This article is a review of a 531 page book that in turn is a review and evaluation of the 2319 page Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by Congress on July 16, 2010. The overriding theme of the book is to pose two approaches to attaining financial stability in the future. One approach is to establish a council of wise men and women supported by an army of highly skilled professional financial economists to formulate and implement regulations designed to prevent future financial crises that wreak havoc on the real economy and require financial support from taxpayers. This is the approach of the Dodd–Frank Act. The second approach proposed by the authors of this book is to design a taxing system that taxes systemically important financial institutions on the basis of their contribution to systemic risk. Borrowing ideas from the literature on the taxation of negative externalities their view is that financial institutions that create crises should pay for the clean-up. They also argue that requiring the financial polluters to pay for the creation of systemic risk will reduce the supply of systemic risk. The reader is invited to decide which approach is best.

This paper investigates the dynamics between key regulatory and supervisory policies and various aspects of commercial bank efficiency and performance for a sample of 22 EU countries over 2000–2008. In the first stage of the analysis we measure efficiency by employing the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique. In addition, we employ two distinct accounting ratios to capture the costs of intermediation (net interest margin) and cost effectiveness (cost-to-income ratio). Our regression framework includes truncated regressions and generalized linear models. Moreover, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for robustness using a fractional logit estimator. Our results show that strengthening capital restrictions and official supervisory powers can improve the efficient operations of banks. Evidence also indicates that interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies such as private sector monitoring and restricting bank activities can result in higher bank inefficiency levels. Finally, the evidence produced suggests that the beneficial effects of capital restrictions and official supervisory powers (interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies) on bank efficiency are more pronounced in countries with higher quality institutions.

We explore the dynamics of default cascades in a network of credit interlink-ages in which each agent is at the same time a borrower and a lender. When some counterparties of an agent default, the loss she experiences amounts to her total exposure to those counterparties. A possible conjecture in this context is that individual risk diversification across more numerous counterparties should make also systemic defaults less likely. We show that this view is not always true. In particular, the diversification of credit risk across many borrowers has ambiguous effects on systemic risk in the presence of mechanisms of loss amplifications such as in the presence of potential runs among the short-term lenders of the agents in the network.