The paper analyzes the effect of changes in eight types of bank-oriented macroprudential policies on bank competition and stability. Using a bank-level database of a maximum of 2511 listed banks from 52 countries, I find that a tightening in bank-oriented macroprudential policies on average increases both bank competition and stability. However, there are differences across policies and countries. Loan supply and liquidity-based policies increase bank competition whereas capital and tax-based policies reduce bank competition. Tighter legal restrictions on entry and activity in a country reduce the positive (increase the negative) effect of macroprudential policies on bank competition. In terms of policy implications, I identify a sub-set of especially useful macroprudential policies that increase not only financial stability but also bank competition.

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.

This paper suggests that accounting and auditing systems can be effective devices to counteract tendencies for firm risk-taking associated with bank safety nets. Results are obtained from an international sample of publicly traded banks after controlling for other regulatory control devices for bank risk such as restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements and official discipline. The efficacy of accounting and auditing systems in controlling bank risk diminishes with bank charter value and increases with moral hazard stemming from a country's deposit insurance. The results also indicate that accounting and auditing systems are complements for minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.

This paper analyzes the channels through which financial liberalization affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4333 banks in 83 countries. Our results indicate that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Financial liberalization promotes stronger bank competition that increases risk-taking incentives in developed countries, whereas in developing countries it increases bank risk by expanding opportunities to take risk. Capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalization on financial stability in both developed and developing countries. However, official supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries.

The paper analyzes the influence of banking stability on the volatility of industrial value added using data for 110 countries. Our results confirm the relevance of lending and asset allocation effects because banking stability reduces the volatility of value added more in industries that have greater external financial dependence and intangible intensity when they are located in countries with more developed financial and institutional systems. Moreover, banking stability helps reduce economic volatility more in countries with less bank market competition. We control for recessions, reverse causality problems, and endogeneity of banking stability.