In January 2006, federal regulators issued guidance requiring banks with specific high concentrations of commercial real estate (CRE) loans to tighten managerial controls. This paper shows that banks with concentrations in excess of the thresholds set in the guidance subsequently experienced slower growth in their CRE portfolios than can be explained by changes in bank or economic conditions. Moreover, banks above the CRE thresholds tended to have slower commercial and industrial loan growth but faster household loan growth following issuance of the guidance. The results highlight the potentially broad influence that portfolio-based macroprudential regulation might have on bank behavior

The severity and longevity of the recession caused by the 2007 financial crisis has highlighted the lack of a reliable macro-based financial regulation framework. As a consequence, addressing the link between the stability of the financial system as a whole and the performance of the overall economy has become a mandate for policymakers and scholars. Many countries have adopted macroprudential tools as policy responses for safeguarding the financial system. This paper provides a literature review of macroprudential policies, its objectives and the challenges that a macro-based framework needs to overcome, such as financial stability, procyclicality, and systemic risk

Excessive (substantially above peer) litigation against a bank is indicative of operational risk because it often suggests failure to maintain a strong system of internal control. We examine the relation between bank performance and weak internal control using legal expense as a proxy. We find that legal expense is a strong determinant of loan losses and stock returns. Bank regulators should require reporting of legal expense on call reports to help identify institutions with weaknesses in internal control. Current reporting creates unnecessary information asymmetries because investors are not well informed about operational risk, leading to mispricing of bank securities

This paper contributes to prior literature and to the current debate concerning recent revisions of the regulatory approach to measuring bank exposure to interest rate risk in the banking book by focusing on assessment of the appropriate amount of capital banks should set aside against this specific risk. We first discuss how banks might develop internal measurement systems to model changes in interest rates and measure their exposure to interest rate risk that are more refined and effective than are regulatory methodologies. We then develop a backtesting framework to test the consistency of methodology results with actual bank risk exposure. Using a representative sample of Italian banks between 2006 and 2013, our empirical analysis supports the need to improve the standardized shock currently enforced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It also provides useful insights for properly measuring the amount of capital to cover interest rate risk that is sufficient to ensure both financial system functioning and banking stability.

This paper shows how the debt-overhang distortion on bank lending can generate a self-fulfilling-expectations banking crisis accompanied by a plunge in the value of banks’ assets and a contraction of bank lending and economic activity. Moral hazard in banking adds an additional channel that can generate multiple equilibria, worsen the debt-overhang distortion, and deepen the crisis. Some signals of systemic risk include: high volatility and the presence of two modes in the probability distribution functions of the returns on bank-issued bonds and on portfolios of bank-issued bonds and equities; and high correlation between the returns on bank-issued bonds. Macroprudential regulation should discourage the exposure of banks to the economic and financial cycle by raising the capital requirements for banks with more cyclical assets

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, in several countries new levies on the financial sector have been proposed and in some cases implemented. We focus in particular on the recent introduction of a securities transaction tax (STT) in Italy. A peculiarity of the Italian STT is that it only concerns stocks of corporations with a market capitalization above € 500 million. We exploit this feature via a differences-in-differences approach – comparing taxed and non-taxed stocks before and after the introduction of the tax – and via a regression discontinuity design – comparing the performance of stocks just above the threshold with those just below. Focusing on the regulated market, we find that the new tax reduced liquidity, but it left transaction volumes and returns substantially unaffected. There is also evidence – although not conclusive – that the tax increased volatility

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe

We investigate whether: (i) co-skewness and co-kurtosis are significant factors in modeling hedge fund (HF) returns, (ii) HF return volatility displays clusters, asymmetry and shock persistence, (iii) volatility clusters of HF styles drive volatility clusters of one another, major asset classes, and major banking organizations, (iv) HF return and volatility patterns changed after the financial crises of 1998 and 2007–2009. A higher-moment EGARCH model and monthly data over January 1993–April 2014 period on 13 HF styles are employed. Out-of-sample forecasts are generated over the period of May 2014–April 2016. Results show: (i) most of the co-skewness and co-kurtosis coefficients are statistically significant, strongly supporting the higher-moment return generating models; (ii) there is strong evidence in favor of EGARCH specification, volatility clustering, asymmetry, and shock persistence; (iii) there were distinct effects on the returns and volatilities of HFs during the 1998 Russian bond crisis, Long-Term Capital Management crisis, and the 2007–2009 financial crisis; and (iv) shocks to volatility clusters of a HF style do spillover to other HF styles, major banking firms, and key asset classes. Our findings have major implications for regulators, investors, HF managers and hedging strategists

In this paper we show in a thought experiment that in an economy where i) investors hold rational expectations, ii) output is generated by a linear homogeneous production function, and iii) real investment is allocated across sectors according to the CAPM, a fractional reserve banking system is not Pareto efficient and amplifies the business cycle. In developing these results we show that these three well known propositions in economics also imply a new view of the business cycle, one where the business cycle is described in terms of the dispersion of an ex-ante probability distribution. The policy implication of this analysis is that bank regulation should go further than the Volcker rule or the Vickers commission proposal by restricting bank investments to currency and deposit accounts on the central bank. Nonbank financial institutions should then carry out the financial intermediation function now carried out by banks. The paper proposes that post office banking perhaps augmented with blockchain technology sometime in the future is one way to implement the transition from fractional reserve banking to full reserve banking. While little academic work has been done on full reserve banking in the aftermath of the Great Crisis, it is interesting to note that it is part of banking reform proposals now (July 2016) before the parliament in Iceland and a special national referendum in Switzerland