This paper studies the welfare implications of various government policies that have been used to prevent bank runs. The benchmark model suggests that a bank run is a business-cycle-state-related phenomenon and it leads to the failure of the risk-sharing mechanism provided by the banking sector. Extensions of the model show that a number of policy instruments, including the suspension of convertibility of deposits, the taxation on short-term deposits, reserve requirement and blanket guarantee, turn out to be inefficient. Instead, I propose that a limited-coverage deposit insurance scheme or capital requirements can be welfare-improving.

In this paper we bring new empirical evidence that political uncertainty is associated with higher corporate debt financing costs. Controlling for all bond and firm characteristics that could affect a firm's cost of debt financing, the uncertainty associated with the outcome of U.S. presidential elections leads to a 34 basis point increase in corporate bond spreads, with closer campaign years associated with additional costs. Similar results hold when we use the continuous measure of the Political Uncertainty Index by Baker et al. (2012). The uncertainty associated with gubernatorial elections, on the other hand, has no effect on the pricing of corporate bonds.

Few areas of monetary economics have been studied as extensively as the transmission mechanism. The literature on this topic has evolved substantially over the years, following the waxing and waning of conceptual frameworks and the changing characteristics of the financial system. In this paper, taking as a starting point a brief overview of the extant work on the interaction between capital regulation, the business cycle and the transmission mechanism, we offer some broader reflections on the characteristics of the transmission mechanism in light of the evolution of the financial system. We argue that insufficient attention has so far been paid to the link between monetary policy and the perception and pricing of risk by economic agents—what might be termed the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy. We develop the concept, compare it with current views of the transmission mechanism, explore its mutually reinforcing link with “liquidity” and analyse its interaction with monetary policy reaction functions. We argue that changes in the financial system and prudential regulation may have increased the importance of the risk-taking channel and that prevailing macroeconomic paradigms and associated models are not well suited to capturing it, thereby also reducing their effectiveness as guides to monetary policy.

We present a theoretical framework for studying how the cross holdings of asset securitization products may affect systemic risk in banking. We demonstrate that cross holdings can be understood from the perspective of profit seeking and credit creation; these motives drive up banks’ leverage. We also show that the capital adequacy ratio regulatory constraint may become invalid with cross holdings, which adversely impacts the monitoring of the stability of a system. We demonstrate that, generally, the impact of asset securitization on systemic risk is nonmonotonic and critically hinges on the banking asset structure, cross-holding degree among banks, and asset securitization characteristics including its state of risk retention. We empirically examine theoretical predictions using a comprehensive set of data from 27 countries/regions spanning the past 15 years.

Can leaders’ names have an impact on their compensation and firm performance? We reason about how and why certain leaders’ names are related to higher financial compensation, yet unrelated to their ability to lead a company and thus firm performance. Based on a sample of 6132 CEOs working at large, publicly traded (S&P 1500) firms, we find that CEOs who have more “fluent” names—or names associated with feelings of cognitive ease (e.g., shorter length, more common)—obtain greater financial as well as non-financial perks, even though they are no more competent. Therefore, the study looks beyond the influence of sex- and race-typed names to help explain the observed mismatch between top management compensation and firm performance. We discuss the theoretical implication of this study for the cognitive bias and discrimination literature, and managerial implications for strategic human resource management.

The paper develops a network-based framework to assess the impact of a firm's financial interconnections and interdependencies on it optimal hedging and risk transfer strategy. This is important consideration as risk concentrations and propagation embedded in risk transfers pose as a significant challenge for financial regulations and risk management. Using an a priori and an a posteriori analysis, we investigate the impact of the network structure on optimal hedge decisions and hedge efficacy. The a priori analysis shows that network features play an important role in determining corporate hedging decisions through their impact on hedge costs. In the a posteriori analysis for counterparty risk, benefit of modification from the a priori optimal hedge decision is realized when variance of firm value matters, but not when tail risk measures are utilized. Financial network assessment indicates that an a priori analysis is insufficient for robust hedging decisions, and choice of risk measures behind risk management objectives dictates the extent of impact of network characteristics.

We find that the magnitude of unique credit default swap (CDS) market information (constructed to be orthogonal to contemporaneous and lagged stock returns) declined after recent reforms that increased the level of post-trade regulatory and market transparency for CDSs. Around the same reforms, the ability of this CDS-unique information to predict future stock returns decreased. These results suggest the CDS market has become less of a “hidden” trading venue for informed investors since central clearing and trade reporting started.

This paper measures the systemic risk of a banking sector as a hypothetical distress insurance premium, identifies various sources of financial instability, and allocates systemic risk to individual financial institutions. The systemic risk measure, defined as the insurance cost to protect against distressed losses in a banking system, is a summary indicator of market perceived risk that reflects expected default risk of individual banks, risk premia as well as correlated defaults. An application of our methodology to a portfolio of twenty-two major banks in Asia and the Pacific illustrates the dynamics of the spillover effects of the global financial crisis to the region. The increase in the perceived systemic risk, particularly after the failure of Lehman Brothers, was mainly driven by the heightened risk aversion and the squeezed liquidity. Further analysis, which is based on our proposed approach to quantifying the marginal contribution of individual banks to the systemic risk, suggests that “too-big-to-fail” is a valid concern from a macro-prudential perspective of bank regulation.

In this paper, we investigate the interest rate setting behaviour of the Bank of England (BoE) over the 16 year period covering both the Great Moderation and the 2008−9 Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession. We contribute to the literature by using the BoE’s own inflation projections in our estimations. Also, we develop a novel measure of the output gap to encapsulate the array of real variables that the Monetary Policy Committee of the BoE reviews. In order to assess the BoE’s responsiveness to financial markets, we estimate a new financial conditions index that covers a wide range of financial indicators that feature in the Inflation Report. Our study provides some new insights into the BoE’s monetary policy behaviour. We show that the BoE was concerned not only with price stability but also output, employment and financial conditions during the Great Moderation. In contrast to previous studies, we find that the BoE responds relatively less to financial conditions and relatively more to inflation projections when the 2008−9 Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession period is included.