This study examines the valuation consequences of control-related outcomes that follow toehold acquisitions. We find evidence that toehold acquisitions facilitate value enhancing control transfers. The types of control transfers not only include takeovers, but also internal mechanisms, such as proxy fights and management turnovers. We find that toehold targets experiencing such control transfers exhibit an abnormal increase in share value, while those not experiencing such control transfers exhibit an abnormal decrease in share value. The results suggest that the positive valuation effect associated with toehold acquisitions reflects the expected benefits of subsequent control transfers.

In a recent article [1], Beedles suggests that the valuation process for cash outflows (or negative benefits using his terminology) is, in some sense, different from the valuation process for cash inflows. This result, however, is not consistent with the assumption of perfect capital markets. Any cash outflow from one firm represents a cash inflow to some other firm(s) or investor(s). Consequently, any difference in the valuation processes for cash outflows and cash inflows will create profitable arbitrage possibilities.