Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the behavior of analyst earnings forecast error in response to policy uncertainty. We find that the accuracy of analyst forecasts is compromised at times of increased economic policy uncertainty, when market volatility and information opacity are high. This negative association between policy uncertainty and earnings forecast accuracy is alleviated in firms where good CSR practices are in place. The disclosure of CSR-related nonfinancial information reportedly improves forecast accuracy; in the context of policy uncertainty, we document that CSR plays a stabilizing role by moderating analyst forecast error. Additionally, we report that the moderating effect of CSR is more pronounced in domestic rather than multinational firms, where, for the former, analysts are able to better assess the quality of information. Finally, we observe that analysts attach more value to the external legitimacy aspect of CSR rather than internal sustainability in guaranteeing earnings resilience in the face of high policy uncertainty. Our results remain valid in various robustness settings.

Until the 1970s, both banks and nonfinancial corporations relied on performance targets linked to their earnings per share (EPS). Over the next few decades, banks rapidly changed to emphasize return on equity (ROE) as a performance target. Investors seem aware of this change because ROE growth (EPS growth) better explains banks’ (nonfinancials’) stock market values. Also, manager compensation linked to ROE is more common for banks than for nonfinancials. This paper presents a model of a bank subject to fixed-rate deposit insurance and facing increasing competition that erodes its charter value. When the bank chooses its capital to maximize its shareholder value, its performance based on ROE appears better than its performance based on EPS. Thus, the increase in competition that started in the 1970s, along with fixed-rate deposit insurance, may explain banks’ growing preference for ROE over EPS as a performance target.

Using unique micro data compiled from the real estate registry in Japan, we examine more than 400,000 loan-to-value (LTV) business loan ratios to draw implications for caps on LTV ratios as a macroprudential policy measure. We find that the LTV ratio exhibits counter-cyclicality, behavior that would have severely impeded the efficacy of a simple LTV cap had it been imposed. We also find that borrowers obtaining high-LTV loans are more risky but grew faster than those with lower LTV loans, which implies that a simple fixed cap on LTV ratios might inhibit growing (albeit risky) firms from borrowing.

This study empirically investigates the relationship between customer concentration and corporate risk-taking. We find that overall customer concentration significantly reduces corporate risk-taking. However, the relationship varies across different settings. Specifically, the negative relationship between customer-base concentration and corporate risk-taking is only significantly present in more marketized regions, more competitive industries, firms with lower market shares, less innovative and non-state-owned firms, and those without major governmental or state-owned-enterprise customers. Moreover, our panel threshold models indicate significant threshold effects. When customer-base concentration is below the first threshold (low concentration level), it is positively associated with corporate risk-taking. When customer-base concentration increases to above the second threshold, the association turns significantly negative, suggesting that a highly concentrated customer base prompts suppliers to take more precautionary measures and avoid excessive risk-taking. Overall, our findings suggest that the concentration of a supplier’s customer base significantly impacts its risk-taking behaviours.

This paper argues that the European Union’s Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has improved market discipline in the European bank market for unsecured debt. The different impact of the BRRD on bank bonds provides a quasi-natural experiment that allows us to study the effects of the BRRD within banks using a difference-in-difference approach. Identification is based on the fact that (otherwise identical) bonds of a given bank maturing before 2016 are explicitly protected from BRRD bail-in. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that debt holders actively monitor banks and that the BRRD diminished bailout expectations after its enactment. Bank bonds subject to BRRD bail-in carry a 13-basis points bail-in premium in terms of the yield spread, driven by low capitalization. Banks that respond to market pressure by de-risking their portfolios are able to secure cheaper funding for instruments that are subject to bail-in.

Policymakers have put forward proposals to ensure that banks do not underestimate long-term risks from climate change. To examine how lenders account for extreme weather, we compare matched repeat mortgage and property transactions around a severe flood event in England in 2013–14. First, lender valuations do not “mark-to-market” against local price declines. As a result valuations are biased upwards. Second, lenders do not offset this valuation bias by adjusting interest rates or loan amounts. Third, borrowers with low credit risk self-select into high flood risk areas. Overall, these results suggest that lenders do not track closely the impact of extreme weather ex-post, and that public flood insurance programs subsidize high income households in some areas.

This study provides evidence on the existence of a negative greenium, i.e. a risk premium related to the greenness of a firm, based on European individual stock returns. We define a priced ‘greenness and transparency’ factor based on companies’ greenhouse gas emissions and the quality of their environmental disclosures, and show that what is priced by the market is the combination of environmental performance and environmental transparency. Based on this factor, we offer a tool to assess the exposure of a portfolio to the risk associated with the low-carbon transition, and hedge against it. We estimate that in a stressed scenario where greener and more transparent firms very much outperform brown stocks, there would be losses at the global level, including for European large banks, should investors fail to price climate-transition risks. These results call for the introduction of climate stress tests for systemically important financial institutions.

This paper investigates the effects of stock exchange consolidation on foreign portfolio holdings. Sharing a common stock exchange platform enhances cross-border investments, and the consolidation effect is particularly pronounced among member countries that are smaller in size and closer in geographical, cultural and economic terms. These findings survive different econometric specifications and outlier treatments. After accounting for endogeneity of the consolidation process, the effect of exchange consolidation on cross-border investment is confirmed.

We study an equilibrium risk and return model to explore the effects of the coronavirus crisis and associated skewness on the market price of risk. We derive the moment and equilibrium equations, specifying skewness price of risk as an additive component of the effect of variance on mean expected return. We estimate our model using the flexible skewed generalized error distribution, for which we derive the distribution of returns and the likelihood function. Using S&P 500 Index returns from January 1980 to mid-October 2020, our results show that the coronavirus crisis generated a deeply negative reaction in the skewness and total market price of risk, more negative even than the subprime and the October 1987 crises.