Knowledge that Transforms

We find that the magnitude of unique credit default swap (CDS) market information (constructed to be orthogonal to contemporaneous and lagged stock returns) declined after recent reforms that increased the level of post-trade regulatory and market transparency for CDSs. Around the same reforms, the ability of this CDS-unique information to predict future stock returns decreased. These results suggest the CDS market has become less of a “hidden” trading venue for informed investors since central clearing and trade reporting started.

According to “Schwartz's conventional wisdom” and what has been called “divine coincidence”, price stability should imply macroeconomic and financial stability. However, in light of the global financial crisis, with monetary policy focused on price stability, scholars have held that banking and financial risks were largely unaddressed. According to this alternative view, the belief in divine coincidence turns out to be benign neglect. The objective of this paper is to test Schwartz's hypothesis against the benign neglect hypothesis. The priority assigned to the inflation goal is proxied by the central banks’ conservatism (CBC) index proposed by Levieuge and Lucotte (2014), here extended to a large sample of 73 countries from 1980 to 2012. Banking sector vulnerability is measured by six alternative indicators that are frequently employed in the literature on early warning systems. Our results indicate that differences in monetary policy preferences robustly explain cross-country differences in banking vulnerability and validate the benign neglect hypothesis, in that a higher level of CBC implies a more vulnerable banking sector.

We examine the monitoring and ex-post influence of depositors on risk-taking of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from September 1986 to December 2013. As the basis for our empirical analysis, we develop a theoretical model which shows that under risky lending and deposit insurance, a bank’s liability and asset choices are interrelated through its probability of insolvency. Our empirical results are as follows. First, for the sub-sample of the ten largest (Top10) BHCs, deposit risk pricing only exists over some sub-periods prior to the 2007 financial crisis. However, interest rates on insured deposits and uninsured deposits for the Non-Top10 BHCs increase with bank risk over the whole sample period. Moreover, the growth rates of insured and uninsured deposits tend to decrease as bank risk increases for Non-Top10 BHCs over the entire sample period, but only in some sub-periods for the Top10 institutions. Second, although Top10 BHCs do not increase the insured deposits-to-liabilities ratio to weaken market discipline over the entire sample period, all other institutions engage in such regulatory arbitrage in some sub-periods. Third, higher risk premium embedded in current deposit interest rates is more likely to reduce future insolvency risk of troubled BHCs. This suggests that depositors monitor the riskiness of BHCs while also exerting strong ex-post influence on risk-taking of problem institutions. Fourth, in the post-Dodd-Frank Act/Basel III period, the interest rates, the shares, and the growth rate of insured deposits for the Top10 BHCs are significantly negatively related to bank insolvency risk. This could be due to strengthened regulatory oversight on the largest high-risk institutions and is consistent with a substitution relationship between depositor discipline and regulatory oversight.

This paper takes advantage of access to detailed matched bank-firm data to investigate whether and how employment decisions of SMEs have been affected by credit constraints during the European sovereign debt crisis. Variability in banks’ financial health following the 2008 crisis is used as an exogenous determinant of firms’ access to credit. Findings, relative to the Belgian economy, clearly highlight that credit matters. They show that SMEs borrowing money from pre-crisis financially less healthy banks were significantly more likely to be affected by a credit constraint and, in turn, to adjust their labour input downwards than pre-crisis clients of more healthy banks. These results are robust across types of loan applications that were denied credit, i.e. applications to finance working capital, debt or new investments. Yet, estimates also show that credit constraints have been essentially detrimental for employment among SMEs experiencing a negative demand shock or facing strong product market competition. In terms of human resources management, credit constraints are not only found to foster employment adjustment at the extensive margin but also to increase the use of temporary layoff allowances for economic reasons. This outcome supports the hypothesis that short-time compensation programmes contribute to save jobs during recessions.

We use a quasi-natural experimental framework provided by the staggered removals of interstate banking restrictions to identify the effect of a credit supply shock on household finances in the US. Banking deregulation is found to have increased the propensity to hold debt, the amount of debt held and the level of leverage. We also find that the deregulation had a more pronounced effect on non-white headed households. Moreover, we show how deregulation increased debt and leverage at the middle and the top of the debt and leverage distributions. The credit supply shock also had a relatively large effect on non-white headed households at the top 20% of the debt distribution.

We propose a model of collateral choice by banks to quantify how changes in the haircut policy of the central bank affect the collateral used by banks and the funding cost of banks. We estimate the model using data on assets pledged to the European Central Bank from 2009 to 2011. Our results suggest that an increase in the haircut on low rated collateral by 5 percentage points would have reduced the use of this collateral by 10% but would have increased the average funding cost spread between high yield and low yield countries by 5% over our sample period.

The paper investigates the impact of global liquidity on house prices around the world using a novel proxy measured by the funding availability to global banks in the main financial centers. We find supporting evidence that global conditions from the financial centers are transmitted to local banks through bank flows. Focusing on the repo markets in the US, Europe, and the UK, over the period 2000–2014 and using a panel VAR, we find that liquidity shocks impact house prices in both emerging and advanced economies. However, countries’ exposure to liquidity shocks can be mitigated by monetary policy, and by various general and house market specific macroprudential policies. We document strikingly different effectiveness of these policies in advanced and emerging markets.

In this paper, we examine the links among banking supervision, the volatility of financial flows, and economic growth. In particular, we explore whether banking regulation mitigates the adverse effects of capital flows volatility on economic growth. Using cross-country data over four decades, we find that banking supervision promotes economic growth by dampening the negative impact of volatile capital flows. The findings hold for both aggregate capital flows and its various components, and for both its net and gross counterparts, while they are also robust for various indicators of regulatory policies. The results support the argument that bank regulatory policy rules designed to ensure financial stability are beneficial to long-run economic growth.

Unsustainable credit growth leads to financial stability risks, with real repercussions. But what is unsustainable? In this paper we suggest that the balance between the growth in mortgage credit and business credit is a key factor in post-crisis macroeconomic vulnerability. The sample-average rise in credit composition (the share of household mortgage credit in total credit) in 51 economies in the five years before the 2007 global financial crisis is associated with a 2.1% average growth loss in the five years after the crisis. This finding is robust for total-credit growth and for post-crisis fiscal and monetary policy responses. Delving into the channels, we find that larger changes in credit composition before the crisis are linked to less efficient capital reallocation and larger investment cutbacks afterwards.

We establish that the effect of intensified deposit market competition, measured by reduced switching costs, on the probability of bank failures depends critically on whether we focus on competition with established customer relationships or competition for the formation of such relationships. With inherited customer relationships, intensified competition due to lower switching costs destabilizes the banking market, whereas it stabilizes the market if we focus on competition for the formation of customer relationships. We characterize the factors important for evaluating the effects of intensified competition on stability in a market with unattached as well as locked-in depositors.