Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies the interaction between bank capital regulation, moral hazard and co-existence of traditional and shadow banks. Bank managers can choose between traditional banking and off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles (SPV), in a setup with deposit insurance and moral hazard. We first show that in the absence of SPV intermediation, capital requirements are ineffective at preventing the moral hazard problem originated by deposit insurance. We find that shadow banks can improve financial stability, when there is full information sharing. Finally, we analyze the case of neglected tail risk. We find that under such circumstances, the SPV will increase financial risk by exposing the system to extreme events.

This study provides a model explaining how small changes in asset prices may disrupt an entire financial market. Based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), our model implies that during a market crash, asset price changes affect the relative distribution of the CAPM betas of individual assets and force all tradable assets to co-move. Using US stock market data, our empirical results are consistent with the model’s predictions. Overall, the study aids understanding of the price patterns of assets during substantial market downturns, such as financial crises.

While the traditional objectives of capital controls were to address macroeconomic stability risks, a new “externalities view” has emerged prescribing their use to contain financial stability risks. In this context, our understanding of whether capital controls are used in practice to mitigate macroeconomic or financial stability remains limited. Using a novel database on high-frequency capital account regulations for 47 advanced and emerging economies from 2008 to 2020, this paper empirically assesses this question. Our main findings are that: (a) in emerging markets there is a strong association of capital controls on inflows to mitigate risks to macro stability but not financial stability risks; (b) in advanced economies there is a robust association between capital controls on inflows to lean against the buildup of financial stability but not macro stability risks; (c) banking sector flows, but not aggregate capital flows, are strongly associated with tightening capital controls on inflows in emerging markets; and (d) pooling advanced and emerging economies attenuates regression estimates and would lead to concluding that capital controls have weak association with both financial and macro stability motives. Our results can be rationalized by the greater capital flows, more volatile business cycles and stronger interaction between business and financial cycles in emerging markets, and the deeper asset markets found in advanced economies.

We assess the effects of increased bank competition on macroeconomic and lending dynamics and on the transmission of monetary policy. Applying panel local projections to state-level data, we, in a first step, investigate the dynamic effects of fiercer bank competition induced by deregulation allowing geographical expansion of banks across state borders in the 1980s and early-1990s. We allow for possible adjustments before the new laws became effective due to potential anticipation effects. Our findings suggest that these events were anticipated and that they temporarily increased economic activity as well as business and consumer lending. We also find a permanent increase in real estate lending and house prices. In a second step, we show that the impact of monetary policy on economic activity, house prices and lending tended to become stronger after interstate banking deregulation.

The systemic risk and negative social impacts from bank-issued wealth management products (WMPs) are well studied by scholars and practitioners in China. Using hand-collected bank data, we find that WMPs help reduce banks’ cost of funds, which is then passed on to their borrowers as lower borrowing cost. This finding shows an upside of this controversial but increasingly popular bank product. We propose four mechanisms through which WMPs can lower banks’ cost of funds: structural change in deposits, cross-subsidization, liquidity effect, and related-party transactions. We find supporting evidence for those mechanisms, and their effects vary across state-owned, joint-stock, and city commercial banks. Those variations are consistent with the unique characteristics of each bank group. We further explore the competition for capital between state-owned and non-state-owned banks. The results suggest that state-owned banks offer significantly higher interest rates for deposits as non-state-owned banks expand in the same region. WMP issuance is likely a differentiation strategy in response to the competition for deposits.

At the beginning of the present century, the literature on financial integration focused on the benefits of increased integration. In particular, the literature emphasized that a well-integrated financial system allows economic agents to engage in risk sharing while enhancing the smooth transmission of monetary policy. However, the international financial crisis of 2007-08 and the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2009-15, brought to the fore the flip side of increased financial integration – namely, that higher financial integration among national jurisdictions creates the potential for destabilizing cross-country spillovers of capital flows. The papers in this Special Issue address financial system vulnerabilities in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial crisis and the 2009-15 euro area crisis. In particular, the papers assess (1) vulnerabilities arising from such factors as the liberalization of financial systems, cross-country contagion, and climate change, and (2) policy responses, including macroprudential supervision and quantitative easing, to financial instabilities.

Bank capital requirements reduce the probability of bank failure and help mitigate taxpayers’ sharing in the losses that result from bank failures. Under Basel III, direct capital requirements are supplemented with liquidity requirements. Our results suggest that liquidity provisions of banks are connected to bank capital and that changes in liquidity indirectly affect the capital structure of financial institutions. Liquidity appears to be another instrument for adjusting bank capital structure beyond just capital requirements. Consistent with Diamond and Rajan (2005), we find that liquidity and capital should be considered jointly for promoting financial stability.

Do climate-oriented regulatory policies affect the flow of credit towards polluting firms? We match loan-level data to firm-level greenhouse gas emissions to assess the impact of the Paris Agreement. We find that, following this agreement, European banks reallocated credit away from polluting firms in relative terms. Specifically, euro area banks’ loan share to more polluting firms decreased by about 3percentage points compared to less polluting (or “green”) firms after the 2015 Paris Agreement (COP21). This result is stronger for banks that are well capitalized, have lower credit quality, and are less profitable.

This paper assesses the effects of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomy and the euro area banking sector after the global financial crisis. First, financial risk-return indicators of the banking sector based on a compound option-based structural credit risk model are embedded in a large macro-financial quarterly database covering the period 2008Q4–2019Q4. Second, a SFAVAR identifies and estimates the shocks’ responses relating them to the endogenous build-up of banks’ vulnerabilities which are consistent with the internally coherent structure of the credit risk model. By introducing structure in the understanding of banks’ asset-liability management behavior following monetary policy shocks, the research strategy contributes to disentangling results that are often mixed in the empirical literature. The study finds that unconventional monetary policy, in particular the Asset Purchase Program of the European Central Bank, seems to have been more successful than conventional monetary policy in raising output and inflation. The desired boost to bank lending has been muted and loan cyclicality has varied across countries and loan types. The performance of the banking sector following monetary policy shocks can be characterized by a drop in expected return on equity and assets, a relaxation of lending conditions and increased correlation between banks’ assets return and the market return, a mechanism pointing to enhanced risk-taking. While banks’ probabilities of default fall following monetary policy shocks, the price of risk increases. Banks’ net worth rises via higher market capitalization and implied assets value together with lower volatility, despite often incurring more debt. Risk-taking in the banking sector may pose a risk to financial stability, especially if its effects on banks’ vulnerability spread and increase systemic risk. The unintended endogenous build-up of macro-financial vulnerabilities may need to become part of monetary policymaking.

We introduce a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in the network of financial accounts. Simulating a shift of deposits by both households and non-financial corporations from the banking sector to the central bank, we model the different responses of the affected institutional sectors. We find that the introduction of CBDC generates funding shortages in banks, which may propagate to other sectors. In addition, significant adjustments in the balance sheets of all sectors trigger large moves in securities prices and induce changes in the financial network structure. Finally, we extend the analysis to the introduction of a crypto financial asset (stablecoin) issued by either a domestic or a foreign entity.