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Macroprudential policy and systemic risk in G20 nations

Journal of Financial Stability 2024 75, 101340
Using a panel of 496 banks from the G20 nations, the study assesses the role of macroprudential policies in reducing systemic risk. The study further assesses the utility of these policies in conjunction with monetary policy instruments and bank and country-specific characteristics and finds the significant impact of macroprudential policies in curbing systemic risk and promoting economic stability. The study finds this relationship to hold regardless of economic conditions like inflationary pressure and financial distress. The result highlights that easing macroprudential policies during financial distress can help banks cope with systemic losses. We split the macroprudential policies into policies targeting the demand and supply of loans and find complementarity among the policies to reduce systemic risk. Our results demonstrate the heterogenous effect of macroprudential policies in limiting systemic risk, with the effect varying with bank size, leverage, liquidity, and concentration of loans. Finally, we find a moderating role of these policies in limiting the impact of uncertainties on systemic risk.

Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

Journal of Financial Stability 2022 63, 101084 open access
This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.