Regulatory forbearance in times of corporate distress has been a common practice in many countries to achieve bank stability, particularly so in the absence of a unified bankruptcy code, yet very little is known in the context of emerging market economies. Exploiting variation of membership across banks in a corporate debt restructuring programme (CDR) sponsored by the central bank in India, this paper finds that the banks that made use of regulatory forbearance (RF) on the restructured corporate loans could increase their stability significantly due to the extension of low provisioning on restructured loans. However, the positive effect of RF diminishes at higher levels of market power, highlighting that member banks with higher market power tend to originate riskier assets (as reflected in their risk-weighted assets) under the auspices of this programme. Our results remain robust to different estimators (including propensity score matching), ownership structure, and alternative measures of bank stability.

Using dynamic conditional correlations and network theory, this study brings a novel interdisciplinary framework to define the integration and segmentation of emerging countries. The individual EMBI+ spreads of 13 emerging countries from January 2003 to December 2013 are used to compare their interaction structure before (phase 1) and after (phase 2) the global financial crisis. Accordingly, the unweighted average of dynamic conditional correlations between cross country bond returns significantly increases in phase 2. At first glance, the increased co-movement degree suggests an integration of the sample countries after the crisis. However, using correlation based stable networks, we show that this is not enough to make such a strong conclusion. In particular, we reveal that the increased average correlation is more likely to be caused by clusters of countries that exhibit high within-cluster co-movement but not between-cluster co-movement. Potential reasons for the post-crisis segmentation and important implications for international investors and policymakers are discussed.

We investigate whether and how political systems affect the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks. Using factors extracted from principal component analysis, we find that Islamic banks underperform their conventional counterparts in more democratic political systems but outperform them in hybrid and Sharia’a-based legal systems. The findings reflect the challenges Islamic banks face in Western countries in terms of perception, financial infrastructure, and regulatory constraints while mirroring the recognition of their specificities and their cultural and religious compliance with Sharia’a law in Muslim countries. The findings are robust to a battery of alternative estimation techniques and methods of correcting standard errors.

We develop an empirically based simulation study to test two types of policies designed to control systemic risk: preventive policies targeting capital requirements and mitigation policies targeting default resolution. We find that capital buffers reduce both the number of defaults and the resulting losses. The loss reduction benefit increases as the magnitude of adverse shocks becomes higher. We find that a simple branch-breakup resolution strategy reduces the loss borne by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The mitigation effect becomes higher as the fraction of assets resolved through auctions and auction competitiveness increase.

Against the backdrop of the Great Recession, investigating the differences in institutional frameworks became important to explain the heterogeneity in the market perception about the credit quality and default risk of banks in different countries. Using data for 118 banks of 30 countries over the period 2004–2011, we find that an improvement of the quality of economic and legal institutions can help in reducing banks' CDS spreads, as banks operating in countries where the regulatory quality is stronger tend to be less affected by spikes in financial stress of 2008–2009. Considering a series of indicators of the financial structure of the banking system, our results reveal that more concentration of the banking sector, a stronger presence of foreign banks, a deterioration of the banking sector health or the lack of alternative means of finance is associated with higher CDS spreads of banks. We also show that the dynamics of bank CDS spreads accrue to: (i) the quality of banks’ balance sheet; (ii) (il)liquidity of banks’ assets; (iii) how profitable banks’ operations are; and (iv) the banks’ leverage ratios. Finally, higher CDS spreads of banks tend to be associated with periods of high inflation and low GDP growth.