This paper investigates the effects of CEO’s social network on bank risk-taking. We document a positive relation between bank CEO’s social connections and bank risks. To address the endogeneity concerns, we use deaths and retirements within networks to perform a difference-in-difference analysis, and find robust results. We also report that well-connected bank CEOs take more risk when more of their social ties are linked to informationally opaque firms and when the labor market offers fewer employment options. In addition, diversity of social ties (professional and educational) helps to mitigate the impact on risk. Finally, this study reveals an inefficient trade-off between bank risk and return, suggesting that executive social networks lead to excessive bank risk.

This study examines the relation between a firm’s supply chain hierarchical position and its information quality. We predict that firms located in a more upstream position within the supply chain network are exposed to greater demand variance, thereby leading to decreased quality of reported earnings and greater uncertainty in the public information available to investors. Consistent with this prediction, we find that firm’s vertical position in the supply chain network is negatively associated with its information quality (i.e., poorer earnings quality and higher stock return synchronicity). Our results are robust to the matched sample analysis, residual analysis, and alternative measures of information quality. We further show that the positive relation between firm’s hierarchical position and stock return synchronicity is more pronounced for firms facing higher information asymmetry. Overall, our findings suggest that a more upstream position in the supply chain network entails not only operational costs associated with amplified demand uncertainty but also costs related to the quality of reported information on which capital providers and other stakeholders rely.