We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and political system.

This paper explores the determinants for the leverage decision of financial institutions via the channels of bank-specific characteristics, peer bank behavior, and economic policy uncertainties, which are critical to appropriately control the risk of the financial system and explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk-taking behavior among financial institutions. Our results indicate that bank-specific characteristics are the most influential one among the three channels for leverage decision of financial institutions, while the other two channels also exhibit significant effects on the leverage decision. We further note that economic policy uncertainty may affect their leverage decisions through the channels of their shifting lending behavior and risk-taking capacity.