Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines the impact of political factors on the behaviour and performance of commercial banks in 11 Central European countries from 1995 to 2008. Using a unique dataset of commercial banks and political factors, we find that state-owned banks report significantly smaller net interest income ratios during the years of parliamentary elections. The proxy cumulative amount of net interest income lost by state-owned banks during the election years equals, on average, 0.38% of each country's GDP. The decrease in the profitability of state-owned banks is caused primarily by the lower interest rates charged on loans. In contrast, we document that the lending growth of state-owned banks is not affected by the political cycle. Hence, to a certain extent, this study supports the view that state-owned banks constitute a tool that serves political goals in Central European countries.

We examine the effectiveness of the financial sector rescue packages provided by the national governments during the 2008 financial crisis. This study questions the implicit assumption that government interventions have an uniform effect on the default risk of individual banks. After testing the results for sensitivity, our main findings suggest that there exists a significant negative relationship between the announcement of the financial sector rescue packages and the daily change of the credit default premium. However, quantile regressions show that the effectiveness of these packages differs across banks: most interventions do not decrease the risk of intermediate to low-risk banks, while they do reduce the risk of high-risk banks. Besides, we find that interventions aimed at specific financial institutions are more effective in restraining banking risk than broad interventions taken to stabilize the financial market as a whole.

Carrying out interbank contagion simulations for the German banking sector for the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2011, we obtain the following results: (i) The system becomes less vulnerable to direct interbank contagion over time. (ii) The loss distribution for each point in time can be condensed into one indicator, the expected number of failures, without much loss of information. (iii) Important determinants of this indicator are the banks’ capital, their interbank lending in the system, the loss given default and how equal banks spread their claims among other banks.

Based on Contingent Claims Analysis, this paper develops a method to monitor systemic risk in the European banking system. Aggregated Distance-to-Default series are generated using option prices information from systemically important banks and the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index. These indicators provide methodological advantages in monitoring vulnerabilities in the banking system over time: (1) they capture interdependence and joint risk of distress in systemically important banks; (2) their forward-looking feature endow them with early signaling properties compared to traditional approaches in the literature and other market-based indicators; (3) they produce simultaneously smooth and informative long-term signals and quick and clear reaction to market distress and (4) they incorporate additional information through option prices about tail risk and correlation breaks, in line with recent findings in the literature.

This paper examines the effectiveness of Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) Program set up during the financial turmoil following the failure of Lehman Brothers, in increasing credit availability and improving the ex-post performance of small businesses. In particular, using a unique firm–bank matched dataset, the paper examines whether lending relationships enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. It is found that the ECG program significantly improved credit availability for firms using the program. However, when it was a relationship lender (main bank) that extended an ECG loan, the increased availability was partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans by the same bank. Further, propensity score matching estimations show that the ex-post performance of firms that received ECG loans from the main bank deteriorated more than that of firms that received non-ECG loans. We do not find such loan “substitution” or performance “deterioration” effects when a non-main bank extended ECG loans. Our findings suggest that close firm–bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees.