Knowledge that Transforms

We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified boards deter takeover bids. In a stylized model, we show that when target classified boards are costly to bidders, their negative effect on takeover likelihood should be more pronounced during merger waves. Using a sample of takeover bids in the United States between 1990 and 2016, we find strong evidence supporting this prediction. The results are robust to accounting for the benefits of classified boards and controlling for other antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that classified boards effectively reduce a firm’s exposure to the takeover market.

Exploiting demand shocks from changes in federal government spending, we examine how the organizational structure of a firm affects its investment behavior. Government spending shocks affect the investment of government-dependent conglomerate segments less than matched stand-alone firms. Investment also increases in lower government-dependent segments when other segments within the same firm experience positive demand shocks, indicating cross-subsidization between segments. We further show that this cross-subsidization leads to worse operating performance and increases the diversification discount. Our findings are robust after addressing the endogeneity of government spending.

Analyzing 48 foreign exchange (FX) rates and 1.2 million FX-related news articles over a 35-year period, using digital textual analysis, we find that a currency reversal investment strategy that buys (sells) currencies with low (high) media sentiment offers strong positive and statistically significant returns and Sharpe ratios. The results are robust and the strategy adds value over other currency premia determinants. Analysts’ forecasts systematically mispredict the reversal strategy. This is the first article to show that price reversals based on media sentiment are a well-defined feature of the FX market.

I show that hedge funds react to unrealized losses on their passive positions by engaging with the management. The hedge fund managers’ psychological response is consistent with cognitive dissonance: They blame the firms’ management and switch to activism. The loss, which is hedge fund-investment specific, is distinct from economic factors such as the firm’s industry-adjusted performance. Loss-driven activism is more likely to be unfocused on specific issues and results in worse firm performance. This study shows that an overlooked consequence of unrealized losses is to trigger an active engagement with the firm.

We show that merger announcement returns account for virtually all of the measured size premium. An empirical proxy for ex ante takeover exposure positively and robustly relates to cross-sectional expected returns. The relation between size and expected returns becomes positive or insignificant, rather than negative, conditional on this takeover characteristic. Asset pricing models that include a factor based on the takeover characteristic outperform otherwise similar models that include the conventional size factor. We conclude that the takeover factor should replace the conventional size factor in benchmark asset pricing models.

Using debt crowdfunding data, we investigate whether borrowers’ writing style is associated with an online lender and borrower behaviors, whether the information contained in linguistic style can mitigate information asymmetry in peer-to-peer markets, and whether online investors correctly interpret the economic value of written texts. Peer-to-peer lenders bid more aggressively, are more likely to fund, and charge lower rates to online borrowers whose writing is more readable, more positive, and contains fewer deception cues. Moreover, such borrowers are less likely to default. Online investors, however, fail to fully account for the information contained in borrowers’ writing.

We provide evidence of a network of information flow between activists and other investors prior to 13D filings. We match EDGAR search activity to investor IP addresses, identifying specific investors who persistently download information on an individual activist’s campaign targets in the days prior to that activist’s 13D disclosures. This outside investor’s knowledge of pending activist campaign plans seems to benefit both parties: the informed investor, unnamed in the 13D, increases its holdings in the targeted stock prior to the price surge upon 13D disclosure, while the activist earns voting support that increases their likelihood of pursuing and winning a proxy fight.

We document distinctly different clientele effects on investor attention and return responses to information. Macro news crowds out retail investor attention to firms’ earnings news by 49%. For stocks with high retail ownership, macro news dampens earnings announcement returns by 17% and substantially increases post-announcement drift, especially during high VIX periods. In contrast, macro news increases institutional investor attention to scheduled earnings announcements but not their attention to unscheduled analysts’ forecast revisions. The findings confirm the implications of rational inattention models and highlight the importance of considering clientele effects in understanding the effect of news on attention and asset prices.

This article investigates the short-side anomaly trading behavior of alternative mutual funds (AMFs) based on their short positions in U.S. domestic equities. In aggregate, AMFs demonstrate the ability to exploit well-documented stock market anomalies on the short side, and the overpriced stocks sold short by AMFs generate significant negative alpha. Further, AMFs’ short-side trades exhibit significant return predictability, which can at least partially derive from their ability to process public information on firm and anomaly characteristics. Finally, AMFs’ short-side anomaly-based trading activity and profitability appear to be more pronounced among the stocks with higher credit risk or dynamic short-selling risk.

We identify a novel way of evergreening loans in India. A low-quality bank lends to a related party of an insolvent borrower, and the loan recipient transfers the funds to the insolvent borrower using internal capital markets. Incremental investments, interest rates charged, and loan delinquency rates collectively indicate evergreening. These loans are unlikely to represent arm’s length transactions or rescue of troubled related firms by stronger firms to prevent group-wide spillover effects. Indirect evergreening is less likely to be detected by regulatory audits. It has significant real consequences at the firm and industry levels.