private information about loan quality, the Signaling and Sophisticated Syndicate Hypotheses. We measure private information using Shared National Credit (SNC) internal loan ratings made comparable using concordance tables. As outcomes, we use proportions of loans retained by lead banks from SNC and rate spreads on the loans from DealScan. We find favorable private information is associated with higher retention and lower spreads for pure term loans, supporting the Signaling Hypothesis. Only lower spreads occur for pure revolvers, likely because their syndicates more often include large sophisticated banks.

Banks use different risk management practices with varying levels of sophistication. This paper examines the factors that determine the choice of risk-management practices. In a theoretical model, we identify two main determinants for the choice of risk management tools: bank competition and sector concentration in the loan market. We empirically test the predictions of our model using hand-collected data on the credit risk management of 249 German savings banks. The results are in line with our theory: Competition pushes banks to implement advanced risk management practices. Sector concentration in the loan market promotes credit portfolio modeling, but it inhibits credit risk transfer.

I use the staggered passage of creditor rights reforms in 13 countries to examine how changes in creditor rights affect (a) bank stability and (b) the bank market power-stability relationship. (a) There is statistically weak evidence that stronger creditor rights enhance bank stability; the result is not robust across specifications. (b) Market power positively affects stability. However, there is asymmetry in the effect of market power on stability, depending on whether there is an increase or a decrease in creditor rights. The market power-stability relationship is stronger when a country weakens its creditor rights vis-á-vis when it strengthens its creditor rights.

Non-financial corporations typically cite risk management as the primary reason for their derivatives use. If hedging programs are effective, then firms using derivatives should have lower credit risk than those that do not. Consistent with this idea, we find that CDS spreads are lower for firms with derivatives positions that are designated as accounting hedges (typically low basis risk) compared to firms without the accounting hedge designation as well as firms that do not use derivatives. Surprisingly, we find that firms with derivatives positions without a hedge accounting designation have higher CDS spreads than firms that do not hedge with derivatives at all. We do not find evidence that these non-designated positions are associated with future credit realizations, as captured by changes in either credit ratings or CDS spreads. We examine alternative explanations and find evidence that is consistent with a market penalty for high basis risk positions when overall market conditions are poor.