The potential for banks to arbitrage between regulators exists both in the US, with its multiple federal banking regulators, and in Europe, due to multinational banking. This paper models multiple regulators that have an agency bias, which can give rise to a “race to the bottom”. The model is used to analyze the interaction between the regulatory equilibrium and several salient pre-crisis features: rising bank leverage; wholesale funding with asymmetric information; and increasing supervisional costs to disentangling bank asset exposures. Each of these raises bank risk taking on its own, but regulatory competition is shown to be an amplification mechanism

We explore and summarize the evolution in bank capital regulations and bank risk after the global financial crisis. Using a new survey of bank regulation and supervision covering more than 120 economies, we show that regulatory capital increased, but some elements of capital regulations became laxer. Analyzing bank-level data, we also document the importance of defining bank regulatory capital narrowly as the quality of capital matters in reducing bank risk. This is particularly true for banks that have more discretion in the computation of regulatory capital ratios and are subject to weaker market monitoring

We examine the impact of foreign bank presence on a host countries’ business regulatory environment. We employ a panel dataset of 87 developing economies for the 1995–2013 period and measure the efficiency of business regulations using the indices from the Heritage and the Fraser datasets. Our results show that foreign bank presence exerts a positive impact on the efficiency of business regulations; however, we find no evidence in favor of a more pronounced positive effect when foreign banks originate from countries that have a more efficient business regulatory environment. Moreover, host countries’ administrative requirements and, particularly, bureaucracy costs benefit from a foreign bank presence; however, cost and time procedures to start a business do not

This paper studies the differences in the announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) of commercial banks and non-banks, and explores the influence of bank regulation and the financial crisis on such differences. We find that abnormal stock returns on SEO announcements for US commercial banks are significantly higher than those of non-banks, consistent with the hypothesis that bank regulations reduce the likelihood that bank SEOs signal overpriced equity. The propensity score matching-based difference-in-difference analysis indicates that the differences in stock returns between banks and non-banks decreased during the 2007–2009 financial crisis period and increased after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010

This study investigates whether regulations have an independent effect on bank risk-taking or whether their effect is channeled through the market power possessed by banks. Given a well-established set of theoretical priors, the regulations considered are capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities and official supervisory power. We use data from the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998–2005. The empirical results suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. Capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with market power this effect significantly weakens or can even be reversed. Higher activity restrictions in combination with more market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of default, while official supervisory power has only a direct impact on bank risk

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collective level, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk

By examining the impact of capital regulation on bank risk-taking using a local estimation technique, this paper attempts to quantify for the first time the heterogeneous response of banks towards this type of regulation in banking sectors of western-type economies. Subsequently, using this information, we examine the sources of heterogeneity. The findings suggest that the impact of capital regulation on bank risk is very heterogeneous across banks and the sources of this heterogeneity can be traced into both bank and industry characteristics, as well as into macroeconomic conditions. An important implication of the findings is that common capital regulatory umbrellas are not sufficient to promote financial stability, especially if they are not accompanied by supervisory effectiveness. On the basis of our findings, we contend that more focus should be placed on the actions needed to restrain excessive risk-taking of banks

Prudential bank regulation complicates monetary policy because it has cyclical effects on the growth of bank credit, which can be a channel through which monetary policy is transmitted to the economy. Employing a panel of 36 advanced and developing countries for the period 1973–2015, we find that changes in regulation have been procyclical with respect to credit surges and counter-cyclical with respect to credit stops. As a result, monetary policy risks being too loose over the credit cycle. The economic effects of prudential regulation on credit have been meaningful given the large-scale bank liberalizations undertaken by many countries. The result is robust to dealing with a wide range of sensitivity tests and endogeneity concerns. In designing regulations, policymakers need to consider transmission mechanisms through which they might affect the real economy and undermine the goals of monetary policy

Using a sample of 27 countries between 1990 and 2014, we find that banks charge higher interest rates and adjust other contractual features of their loans when lending to firms facing more stringent environmental regulations. Our evidence suggests that lenders’ concerns about the increase in environmental liabilities resulting from regulations is driving the results. Specifically, we show that firms facing such regulations have fewer participants in their loan syndicates, higher bankruptcy risk, and lower credit ratings, despite reducing their leverage. Overall, our results indicate that the observed higher loan spread is the result of environmentally sensitive lending practices by banks

Banks play a central role in the financial system and benefit the real economy by managing risk, and providing finance to households, small and medium-sized enterprises, large corporates and governments. However, their complexity, opacity and interconnectedness can elevate bank-level and systemic risks, posing dangers to the financial system and real economy. This was evident during the global financial crisis where taxpayer funded bailouts were used to rescue ailing banks, which in turn led to an overhaul of regulation and supervision. Consequently, safeguarding bank stability and addressing systemic risks via well designed regulations is essential for ensuring economic resilience and societal well-being. This study uses a quasi-natural experimental research design in the form of the Dutch Liquidity Balance Rule (LBR) to evaluate the impacts of liquidity regulation on bank-level stability and systemic risk. Our findings show that following the introduction of liquidity regulation, the stability of Dutch banks increases significantly relative to counterparts in neighbouring countries unaffected by the regulation. The observed reduction in risk stems from improved capitalization and reduced leverage, which contribute to greater financial stability. Systemic risk also decreases. Our findings have relevance beyond our research setting for policymakers tasked with implementing and monitoring the impacts of similar forms of liquidity regulation (such as bank liquidity coverage ratios) post global financial crisis