Knowledge that Transforms

This paper uses granular data on syndicated loans to analyse the impact of international reforms for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) on bank lending behaviour. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we find no effect of the reforms on overall credit supply, while at the same time documenting a substantial decline in borrower- and loan-specific risk factors for the affected banks. Moreover, we detect a significant decline in the pricing gap between interest rates charged by G-SIBs and other banks, which we interpret as indirect evidence for a reduction in funding cost subsidies. Overall, our results suggest that the G-SIB reforms have helped to mitigate moral hazard problems associated with systemically important banks, while the consequences for the real economy have been limited.

Utilizing a hand-collected comprehensive dataset covering U.S. public traded firms from 2006 to 2014, we present descriptive evidence regarding insider pledging behavior in the U.S. and study its determinants. We find an insider’s propensity to pledge company stock is positively associated with her risk exposure and pledgeability of company stock, and negatively with the company’s corporate governance quality. These findings suggest that risk-averse corporate insiders pledge to hedge. Further, we find ISS’s denouncement of pledging in 2012 reduces insider pledging.

The financial system plays a major role in the transition to a low-carbon economy. We shed light on this analyzing recent developments in the bond and debt markets. First, we study the pricing of green bonds at issuance. We find a premium for green bonds issued by supranational institutions and corporates but no yield differences in case of issuances by financial institutions. We also document an effect for external review and repeated access to the green bond market. Second, we show that banks that issue green bonds reduce lending towards carbon-intensive sectors, but limited to the loan amounts granted in the role of lead bank in the deal. This mixed evidence about lending suggests that, at the time of issuance, investors may not be able to identify a clear link between the green bond issued by a financial institution and a specific green investment project, which would explain the absence of a green premium for financial issuers.

Using an ecological macrofinancial model, we explore the potential impact of the ‘green supporting factor’ (GSF) and the ‘dirty penalising factor’ (DPF) on climate-related financial risks. We identify the transmission channels by which these green differentiated capital requirements (GDCRs) can affect credit provision and loan spreads, and we analyse these channels within a dynamic framework in which climate and macrofinancial feedback effects play a key role. Our main findings are as follows. First, GDCRs can reduce the pace of global warming and decrease thereby the physical financial risks. This reduction is quantitatively small, but is enhanced when the GSF and the DPF are implemented simultaneously or in combination with green fiscal policies. Second, the DPF reduces banks’ credit provision and leverage, making them less fragile. Third, both the DPF and the GSF generate some transition risks: the GSF increases bank leverage because it boosts green credit and the DPF increases loan defaults since it reduces economic activity. These effects are small in quantitative terms and are attenuated when there is a simultaneous implementation of the DPF and the GSF. Fourth, fiscal policies that boost green investment amplify the transition risks of the GSF and reduce the transition risks of the DPF; the combination of green fiscal policy with the DPF is thereby a potentially effective climate policy mix from a financial stability point of view.

In November 2011, the Financial Stability Board, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund, published a list of 29 "systemically important financial institutions" (SIFIs, now referred to as "globally systemically important banks" or G-SIBs), institutions whose failure, by virtue of "their size, complexity, and systemic interconnectedness", could have dramatic negative consequences for the global financial system. While "size" and "interconnectedness" have been the subject of much quantitative analysis, less attention has been paid to measuring "complexity." Yet without a consistent way to measure complexity, there is little guarantee that the designated SIFIs capture the complexity that the FSB is concerned about, and little hope of mitigating the consequences that the FSB warns of. In this paper we propose the structure of an individual firm's majority-control hierarchy as a proxy for institutional complexity. We demonstrate as a proof-of-concept how this method might be used by bank supervisors, particularly the Federal Reserve under its authority as consolidated supervisor, using a data set containing information on the majority-control hierarchies of many of the designated SIFIs. Our mathematical intrafirm network representation (and various associated metrics we propose) provides a uniform way to compare firms with often very disparate organizational structures – one that is distinct from a simple size comparison.

Using U.S. bank data from 1996 to 2013, this paper studies how liquidity risk affects bank performance in financial crises. It finds that during the subprime crisis of 2007–09, liquidity risk reduced a bank’s survival probability, ROA, and net interest margin, and increased its loan-loss-provision expenses. This adverse effect was more severe for banks with lower capital ratios and higher credit risk. In contrast, there is no strong evidence that liquidity risk hurts bank performance in market crises. The results in this paper imply that liquidity risk is not merely a symptom of banks’ insolvency problems; it has an independent effect on bank performance in banking crises.

Systemic risk is a multi-layer network phenomenon. Layers represent various types of direct financial exposure of various types, including interbank liabilities and derivative- or foreign exchange exposures. An important layer of systemic risk emerges through common asset holdings of financial institutions. Strongly overlapping portfolios lead to similar exposures that are caused by price movements of the underlying financial assets. Based on the knowledge of individual portfolio holdings of financial agents, we quantify the systemic risk of overlapping portfolios. We then present an optimization procedure whereby we minimize the systemic risk in a given financial market by optimally rearranging overlapping portfolio networks. The optimization is performed under the constraints that the expected returns and risk of the individual portfolios are unchanged. We explicitly demonstrate the power of the method on the overlapping portfolio network of sovereign exposure between major European banks, using data from the European Banking Authority stress test of 2016. Systemic risk can be reduced by more than a factor of two, without any detrimental effects for the individual banks. These results are confirmed by a simple simulation of fire sales in the government bond market. In particular, we show that the contagion probability is dramatically reduced in the optimized network. We comment on the efficiency of the network optimization approach in comparison to equity-injection-based ways to reduce systemic risk. To obtain the same risk levels that are obtained in the network optimization, it would be necessary to increase the actual available capital by two thirds. This shows the immense potential of network-based systemic risk management.

This study examines the interplay between political influence and regulatory decision-making. Political influence is captured based on whether a bank is headquartered in a state where an elected official holds a chair position on a congressional committee related to the banking and financial services industry. Using data of US commercial banks over the period 2000–2015, we show that our measure of political influence reduces a bank's probability of receiving a formal regulatory enforcement action. Results are robust to the use of alternative model specifications and the sample restrictions. However, we find that various bank and environmental characteristics are important conditional factors.

Using a sample of almost 300 European banks, we show that the concentration of ownership leads to larger capital buffers, consistent with theories of interest alignment and the charter value theory. Mixed empirical findings of previous literature suggest that external factors may affect the disciplinary role of controlling owners. In this paper, we demonstrate that the stabilizing impact of concentrated ownership is weaker when the level of regulatory discipline is higher. We also observe a weaker stabilizing impact when the level of market discipline is higher, while this effect seems to be less robust. Moreover, we find evidence for the too-big-to-fail phenomenon, since the stabilizing impact of ownership concentration on capital buffers is significantly weaker for systemically important institutions. Our findings indicate that bank owners are aware of the risk of losing charter value when external monitoring is lower and underline that internal governance of banks should not be discussed in isolation from external governance factors.

In this paper, we investigate the interest rate setting behaviour of the Bank of England (BoE) over the 16 year period covering both the Great Moderation and the 2008−9 Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession. We contribute to the literature by using the BoE’s own inflation projections in our estimations. Also, we develop a novel measure of the output gap to encapsulate the array of real variables that the Monetary Policy Committee of the BoE reviews. In order to assess the BoE’s responsiveness to financial markets, we estimate a new financial conditions index that covers a wide range of financial indicators that feature in the Inflation Report. Our study provides some new insights into the BoE’s monetary policy behaviour. We show that the BoE was concerned not only with price stability but also output, employment and financial conditions during the Great Moderation. In contrast to previous studies, we find that the BoE responds relatively less to financial conditions and relatively more to inflation projections when the 2008−9 Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession period is included.