Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines how financial regulation and institutional quality affect the probability of a banking crisis using a panel of 138 countries over the period 1996–2017. Our key inference is that the probability of a financial crisis fits an inverted U-shaped curve: it rises as regulation stringency moves from low to medium levels and falls from medium to high levels. Countries located in the intermediate level of regulatory stringency face more financial instability than either loosely or severely regulated countries, which are caught in a “liberalization trap” and a “regulation trap,” respectively. Institutional quality interacts significantly with the regulatory environment, implying a trade-off with regulatory stringency.

We view mortgage as a risky derivative of its underlying house collateral and combine no-arbitrage valuation with equilibrium valuation approaches to develop a dynamic model of leverage cycle and interest rate. This model provides a unified explanation to pro-cyclical optimism, asset prices, and leverage, and counter-cyclical volatility and interest rate. In addition, the model shows that tightening funding margin in the mortgage securities market dampens optimism, asset prices, and leverage, whereas it raises volatility and interest rate in the housing market. A double leverage cycle leads to more volatile markets and a severe leverage cycle, thus resulting in worse financial crises.

This paper examines financial stress transmission between the U.S. and the Euro Area. To better understand the linkages between financial stress in the two regions, we construct a financial stress index for the U.S. similar to the Composite Indicators of Systemic Stress (CISS) that has been developed for the Euro Area with a focus on systemic risk. Using weekly data from 2000 to 2021 and Granger predictability in distribution test, we analyze stress transmission in “normal” times as well as under unusually high and low stress episodes. While we document unilateral transmission from the U.S. to the Euro Area under normal conditions based on the center of the distribution, tail dependence tests and impulse response analysis show significant bilateral transmission, particularly in unusually high financial stress episodes. This holds true for aggregate indices as well as the subindicators of financial stress in various financial markets. As such, there must be global efforts to contain financial crises and ensure a strong and resilient financial system.

We document a robust negative relation between operational risk exposure and bank capital levels for a sample of large U.S. banks under the Basel I Capital Accords. The results are consistent with the notion that capital-constrained banks increased operational risk exposure at the time when Basel I regulations did not require an explicit capital charge for operational risk. More broadly, our results show new channel by which financial regulations incentivize banks to shift their risk taking to less regulated risk areas. We focus on the case of operational risk because it went from a largely unregulated risk type to a major risk that accounts for about 25% of large U.S. banks’ risk-weighted assets.

Understanding the global financial network for sovereign debt, particularly with a focus on interaction and spillover effects of sovereign risk, has become important for policy makers as they look to protect the stability of their economies. Using high dimensional Vector Autoregression techniques and network simulation on Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS)’ data of 57 countries, we identify that the global sovereign CDS network is fully integrated as there is virtually no country without any connection to at least one specific node in the system. However, each country has a unique attribute in the network, as a risk exporter or importer and/or risk transmitter. Among developed countries, the US (unsurprisingly) holds the dominant position as a risk exporter while Germany is identified as a connecting country that transmits shocks. The most connected countries in the sovereign CDS network belong to the new European Union members. We examine possible drivers of the network relationships observed, in order to better understand the risk transmission process, and find that connections in the sovereign risk network are stronger within regional groups and countries with the same level of economic development. Central and Eastern Europe and Middle East and Africa have more interactive networks than Northern Western Europe, Asia Pacific and Latin America. We also identify that financial volatility and economic policy uncertainty increase the interactions in market-based default risk assessment.

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.

We examine China’s June 2013 liquidity crunch as a negative shock to banks and analyze the wealth effects on exchange-listed firms. Our findings suggest that liquidity shocks to financial institutions negatively impact borrower performance, particularly borrowers reporting outstanding loans at the end of 2012. Stock valuations of firms with long-term bank relationships, however, outperform the market and experience smaller subsequent declines in investment than peers lacking solid banking relationships. This effect is the strongest for firms that enjoy good relations with China’s large state-owned banks or foreign banks, and weakest for firms whose connections are solely with local banks. We document a positive correlation between the stock performances of firms and the stock performances of lender banks and the likelihood of lender banks operating as net lenders in the interbank market. These results suggest that banks transmit liquidity shocks to their borrowing firms and that a long-term bank-firm relationship may mitigate the negative effects of a liquidity shock.

In this paper, we revisit the question of how bank bailouts affect economic growth. We adopt a broad concept of bailouts, which includes both capital injections and liquidity support to the banking system. We employ an identification strategy that controls for the various dimensions of bailout endogeneity and find that liquidity support has a significant positive real economic effect. The effect of recapitalizations per se is not statistically significant, but they reinforce the positive impact of liquidity interventions. Utilizing bank-level data, we provide evidence that this is the case because better-capitalized banks and banks in significantly recapitalized systems have a higher propensity to lend, thus raising aggregate-level real economic growth.

This paper discusses different definitions of systemic risk and identifies the challenges, which regulators face in addressing this phenomenon. We conducted a systematic literature review of 4859 abstracts to categorize the various methodologies developed to measure systemic risk. In total, 60 systemic risk measures proposed post-2000 have been critically appraised to inform academics and regulators of their practical applications and model vulnerabilities. This review suggests that most of these methods focus on individual financial institutions rather than on system stability. Those methodologies directly reflect the current regulations, which aim to ensure individual institutions’ soundness. As macro-prudential regulation evolves, policy-makers face the issues of understanding contagion and how regulations should be implemented. This paper also discusses new systemic risk and regulatory challenges resulting from the current COVID-19 pandemic.