Knowledge that Transforms

Foreign participation in Indonesian banking has expanded from the establishment of foreign de novo banks into the acquisition of existing local banks. The increase in foreign participation has therefore not been associated with a growing number of banks. This study aims to examine the competitive behavior of foreign and local banks as a competitive banking industry is important in boosting economic efficiency and economic growth. This study also examines the role of modes of entry of foreign banks on competition, either through the establishment of foreign de novo banks or the acquisition of local banks. The recent methodological refinements of the Panzar–Rosse method developed by Bikker et al. (2011) are employed to estimate the level of competition among local and foreign banks. Generally, the foreign banks, particularly foreign de novo banks behaved more competitively than local banks, and their penetration is therefore important in creating a contestable market. This study found that in terms of assets, on average foreign de novo banks were smaller, more efficient, and had lower overhead costs, so they could offer lower loan rates and disburse more loans. The recent consolidation in the Indonesian banking industry may have an adverse impact on competition as it restricts the establishment of foreign de novo banks.

This paper re-examines the empirical relationship between financial and economic development while (i) taking into account their dynamics and (ii) differentiating between stock market and banking sector development. We study the cointegration and causality between finance and growth for 22 advanced economies. Our time series analysis suggests that causality patterns depend on whether countries’ financial development stems from the stock market or the banking sector. We show that stock market development tends to cause economic development, while a reverse causality is mostly present between banking sector development and output growth. These findings indicate that the direction of causality between finance and growth is likely to be different at high levels of development.

The years before the financial crisis saw a dramatic build-up in private debt levels in several countries and this increase was particularly marked in Ireland. In this paper, we look at whether outstanding debt taken out by small and medium sized enterprises in Ireland constrains current performance following the financial crisis. We find that higher debt burdens (measured as the ratio of debt-to-turnover) have significant negative effects on all measures of firm performance, in particular investment, employment and indicators of financial distress. We find the effects are greatest for sectors and enterprises most reliant on domestic demand which collapsed following the crisis. The effects are also strongest for enterprises that were in the mid-lifecycle, gearing phase, prior to the crisis.

Using a unique data set on German banks’ loans to the German real economy, we investigate banks’ credit risk. This data set contains the volume of loans, and write-downs on loans, per bank and industry. Our empirical study for the period 2003–2011 yields the following results: (i) alongside the average nationwide credit loss rate, industry composition, regional factors, and the state of the global economy, the loans’ maturity structure is identified as an additional driver of the bank-wide loss rates in the credit portfolio. (ii) The nationwide loss rate has the largest impact, followed by the maturity structure and the industry composition. (iii) For nationwide banks, these common factors explain about 26% of the time variation in the loss rate of credit portfolios; for regional banks, this figure is less than 8%.

Transfer-function estimation results for bank M&As in Canada during 1867–1935 support the concentration-stability hypothesis. The systemic stability is attributed to risk reduction through geographic diversification as 2/3 of the M&As were cross-province acquisitions. Furthermore, our empirical findings together with a probabilistic theoretical model support the efficiency hypothesis rather than the imminent failure hypothesis. They not only shed light on the debate in the literature but also have policy lessons for M&As today. More specifically, two mega-mergers would have been denied according to the concentration ratio or HHI criteria commonly used in merger guidelines today, thus hindering banks’ risk reduction through consolidation.

We find that in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis banks replenished only 12% of crisis-related losses through SEOs in 2009 and 2010. However, SEOs are disproportionately conducted by Capital Purchase Program (CPP) recipients, and this is not explained by CPP recipients’ economic and regulatory capital needs. SEOs in 2009 and 2010 by CPP recipients alone account for 27% by number, and 50% by dollar amount, of all SEOs by U.S. banks between 1994 and 2010, indicating the CPP is an influential event in the history of U.S. bank SEOs during this period. Controlling for economic and regulatory capital determinants of SEOs, CPP recipients were more likely than non-recipients to have a SEO within four quarters subsequent to CPP receipt. SEO proceeds were used to repay CPP receipts without jeopardizing loan growth. Banks that received CPP funds prior to the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), and banks with greater reliance on non-traditional banking activities, were more likely to have a SEO expeditiously and repay CPP funds early. Collectively, the results provide new evidence on the realized consequences of the CPP for bank SEOs. Tests suggest the CPP's indirect costs of restrictions on corporate policies and actions as the most likely explanation for the results.

The contagion potential of mark-to-market accounting rules interacting with regulatory constraints is compared to that of funding constraints in a network of banks. The fair value accounting rules were amended at the height of the crisis to break the vicious link between allegedly irrational market prices and regulatory constraints. Anecdotal evidence from the recent crisis suggests that funding constraints posed more serious problems to banks than regulatory constraints. Simulation results show that, for low equity and high levels of short-term debt relative to liquid asset holdings, the contagion potential arising due to funding constraints is higher than the one due to accounting induced regulatory constraints. Allowing balance sheet valuation to affect the expectations about future insolvency, and implicitly, the roll-over decision of short-term creditors, can mitigate or amplify systemic risk depending on which contagion channel is dominating. These results could be interesting for a regulator wishing to achieve a trade-off between transparency, the main goal of fair value accounting, and financial stability.

Bank supervisors utilize early warning signals to predict which banks are likely to become distressed. Previous research has found that market discipline signals do not significantly improve out-of-sample forecasts relative to accounting-based signals. Most of that evidence, however, comes from periods in the 1990s when the U.S. economy and banking system were healthy, potentially neutralizing an advantage of market signals to incorporate new information quickly. For the period between the fourth quarters of 2006 and 2012, we assess the accuracy of two market signals – expected default frequency (EDF) and subordinated note and debenture (SND) yield spreads – relative to accounting-based signals in forecasting which publicly traded BHCs would become distressed. In 2008, EDF signals were relatively more accurate, but they did not lead to economically significant reductions in missed distress events relative to other signals. Supervisors would have been better off devoting slack resources to monitor BHCs with high commercial real estate concentrations. As the crisis subsided, a failure probability model developed from bank failures in the 1980s and early 1990s was consistently the most accurate signal. For the two dozen BHCs with actively traded SNDs, yield spreads over Treasuries were extremely poor predictors of distress because the spreads were distorted by too-big-to-fail subsidies. The Tier 1 leverage ratio was the most accurate distress signal for these large BHCs. In sum, the evidence to justify systematic reliance on market signals by supervisory agencies to forecast bank distress remains weak.

This study finds that equity returns in the banking sector in the wake of the Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis have been driven mainly by weak growth prospects and heightened sovereign risk; and to a lesser extent by deteriorating funding conditions and investor sentiment. While the equity return performance in the banking sector has been dismal in general, there is some evidence that better capitalized and less leveraged banks have outperformed their peers in times of stress.