This paper examines the origins of herding behavior in asset markets and its potential to produce a price bubble. I present a model which explains the emergence and the development of herding behavior via asymmetric information and Baysian learning. A corresponding price bubble is explained through herding behavior without assuming any speculative incentives on the part of the investors

It is generally accepted that banks offer renegotiation services to sovereign borrowers facing short-term liquidity shortages. However, the literature has yet to find evidence of such services from the pricing of sovereign bank loans. The research on the pricing of sovereign bank loans has focused on interest spreads alone, while the pricing structure typically includes an up-front fee, as well. In this paper, I explore empirically the economic motivations for such a pricing structure. I find that up-front fees are explained by the probability of renegotiation and by proxies for informational problems. My findings provide evidence that the unique pricing structure of bank loans helps banks provide sovereign borrowers with renegotiation services

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.

We estimate the impact of macroeconomic news on composite stock returns in three emerging European Union financial markets (the Budapest BUX, Prague PX-50, and Warsaw WIG-20), using intraday data and macroeconomic announcements. Our contribution is twofold. We employ a larger set of macroeconomic data releases than used in previous studies and also use intraday data, an excess impact approach, and foreign news to provide more reliable inferences. Composite stock returns are computed based on 5-min intervals (ticks) and macroeconomic news are measured based on the deviations of the actual announcement values from their expectations. Overall, we find that all three new EU stock markets are subject to significant spillovers directly via the composite index returns from the EU, the U.S. and neighboring markets; Budapest exhibits the strongest spillover effect, followed by Warsaw and Prague. The Czech and Hungarian markets are also subject to spillovers indirectly through the transmission of macroeconomic news. The impact of EU-wide announcements is evidenced more in the case of Hungary, while the Czech market is more impacted by U.S. news. The Polish market is marginally affected by EU news. In addition, after decomposing pooled announcements, we show that the impact of multiple announcements is stronger than that of single news. Our results suggest that the impact of foreign macroeconomic announcements goes beyond the impact of the foreign stock markets on Central and Eastern European indices. We also discuss the implications of the findings for financial stability in the three emerging European markets.

It has been argued that central bank independence (CBI) may not only be beneficial for reaching the objective of price stability, but also for maintaining financial stability. Greater independence from external pressure implies that central banks are less politically constrained in acting to prevent financial distress, while it also will allow them to act earlier and more decisively when a crisis erupts. We estimate the relation between CBI and a newly constructed measure of financial instability using a dynamic panel model for the period 1985–2005 with a large set of control variables. We find a significant and robust negative relation between CBI and financial instability, which is mostly due to political independence.

What is the impact of financial sector segments at different stages of development? We apply a production function approach to investigate the impact of the credit, bond and stock segments in nine EU-accession countries over early years of transition (1996–2000) and compare these to mature market economies and to countries at intermediate stage. We find that the transfer mechanisms differ over the development cycle (from bond markets to educational attainment to labor participation) and that financial market segments with links to the public sector (but not stock markets) contributed to stability and growth in transition economies.

An important element of the macro-prudential analysis is the study of the link between business cycle fluctuations and banking sector profitability and how this link is affected by institutional and structural characteristics. This work estimates a set of equations for net interest income, non-interest income, operating costs, provisions, and profit before taxes, for banks in the main industrialized countries and evaluates the effects on banking profitability of shocks to both macroeconomic and financial factors. Distinguishing mainly the euro area from Anglo-Saxon countries, the analysis also identifies differences in the resilience of the respective banking systems and relates them to the characteristics of their financial structure

This paper analyzes the existence of flights from stocks to bonds and vice versa. We propose a definition and a test for flight-to-quality, flight-from-quality and cross-asset contagion and examine their characteristics and effects for the financial system. The empirical analysis for eight developed countries including the US, the UK, Germany and Japan shows that flights exist and are a common feature in many crises episodes. Our findings also reveal that flights are not merely country-specific events but occur simultaneously across countries. This indicates that there is a link between the occurrence of flights and cross-country contagion. Moreover, we show that flights enhance the resiliency of the financial markets by providing diversification benefits in times when they are needed most

An increasing number of countries show a trend towards a certain degree of consolidation of powers in financial supervision, which has resulted in the establishment of unified regulators, that are different from the national central banks. By contrast a high involvement of the central bank in supervision seems to be correlated with a multi-authorities regime (central bank fragmentation effect). This paper, using a simple application of a general common agency game, sheds light on which conditions the politicians prefer when implementing an unified sector supervision outside the central bank. From a theoretical point of view the quality of public sector governance plays a crucial role in determining the supervision unification. Focusing on the behaviour of the “good” policymaker (helping hand type), it will prefer a unified financial authority that is different from the central bank if the correspondent welfare gains-linked to at least one of the three effects: moral hazard, conflict of interest, bureaucracy—are considered higher respect to the information losses. The “bad” policymaker (grabbing hand type) will choose the single financial authority if the financial industry likes it, and the central bank is not a captured one. On the other hand, the paper tests the model, confirming the robustness of the institutional position of the central bank in explaining the recent trend in supervision consolidation, with an empirical analysis performed with ordered functions on an updated dataset