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Expectation-driven house prices and debt defaults: The effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 49, 100760
We embed non-fundamental house price expectation shocks and endogenous mortgage defaults into a DSGE model with a housing and banking sector. We use our DSGE set-up to study the impact of variations in house price expectations upon macroeconomic dynamics and their implications for monetary and macroprudential policies. Model simulations show that an increase in expected future house prices leads to a decline in mortgage defaults and interest rates on loans, whereas it leads to an increase in house prices, household debt, bank leverage ratios and economic activity. Interestingly, a positive fundamental housing preference shock causes a rise in inflation, whilst a positive non-fundamental shock to house prices generates a decline in inflation. We demonstrate that even though monetary policy reacting to household credit growth improves the stability of the real economy, yet it jeopardizes price stability. Finally, we show that the effectiveness of monetary versus macroprudential policy depends on whether the economy is affected by non-fundamental or fundamental shocks.

Do short sellers exploit risky business models of banks? Evidence from two banking crises

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 46, 100719
We find that changes in short interest predict banks’ stock returns during two recent banking crises. Furthermore, before the 2007–2008 crisis, short interest increased more for banks with worse performance during the Long-Term Capital Management crisis of 1998. We also find that changes in short interest predicted banks’ loan quality and default risk during the 2007–2008 crisis. The results are stronger for banks with higher levels of risk-taking. Overall, our findings indicate that short sellers were informed about the persistent risky business models of banks and shorted those banks before the 2007–2008 crisis.

Systemic risk and financial stability dynamics during the Eurozone debt crisis

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 47, 100723
Based on the twin sovereign-banking crisis nexus evolution of the Euro debt crisis era, we address the (volatility) mitigation of credit risk, measured by Credit Default Swap spreads (CDS) in both the banking and sovereign sectors within the Eurozone and the US/UK. Secondly, we highlight the volatility interconnectedness or the risk pass-through between sovereign-bank CDS markets with reference to the core vs. periphery EMU. Moreover, we identify the regime states of crises and recovery periods based on the bivariate CDS dynamic correlation series, categorized as the endogenous EMU sovereign risk coherence index. Finally, we investigate the “efficient” (parity) sovereign credit risk pricing during the post-crisis spillover period identified by the CDS and bond markets. We find heterogeneity between markets in pricing the sovereign risk in the regional tier (core-periphery EMU), emphasized by the absence of long-term association. Cointegration results are country-dependent as well as maturity-dependent. Empirical results reject the “no arbitrage” approach.

Macroprudential policy and bank systemic risk

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 47, 100724 open access
This paper investigates the effectiveness of macroprudential policy to contain the systemic risk of European banks between 2000 and 2017. We use a new database (MaPPED) collected by experts at the ECB and national central banks with narrative information on a broad range of instruments which are tracked over their life cycle. Using a dynamic panel framework at a monthly frequency we assess the impact of macroprudential tools and their design on the banks’ systemic risk both in the short and the long run. We furthermore decompose the systemic risk measure in an individual bank risk component and a systemic linkage component. This is of particular interest because microprudential policy focuses on the tail risk of an individual bank while macroprudential policy targets systemic risk by addressing the interlinkages and common exposures across banks. In general, the announcements of macroprudential policy actions have a downward effect on bank systemic risk. On average, all banks benefit from macroprudential tools in terms of their individual risk. We find that credit growth tools and exposure limits exhibit the most pronounced downward effect on the individual risk component. However, we find evidence for a risk-shifting effect which is more pronounced for retail-oriented banks. The effects are heterogeneous across banks with respect to the systemic linkage component. Liquidity tools and measures aimed at increasing the resilience of banks decrease the systemic linkage of banks. Moreover, these tools appear to be most effective for distressed banks. Our results have implications for the optimal design of macroprudential instruments.

A cautionary tale of two extremes: The provision of government liquidity support in the banking sector

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 51, 100784
Using U.S. bank holding company data, we study the impact of the crisis liquidity programs initiated by the U.S. Federal Reserve on bank-specific information production. We find empirical evidence that following the receipt of liquidity support there was a pervasive decrease in bank stock price informativeness that increased market synchronicity and crash risk. Our findings further suggest that these effects are mainly driven by bank participation in the Discount Window (DW) and Term Auction Facility (TAF) programs. On the bright side, we confirm that the liquidity programs served their purpose in targeting and supporting illiquid banks with low core stable funding sources through the crisis.

Components of credit rationing

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 50, 100762
Credit rationing by lending institutions has been the subject of much research in recent decades. Although there are some empirical indications, there is little theoretical justification about how various forms of credit rationing manifest themselves in credit markets. Understanding how these forms emerge in the market is particularly important for regulators in charge of monetary policy who play a crucial role in attaining economic and financial stability during crises and pandemics. This study first offers a theoretical decomposition of credit rationing by showing that three forms of equilibrium credit rationing can exist in the presence of contract heterogeneity. It then provides empirical evidence on each of the three rationing forms using micro-level data on small- and medium-sized enterprises collected by the European Central Bank over the period 2009–2019.

Beyond common equity: The influence of secondary capital on bank insolvency risk

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 47, 100732
Banks must adhere to strict rules regarding the quantity of regulatory capital held but have some flexibility as to its composition. In this paper, we examine if bank insolvency (distance to default) is sensitive to capital other than common equity for a sample of listed North American and European banks. Decomposing tier 1 capital into tangible equity and non-core components reveals a series of heretofore unidentified non-linear links with insolvency risk. We assess the influence of binding capital requirements, finding that low regulatory capital buffers are associated with increased insolvency risk for banks holding greater quantities of non-core tier 1 and tier 2 capital. The links between insolvency and capital, evident when the latter is denominated relative to tangible assets or total regulatory capital, are found to be expunged when defined relative to risk-weighted assets.

Foreign Strategic Investors, State Ownership, and Non-interest Activities: Evidence from China

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 50, 100779
This paper contributes to the literature on foreign strategic investors (FSIs) by examining the influence of FSIs on non-interest activities. Using data from China’s banks for 2001–2016, we find that FSI entry is associated with significantly increased non-interest activities, especially commission and fee activities, of Chinese banks. Furthermore, local banks with directors appointed by FSIs have increased non-interest activities. Moreover, in state-owned banks, the effects of FSIs and directors assigned by FSIs on non-interest activities are both weaker. We also find that non-interest activities have not significantly changed after the exit of FSIs. These empirical findings will be informative and relevant to both policymakers and practitioners.

Price discovery in Bitcoin: The impact of unregulated markets

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 50, 100776 open access
We analyse minute-level multi-dimensional information flows within and between bitcoin spot and derivatives. We show that perpetual swaps and futures traded on the unregulated exchanges Huobi, OKEx and BitMEX are much the strongest instruments for bitcoin price discovery and we examine potential determinants of their leadership strength. Prices on the regulated CME bitcoin futures and the US-based spot exchanges react to, rather than lead, price movements on the unregulated exchanges and they may do so relatively slowly. In a multi-dimensional setting including the main price leaders within futures, perpetuals and spot markets, the CME futures have a very minor effect on price discovery, even less than the spot exchanges Bitfinex, Bitstamp and Coinbase. Our findings highlight the persistent problems stemming from inconsistent regulation in bitcoin spot and derivatives markets, including insufficient price stability and lack of resistance to manipulative trading. We conclude that the SEC are correct to maintain such issues as their main concern for bitcoin ETF applications.

Reputational dynamics in financial networks during a crisis

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 49, 100759
Firm reputation plays a vital role in financial networks, and it is especially impactful in times of market stress or a financial crisis. This paper uses a novel theoretical model to study reputational dynamics in financial networks, taking into account that firms begin with incomplete information, learn about others over time, and update their connections as their beliefs evolve. In our model, stronger firms develop high reputations and remain in the network, while weaker firms will eventually drop in reputation and get shut out. We show that more information revelation during crisis generally increases network fragility and harms social welfare. It is thus crucial to maintain anonymity among firms during a crisis. Certain network structures, such as core-periphery networks, are more systemically resilient against negative informational effects.