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Lending pro-cyclicality and macroprudential policy: Evidence from Japanese LTV ratios

Journal of Financial Stability 2021 53, 100819 open access
Using unique micro data compiled from the real estate registry in Japan, we examine more than 400,000 loan-to-value (LTV) business loan ratios to draw implications for caps on LTV ratios as a macroprudential policy measure. We find that the LTV ratio exhibits counter-cyclicality, behavior that would have severely impeded the efficacy of a simple LTV cap had it been imposed. We also find that borrowers obtaining high-LTV loans are more risky but grew faster than those with lower LTV loans, which implies that a simple fixed cap on LTV ratios might inhibit growing (albeit risky) firms from borrowing.

When banks become pure creditors: The effects of declining shareholding by Japanese banks on bank lending and firms’ risk-taking

Journal of Financial Stability 2024 73, 101294
This study empirically examines the impact of an exogenous decrease in banks’ shareholding on bank loans and firms’ risk-taking, utilizing a regulatory change in Japan relating to banks’ shareholding as an instrument. We find that an exogenous reduction in a bank’s shareholding decreased the bank’s share of loans in the client firm’s total loans, while it increased the volatility of a firm’s return on assets. The reduction in a bank’s shareholding did not affect firm risk as perceived by equity investors or its borrowing terms. These findings are consistent with the prediction that banks hold equity claims over client firms to gain a competitive advantage, and are weakly compatible with the prediction that banks’ shareholding mitigates shareholder–creditor conflict.

Are lending relationships beneficial or harmful for public credit guarantees? Evidence from Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee Program

Journal of Financial Stability 2013 9(2), 151-167
This paper examines the effectiveness of Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) Program set up during the financial turmoil following the failure of Lehman Brothers, in increasing credit availability and improving the ex-post performance of small businesses. In particular, using a unique firm–bank matched dataset, the paper examines whether lending relationships enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. It is found that the ECG program significantly improved credit availability for firms using the program. However, when it was a relationship lender (main bank) that extended an ECG loan, the increased availability was partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans by the same bank. Further, propensity score matching estimations show that the ex-post performance of firms that received ECG loans from the main bank deteriorated more than that of firms that received non-ECG loans. We do not find such loan “substitution” or performance “deterioration” effects when a non-main bank extended ECG loans. Our findings suggest that close firm–bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees.