Knowledge that Transforms

Stablecoins seek to address the high price fluctuations of unbacked cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and Ether. However, recent studies as well as the collapse of stablecoin USTC (Terra) cast doubt on the stability of stablecoins. Using well-known Markowitz portfolio optimization methods, we combine five leading stablecoins into a global minimum variance portfolio that represents a stable aggregate stablecoin (SAS). We find that SAS is much more stable than its constituent stablecoins. Also, in a stress test adding USTC to the portfolio, SAS remains stable with a narrow price range over time. Importantly, the construction of SAS using modern diversification methods has practical implications for the ongoing development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).

We introduce digital currency into a macro model with a banking sector in which financial frictions generate endogenous systemic risk and instability. In the model, digital currency is fully integrated into the financial system . Stablecoin issuance significantly increases the probability of a banking-sector crisis because it depresses bank deposit spreads, particularly during crises, which limits banks’ ability to recapitalize following losses. While banking-sector stability suffers, household welfare can still improve significantly. Financial frictions nevertheless limit the potential benefits of digital currencies. The optimal level of digital currency could be below what would be issued in a competitive environment. In contrast to stablecoins, which are backed by debt, tokenized deposits backed by traditional bank assets improve welfare without harming financial stability . The scope for welfare gains from stablecoins or tokenized deposits depends on how households value the liquidity services of digital currency relative to traditional deposits and on the cost of issuing stablecoins.

We employ a structural model endowed with a banking system in which assets of different qualities, occasionally binding credit restrictions, and regulatory requirements coexist, to analyze the effectiveness of various macroprudential policies that cope with the level of due loans in the economy. We analyze how policy designs influencing impairment recognition by banks affect output and welfare, both in the steady state and across business cycles driven by financial risk. The cost of managing due loans, credit constraints, dividend strategies, and the cure rate, are key components of the driveshaft propelling policies to outcomes. Our findings suggest that “less is more,” i.e. policies emphasizing greater leniency in impairment recognition outperform stricter approaches, when management costs are sufficiently low, especially when combined with high cure rates that enhance the benefits of delaying recognition. However, reducing penalties for banks that violate regulatory requirements proves largely ineffective and exacerbates incentives for non-compliance. The presence of binding credit constraints enhances the effectiveness of lenient impairment policies when management costs are low and diminishes it otherwise.

This paper explores how geopolitical risk affects corporate maturity mismatch using a sample of Chinese listed corporations. We find that geopolitical risk significantly exacerbates corporate maturity mismatch. Specifically, GPR increases corporate long-term investment and short-term debt, while decreasing corporate short-term investment and long-term debt. Further, the impact of GPR is amplified by R&D investment, industry competitiveness, and financial constraint, but weakened by corporate credit quality. The results of the mechanism test suggest that geopolitical risk exacerbates corporate maturity mismatch by increasing corporate information asymmetry and default risk. Additionally, we find that the impact of GPR on corporate maturity mismatch exhibits industry heterogeneity, and the positive effect of geopolitical risk on corporate maturity mismatch is more significant for high-growth corporations, non-state-owned corporations, small corporations, multinational corporations, and capital-intensive corporations. Finally, based on the extended Fama-French models, we construct two firm-level GPR indicators and the results indicate that individual GPR exacerbates maturity mismatch. Our paper enriches the research on the factors affecting maturity mismatch and helps corporations better manage operational and uncertainty risks.

We investigate the impact of policy uncertainty (PU) on the economic impact of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Using a sample of 3142 deals announced by US banks between 1986 and 2020, we find a significant positive effect of PU on acquirer short- and long-term market value. PU also positively affects acquirer post-merger accounting performance and increases the incentives for synergy-driven bank M&A. Amid PU, acquirers avoid stock-only financed deals, delay deal completion, and pay higher bid premiums. Our results are robust to model specifications that control for different proxies of PU, endogeneity, asset pricing models, and event windows surrounding deal announcements.

The existing literature provides inconclusive theoretical predictions regarding whether central banks’ monetary policy should address financial stability. We therefore empirically evaluate the effect of central banks’ financial stability orientation (“leaning against the wind”) on bank risk-taking. Our baseline results from cross-country, bank-level panel data suggest that higher central banks’ financial stability orientation significantly reduces bank risk-taking. Further investigation shows that monetary policy aimed at achieving financial stability complements macroprudential policy in reducing bank risk-taking, particularly during macroprudential policy tightening. These results offer novel insights into the effect of central bank’s monetary policy on bank stability and provide empirical evidence to prior theoretical works.