Using a sample of publicly listed banks from 62 countries over the 1991–2017 period, we investigate the impact of capital on banks’ cost of equity. Consistent with the theoretical prediction that more equity in the capital mix leads to a fall in firms’ costs of equity, we find that better capitalized banks enjoy lower equity costs. Our baseline estimations indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in a bank’s equity-to-assets ratio lowers its cost of equity by about 18 basis points. Our results also suggest that the form of capital that investors value the most is sheer equity capital; other forms of capital, such as Tier 2 regulatory capital, are less (or not at all) valued by investors. Additionally, our main finding that capital has a negative effect on banks’ cost of equity holds in both developed and developing countries. The results of this paper provide the missing evidence in the debate on the effects of higher capital requirements on banks’ funding costs.

We examine whether the prevailing national culture has been material in determining bank performance during the recent financial crisis. In this paper, we focus on three particular national culture dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and power distance. We expect banks from high uncertainty avoidance and power distance societies to perform relatively better during the recent financial crisis. On the other hand, banks in individualistic (collectivist) societies are likely to perform worse (better) during the crisis. Using an international sample of 3438 banks from 48 countries, we find support for our main conjectures. Specifically, we establish that uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, and power distance have a first order impact on bank performance during the crisis. Our results are robust to a battery of additional checks, including additional variables, alternative samples, and correcting for potential endogeneity.