Knowledge that Transforms

Banks argue that holding higher capital will have adverse implications on their lending activities and thereby on economic growth. Yet, the effect of a stronger capital base on economic growth remains largely unsettled. We argue that better capitalized banks improve financial stability conditions and, in dire times, they are able to sustain credit to the economy thereby containing adverse macroeconomic implications. Using various methods, we test for the presence and strength of a financial stability channel and a bank lending channel by drawing evidence from 47 advanced and developing countries over close to two decades. We find that higher capital ratios improve financial stability and help sustain bank lending, ultimately exerting a positive influence on economic activity. These effects on real GDP growth are economically significant, reaching up to 1¼ percentage points for each percentage point acceleration in capital. Our main results are robust to various sensitivity checks, supporting the conclusion that safer banking systems do not bridle economic activity.

We estimate a standard structural model of credit risk to draw insights about the premium demanded by investors for bearing default risk, using data on credit default swaps and market capitalization. We pin down the daily market value of assets for a set of non-financial firms and uncover cross-sectional heterogeneity in terms of the magnitude and time variation of the premium. By exploring the link between asset and default risk premia, we show that this heterogeneity closely depends on the relationship between the firm-specific market value of the assets and the business cycle.

The broad economic damage of the COVID-19 pandemic poses the first major test of the bank regulatory reforms put in place after the Global Financial Crisis. Our study assesses the U.S. regulatory framework, with an emphasis on capital and liquidity requirements. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, banks were well capitalized and held ample liquid assets, which partly reflects enhanced requirements. The overall robust capital and liquidity levels resulted in a resilient banking system, which maintained lending and market making through the early stages of the pandemic. Trading activity was a source of strength for banks, reflecting in part a prudent regulatory approach. That said, leverage requirements are associated with more repo position netting by banks, with potential implications for market making.

We empirically evaluate how accounting and financial variables affect the level of systemic risk in traditional and shadow banks, and in real estate finance services in China over the period 2006–2019. We also conduct some stability analysis by evaluating the impact of crisis sub-periods. We find that systemic risk increases in the Size of large financial institutions, particularly shadow entities, while it is insensitive to the Size of real estate finance services. Real estate finance services are instead particularly sensitive to Maturity Mismatch and Leverage. Finally, systemic risk differs across state and non state owned banks.

We study the impact of higher bank capital requirements on corporate lending spreads using granular bank- and loan-level data. Our empirical strategy employs the heterogeneity in capital requirements across banks and time of implementation in Switzerland. We find that changes in the capital deviation from the regulatory minimum affect lending spreads asymmetrically. In response to a reduction in the capital deviation, banks with deficits with respect to their risk-weighted capital requirement raise spreads relative to banks with surpluses and de-leverage. Banks respond to higher requirements by raising spreads and, for deficit banks, by cutting lending.

We investigate the effects of unconventional monetary policies on corporate debt through the risk-taking channel using corporate bond and syndicated loan contracts from 2000 to 2016 in Japan. In this period, the policy rate remained fixed near the zero bound. Using the daily changes in the yield curve on monetary policy meeting days, we identify one call rate shock and two unconventional monetary policy shocks that do not affect short-term rates. We find that QE shocks, which move all medium-to-long-term rates, increase the maturity of debt contracts, especially for syndicated loans. In addition, such QE shocks decrease the size of corporate bonds with short maturity. On the other hand, QQE shocks, which raise medium-term rates and lower long-term rates, decrease the size of loans and corporate bonds with longer maturity. These effects imply the existence of the risk-taking channel of unconventional monetary policy: it stimulates investment in longer-maturity assets and decreases investment in assets with lower yields. Our findings show that unconventional policies affect debt contracts even in an extremely low interest rate environment.

We examine the likelihood that the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in its enforcement role, will accord particular attention to firms that are managed by CEOs who exhibit over-confidence, given that such CEOs may be more aggressive in their tax policies and strategies. Using data from 7757 firms, we find that this is indeed the case. Such attention is even more pronounced in the instance of overconfident CEOs whose firms are financially constrained and/or financially distressed. We also find that the IRS has augmented its audit processes to give more attention to overconfident CEOs during and post financial crisis. This may be due to the increased vulnerability of their firms to external shocks, which consequently increases the incentives to embark on tax avoidance strategies, value-destroying investments, and/or highly biased financial reporting (and forecasting responses) to tax authorities. Our results are robust after accounting for the possibility of endogeneity and using a wide range of specifications, measures, and econometric models.

This paper analyzes the evolution of Milton Friedman’s thinking about bailouts. It covers bailouts of commercial banks, shadow banks and other financial firms, manufacturing firms, governments, financial markets, and other cases where the term is commonly used. It is based on his academic writings and on the many interviews, op-eds, letters to the editor, and so on through which he communicated his views during and after his transition from professor to public intellectual.

We examine the effect of quantitative easing on the supply of bank loans. During the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, lending banks reduced relatively more loan spreads, offered longer loan maturities, provided larger loans, and loosened more covenants for firms whose long-term bond ratings were below BBB and were lower than those with investment-grade bond ratings. Furthermore, we find that new bank loans in this period were associated with a reduction in a firm’s value and an increase in default risk. These results indicate that banks took greater risk during the 2008 quantitative easing by relaxing lending standards to relatively riskier borrowers.