We propose a model in which banks are exposed to the risk of contagion through their portfolio of loans. We show that a solvency problem in one bank can be transmitted to another if they lend to the same borrower. The novelty is that the channel for the transmission involves banks’ monitoring incentives. The intensity with which all banks monitor a common borrower is reduced when one of the banks suffers a solvency shock. The reduced effort intensity affects the borrower's probability of success and creates a contagion (endogenous correlation) from the balance-sheet of the affected bank to the balance-sheet of the other banks lending to the same borrower. Banks hit by a solvency shock have lower incentives to monitor borrowers because less is left after paying depositors. Banks not hit by a solvency shock face borrowers’ risks entirely on their own, which increases the expected cost of lending. As a consequence, they respond by reducing the monitoring intensity for the common borrower. Bank equity can mitigate the risk of contagion.

Using data on bank holding companies in the United States and Europe, this paper analyses the impact of capital and liquidity on bank-lending-growth following the 2008 financial crisis, and the new measures inspired by the Basel III regulatory framework. We find that U.S. banks reinforce their risk absorption capacities when expanding their credit activities. Capital ratios have significant, negative impacts on bank-retail-and-other-lending-growth for large European banks in the context of deleveraging and the “credit crunch” in Europe over the post-2008 financial crisis period. Additionally, liquidity indicators have positive but perverse effects on bank-lending-growth, which supports the need to consider heterogeneous banks’ characteristics and behaviors when implementing new regulatory policies.

This paper analyzes various channels of shock transmission in an economy subject to financial frictions, by incorporating liquidity and default effects on asset prices. We develop a framework in which we can assess financial stability policy by introducing a simplified model of exchange and financial intermediation that captures the effects of shocks on financial and real sectors of the economy. The model allows us to explain essential mechanisms and interactions of financial and real economic variables in a comprehensive, yet intuitive fashion. Our results suggest that liquidity and default in the credit markets should be analyzed contemporaneously when financial, monetary and productivity shocks affect financial stability as well as the real economy.

Using data on publicly traded banks in 61 countries, we examine how the institutional environment affects the relationship between bank capital and system-wide fragility. Consistent with prior studies, we find that bank capital is associated with a reduction in the systemic risk contribution of individual banks. This effect is more pronounced for banks located in countries with less efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions and in countries with lower levels of information availability. Overall, our findings suggest that capital can act as a substitute for a weak institutional environment in reducing systemic risk.

We construct a measure of systemic vulnerability in selected EU banking systems using an indirect, time-varying measure of the system covariance. Systemic vulnerability indicates the extent to which a banking system as a whole is sensitive to a negative shock. We proceed to examine to what extent the resulting measures of systemic vulnerability provide a convincing narrative of events during the period January 2000 to April 2016. The results provide evidence of: (i) rising vulnerability prior to the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2007/08 in countries with banks exposed to toxic assets; (ii) vulnerability associated with the euro area sovereign debt crisis from 2009/10; and (iii) continued concerns from 2013 onwards regarding the need for euro area banks to improve their balance sheets and raise new capital at a time of sluggish profitability.