In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 crisis, banks claiming positive diversification benefits are being met with skepticism. Nevertheless, diversification might be important and sizable for some large internationally active banking groups. We use a universally applicable correlation matrix approach to calculate international diversification effects, in which bank subsidiaries are treated as individual assets of the banking group portfolio. We apply the framework to 49 of the world's largest banking groups with significant foreign business units over the 1992–2009 period. Focusing on the most important risk in banking, credit risk, we find that allowing for geographical diversification could reduce banks’ credit risk by 1.1% on average, with risk reduction ranging from negligible up to 8%.

This paper investigates the effect of management-level professional ties between suppliers and customers on the sustainability of business partnerships. We find that the presence of cross-firm professional ties between directors and senior executives along the supply chain significantly reduces the probability of relationship termination around customers’ industry negative shocks and during financial crises. The results are robust using professional-tie strength as an alternative measure. Exploring contingency effects, we find that, for suppliers who lack R&D, face high competition, are smaller in size, or are less important to customers in terms of sales, such professional ties are more helpful in sustaining such relationships. Furthermore, we find that professional ties also significantly reduce firm risk during periods of market turbulence. Taken together, our results suggest that professional ties along the supply chain can facilitate information flow and build mutual trust, which can lead to healthy long-term relationships and can help firms survive economic and industry downturns.

We present an empirical study of stress testing for portfolios of auto loans. We find that loans aged five years or more have significantly higher default probabilities. This finding raises concerns about the increasing maturity of auto loans in recent years. A challenge in stress testing is the instability of the estimated coefficient of macroeconomic variables, which raises questions on the reliability of stress test results. For this reason, it is important for model developers to perform sensitivity analyses and make conservative adjustment to minimize model risk.

This study examines the spillover effect of constituency statutes along the supply chain. We posit that the enactment of constituency statutes in customer firms’ incorporation states, by removing legal obstacles for customer firms to cater to non-shareholders’ interests, builds suppliers’ trust and cooperation. Consistent with the notion that constituency statutes entice greater trust from suppliers, we find that suppliers make more relationship-specific investments in the supply chain after the enactment of constituency statutes in customers’ states, indicating a greater commitment to the customer. We also show an improvement in customers’ corporate social responsibility performance in the post-constituency-statute period, thus substantiating the claim that the constituency statutes increase customers’ stakeholder orientation. Cross-sectionally, we find the positive effect of constituency statutes on supplier relationship-specific investments is attenuated if the customer and supplier have more repeated interactions in the past, whereas the effect is more pronounced if suppliers produce durable goods. Overall, we provide novel evidence on the spillover of constituency statutes along the supply chain.

This paper investigates the effects of operational hedging on commodity price risks. It explores a novel type of operational hedging, i.e., the natural operational hedge position between upstream crude oil production and downstream activities in the supply chain. Using hand-collected data from 293 unique oil-producing firms, we find that operational hedging is sufficiently effective in reducing firms’ exposure to oil-price risk. We also find an inverse relationship between operational and financial hedging, suggesting that they can substitute for each other.

This paper investigates the effects of CEO’s social network on bank risk-taking. We document a positive relation between bank CEO’s social connections and bank risks. To address the endogeneity concerns, we use deaths and retirements within networks to perform a difference-in-difference analysis, and find robust results. We also report that well-connected bank CEOs take more risk when more of their social ties are linked to informationally opaque firms and when the labor market offers fewer employment options. In addition, diversity of social ties (professional and educational) helps to mitigate the impact on risk. Finally, this study reveals an inefficient trade-off between bank risk and return, suggesting that executive social networks lead to excessive bank risk.

This study examines the relation between a firm’s supply chain hierarchical position and its information quality. We predict that firms located in a more upstream position within the supply chain network are exposed to greater demand variance, thereby leading to decreased quality of reported earnings and greater uncertainty in the public information available to investors. Consistent with this prediction, we find that firm’s vertical position in the supply chain network is negatively associated with its information quality (i.e., poorer earnings quality and higher stock return synchronicity). Our results are robust to the matched sample analysis, residual analysis, and alternative measures of information quality. We further show that the positive relation between firm’s hierarchical position and stock return synchronicity is more pronounced for firms facing higher information asymmetry. Overall, our findings suggest that a more upstream position in the supply chain network entails not only operational costs associated with amplified demand uncertainty but also costs related to the quality of reported information on which capital providers and other stakeholders rely.

This study investigates how the political connections of government bank CEOs affected their banks’ performance during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Examination of global data shows that government banks with politically connected CEOs experienced significantly higher loan default rates and worse operating performance during the crisis than those without politically connected CEOs. However, these politically connected CEOs were less likely than others to be penalized for the poor performance of their banks. Our evidence suggests that politically connected CEOs of government banks can influence a bank’s lending decisions by using their political power and influence to relax lending standards and to reap private benefits that thus raise their banks’ sensitivity to a crisis.

Despite the significance of social networks in influencing firm behavior, research on their impact on corporate tax behavior is limited. In this paper, we construct social networks of CFOs from U.S. companies based on their employment history, education, and non-professional activities. We find that firms with more socially connected CFOs have lower effective tax rates (ETR) compared to firms with less socially connected CFOs. This effect is more pronounced when corporate governance is weaker and managers have higher incentives. Furthermore, a firm's ETR decreases as CFO centrality increases. We do not observe similar results regarding the connectedness of boards of directors. Additionally, firm pairs exhibit similar ETRs when their CFOs are socially connected, suggesting an exchange of tax-related information among CFOs through their social networks. We also find that the past ETRs of firms with central CFOs predict the ETRs of firms with non-central CFOs. This indicates that less socially connected CFOs tend to follow the tax planning strategies of their more socially connected counterparts. Overall, our findings indicate that more socially connected CFOs possess more relevant information and resources regarding tax planning, leading to the adoption of more aggressive tax strategies compared to their less socially connected counterparts.