We propose a contingent clawback bond (COCLA) as an alternative source of contingent convertible capital (CoCo). We develop a utility maximization model in which a bank manager faces the following two trade-offs: one trade-off is between the private benefits of control and costs of financial distress when loans under-perform, and the other is between the costs and benefits of screening loan credit quality (effort). In our model, the supply of loans, amount of junior debt issued, level of effort exerted by a manager, and manager's decision to exercise the clawback option are endogenously determined in the maximization of the manager's utility function. We find that the manager optimally exercises the clawback following a low realization of cash flows, thereby solving the trigger problem presented in CoCos. In the model, the debt to equity conversion from the COCLA is an endogenous decision, the regulatory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is satisfied, and the bank does not face distress costs. From a practical perspective, the conversion rate for the COCLA that jointly maximizes the manager's expected utility and stock holders’ pay offs is around 25%, a rate close to the typical percentage (30%–35%) that is often found in initial public offering clawback (IPOC) contracts used in the corporate world.

This study examines the effect of regulations on European insurers’ profitability and risk-adjusted returns. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between return on assets and regulations relating to capital adequacy, accounting and auditing requirements, and disclosures to supervisors. In contrast, requirements related to technical provisions have a negative effect on return on assets, and we find no evidence of an association with regulations related to investment and supervisory power. We also find evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm's risk-adjusted rate of return and regulations relating to capital requirements as well as corporate governance and internal control. We observe the opposite in the case of technical provisions. These results are robust to controls for various country-specific attributes such as macroeconomic environment, stock market development, overall quality of institutions, and legal origins.

This paper investigates the effects of CEO’s social network on bank risk-taking. We document a positive relation between bank CEO’s social connections and bank risks. To address the endogeneity concerns, we use deaths and retirements within networks to perform a difference-in-difference analysis, and find robust results. We also report that well-connected bank CEOs take more risk when more of their social ties are linked to informationally opaque firms and when the labor market offers fewer employment options. In addition, diversity of social ties (professional and educational) helps to mitigate the impact on risk. Finally, this study reveals an inefficient trade-off between bank risk and return, suggesting that executive social networks lead to excessive bank risk.

This study investigates how retail payment methods affect aggregate macroeconomic activity. By tracing the relative norms and practices of paper-based payment instruments (checks) and electronic payment methods (payment cards, credit transfers and direct debits) in 27 European Union member countries, the paper reports that a higher penetration ratio of electronic payment methods is generally associated with greater GDP, trade, consumption and tax revenue. The 2008 financial crisis and a country’s shadow economy level have an incremental impact on the relationship between payment methods and economy. The study also finds substitution effects between paper-based and electronic payment methods and complementary effects across electronic payment methods. The findings are robust after controlling for endogeneity. Our study supports policies promoting further repositioning and transfer to efficient electronic payment instruments.