Knowledge that Transforms

The paper explores the empirical relationship between the share of pension funds assets invested in stocks and stock market volatility in OECD markets. For this purpose, by using panel data of 34 OECD countries from 2000 to 2010, we estimate both a random-effects panel model and a Prais–Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors and autoregressive errors. The estimations document that there is a significant negative relationship between the share of pension funds assets invested in stocks and stock market volatility in OECD markets. The binary probit and logit models further validate the argument that pension funds as institutional investors can dampen stock market volatility.

Since 2007, monetary authorities around the globe have reduced their key policy interest rates to unprecedented low levels and intervened with non-standard policy measures (i.e., monetary easing and liquidity provision) to support funding conditions for banks, enhance lending to the private sector and contain contagion in financial markets (e.g., European Central Bank, 2011). Using a detailed dataset of monetary policy interventions between June 2007 and June 2012 in the most advanced monetary areas (the Euro area, Japan, the U.S., the UK and Switzerland), we analyze their effects at three different levels, including (1) the interbank credit market, considering the 3-month LIBOR-OIS spread as a measure of financial distress (e.g., Taylor and Williams, 2009); (2) the stock market, represented by wide equity indices; and (3) the banking sector, focusing on global systematically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs). We demonstrate that different monetary policy interventions from single central banks have produced a diverse market reaction. Standard measures have been more effective than non-conventional ones in restoring the interbank market, which is fundamental for maintaining a fully operational traditional interest rate channel and for guaranteeing the normal functioning of financial intermediation. Non-traditional measures have registered a stronger stock market reaction with respect to standard interest rate decisions, both in terms of broad equity indices and single prices of large banks.

We present a comprehensive analysis to calculate the Basel III liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) of U.S. commercial banks using Call Report data over the period 2001–2011, and provide indirect empirical evidence on net cash outflow rates of certain liability categories. In addition, we examine potential links between Basel III liquidity risk measures and bank failures using a model that differentiates between idiosyncratic and systemic liquidity risks. We find that while both the NSFR and the LCR have limited effects on bank failures, the systemic liquidity risk is a major contributor to bank failures in 2009 and 2010. This finding suggests that an effective framework of liquidity risk management needs to target liquidity risk at both the individual level and the system level.

We construct and explore a new quarterly dataset covering crisis episodes in 40 developed countries over 1970–2010. First, we present stylized facts on banking, debt, and currency crises. Using panel vector autoregression we find that banking and debt crises are interrelated and both typically precede currency crises, but not vice versa. Banking crises are the most costly in terms of the overall output loss, and output takes about six years to recover. Second, on a reduced sample we try to identify early warning indicators of crises specific to developed economies, accounting for model uncertainty by means of Bayesian model averaging. The most consistent result across the various specifications and time horizons is that significant growth of domestic private credit precedes banking crises, while rising money market rates and global corporate spreads are also leading indicators worth monitoring. For currency crises, we also corroborate the role of rising domestic private credit and money market rates and detect the relevance of domestic currency overvaluation. The role of other indicators differs according to the type of crisis and the warning horizon selected, but it mostly seems easier to find reliable predictors at a horizon shorter than two years. Early warning indicators of debt crises are difficult to uncover due to the low occurrence of such episodes in our dataset. We also employ a signaling approach to derive the threshold value for the best single indicator (domestic private credit), and finally we provide a composite early warning index that further increases the usefulness of the model.

We study the Diamond–Dybvig model of financial intermediation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected by nature is of perfect or imperfect information. Our result is robust to several extensions.

Are some insurers relevant for the stability of the financial system? And if yes, what firm fundamentals and aspects of insurers’ business models cause them to destabilize an entire financial sector? We find that several insurers did indeed contribute significantly to the instability of the U.S. financial sector during the recent financial crisis. We empirically confirm that insurers that were most exposed to systemic risk were on average larger, relied more heavily on non-policyholder liabilities and had higher ratios of investment income to net revenues. Contrary to current conjectures of insurance regulators, we find that the contribution of insurers to systemic risk is only driven by insurer size.

In order to incentivize stronger issuer due diligence effort, European and U.S. authorities are amending securitization-related regulations to force issuers to retain an economic interest in the securitization products they issue. This paper contributes to the process by exploring the economics of equity and mezzanine tranche retention in the context of systemic risk, moral hazard, accounting frictions and funding distortions. It shows that loan screening activity is maximized when the loan originating bank retains the equity tranche. However, in case capital structure irrelevance does not hold a profit maximizing bank is likely to favor retention of the less risky mezzanine tranche. From a regulator's perspective this is a problem because the implied loan screening activity is substantially lower in this case. Policy attention is even more warranted if performing due diligence is costly, the economic outlook is positive or loan profitability is high.

Financial systems all over the world have grown dramatically over recent decades. But is more finance necessarily better? And what concept of financial system – a focus on its size, including both intermediation and other auxiliary “non-intermediation” activities, or a focus on traditional intermediation activity – is relevant for its impact on real sector outcomes? This paper assesses the relationship between the size of the financial system and intermediation, on the one hand, and GDP per capita growth and growth volatility, on the other hand. Based on a sample of 77 countries for the period 1980–2007, we find that intermediation activities increase growth and reduce volatility in the long run. An expansion of the financial sectors along other dimensions has no long-run effect on real sector outcomes. Over shorter time horizons a large financial sector stimulates growth at the cost of higher volatility in high-income countries. Intermediation activities stabilize the economy in the medium run especially in low-income countries. As this is an initial exploration of the link between financial system indicators and growth and volatility, we focus on OLS regressions, leaving issues of endogeneity and omitted variable biases for future research.

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk shifting. It proposes a method to find out whether risk shifting is present in the banking industry and, if so, what type. The type of risk shifting depends on the group of debt holders to whom risk is shifted. We apply this method to the US banking sector in 1998–2011. To study the relationship between risk shifting and the 2008 crisis, the sample is also split into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Our results suggest that the same type of risk shifting is present in the entire sample and in the pre-crisis and crisis subsamples. We find no evidence of risk shifting after the crisis. Furthermore, holding capital buffers seems to disincentivize risk shifting. This finding appears to provide support for the conservative buffer included in Basel III.

In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.