This paper examines the relation between changes in firm value associated with public equityissue announcements and management ownership, nonmanagement large block ownership, institutional ownership, information variables, and leverage. A significant negative relationis found between the ratio of announcement period abnormal returns to changes in management ownership and the level of management ownership. This result is consistent with Stulz (1988) who predicts that firm value increases at a decreasing rate as management control of voting rights increases. This finding is also consistent with improvements in alignment of interests, where such improvements diminish as management becomes entrenched. The announcement period abnormal returns appear to be unrelated to outside blockholdings (large block ownership or institutional holdings), information variables, or leverage.

Traditional planning for working capital needs is typically conducted with a relatively short time horizon. In this process, management attempts to optimize the return on existing fixed assets. The period for capital investment planning is much longer, reflecting the irreversibility of these decisions. Current research in the two areas tends to dichotomize these decision processes. The implications seem to be that working capital policies only have impact in the short run. However, it is clear that cash flows for potential capital expenditures are based on assumptions relative to expected future demand and production to meet this demand—assumptions that are necessarily tied to working capital commitments in the long run. The overall planning for credit, inventory, and liquidity should, therefore, be carried out before, or simultaneously with, the capital investment decision. It is a planning requirement that becomes an integral part of the total asset planning system. The vast majority of existing working capital models or long-term capital planning models do not allow for the explicit existence of and the simultaneous interrelationships between these two important subsystems.

The current assets and current liabilities of a firm are the stock reflections of closely interrelated operational and financial cash flows. The net effect of these combined flows must be recognized in searching for the optimal credit, inventory, or short-term borrowing policies. Yet, the vast majority of models for short-term investment and borrowing decisions do not allow for the interrelationships of this system.

Donald L. Tuttle, William L. Wilbur, A Multivariate Time-Series Investigation of Annual Returns on Highest Grade Corporate Bonds, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Mar., 1971), pp. 707-721

Recent theoretical models show that irrational expectations can generate return predictability consistent with apparent violations of weak-form market efficiency documented in the empirical literature. These behavioral models constrain rational investors' ability toexploit inter-temporal predictability by assuming that rational agents face high transactions costs, are myopic, or are non-existent. This paper presents a model in which there are two types of irrational expectations, one that causes momentum and another that creates reversals. I investigate whether these types of predictability will persist in the presence of fully rational agents who face no transactions costs, are long lived, and trade dynamically to optimally exploit any predictability due to irrational mispricings. I show that weak-form market efficiency will be violated under two very weak conditions: rational investors are risk averse and the fundamental value of the asset is risky. The paper also investigates the accumulation of wealth by trader type and shows that irrational agents will survive under a large set of parameters.

This paper provides empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate hedging decisions. The paper examines the evidence in light of currently mandated financial reporting requirements and, in particular, the constraints placed on anticipatory hedging. Data on hedging are obtained from 1992 annual reports for a sample of 3,022 firms. Out of the 771 firms classified as hedgers, 543 firms disclose information in their annual reports on their hedging activities; the remaining 228 firms report use of derivatives but no information on hedging activities. Based on the evidence, I draw the following conclusions with respect to the models of hedging: evidence is inconsistent with financial distress cost models; evidence is mixed with respect to contracting cost, capital market imperfections, and tax-based models; and evidence uniformly supports the hypothesis that hedging activities exhibit economies of scale.

Previous studies in the valuation of American options apparently undervalue the right of early exercise. This study uses actual prices from the CBOE's S&P 100 option instead of model-generated values. Deviations from the theoretical put-call parity relationship are caused by the possibility of early exercise. These deviations are used to infer the value of early exercise. The actual value of early exercise is both statistically and economically significant. As expected from theoretical considerations, the value of early exercise for put options is greater than for call options.

In this paper, a general treatment of identifying the set of unbiased estimators of N-period mean returns is advanced and a new unbiased estimator, which promises near-minimum variance and minimal computation, is formulated. The new estimator is also equally applicable to other processes of compound growth.

This study focuses on the risk-return characteristics of investments in the common stocks of U.S.–based multinational corporations (MNCs) and U.S. national corporations (NATLs). Findings follow from a comparison of the risk-adjusted performance of MNCs and NATLs using the framework of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Results of this comparison challenge assertions of earlier writers that marginal benefits or advantages accrue from investments in MNCs as compared to NATLs.

The mean-variance capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe and Lintner was extended by Brennan [3] to incorporate divergent borrowing and lending rates. He found that in equilibrium the security market line (SML) has the same structure as the SML under the single-rate CAPM of Sharpe and Lintner. That is, the expected return of a security or a portfolio remains linear in its systematic risk, with the intercept replaced by an equivalent risk-free return, which is an average of the divergent borrowing and lending rates weighted by the investors' taste parameters. The equivalent risk-free return is larger than the riskless lending rate and, hence, does not represent an inconsistency with the empirical findings by Friend and Blume [4] and by Black, Jensen and Scholes [1[ that the intercept of empirical SML estimated for the single-rate CAPM is larger than the riskless rate. Moreover, Brennan attempted to show that his construct can be extended to the extreme case where there are no riskless opportunities. The case of no riskless opportunities was of course investigated by Black [2], who generalized the CAPM and SML by inventing the concept of zero-beta port-folio to account for the same empirical problem encountered in the traditional SML tests of CAPM. Since the Sharpe-Lintner single-riskless-rate CAPM implies a perfect loan market, we may view the attempts by Black and Brennan as generalizing the CAPM by incorporating financial restrictions and loan market imperfections. Their primary motive, however, is empirical, i.e., to reconcile the results from the traditional SML tests with their generalized CAPM.