Knowledge that Transforms

The debt overhang problem is shown to arise in the context of an entrepreneurial project that requires a sequence of investments financed by an outside lender. The entrepreneur, not internalizing losses accruing to the lender which financed the initial investments, may inefficiently cancel the project and instead pursue an outside opportunity. It is shown that loan commitments (contracts that allow the entrepreneur to borrow a variable amount at a set interest rate in return for a fixed fee) are the optimal financial contracts in this setting, strictly dominating standard debt. The existence of the fixed fee allows loan commitments to set a relatively low interest rate, improving the entrepreneur's incentives to continue the project. The paper specifies the optimal contract fully, derives robust comparative statics properties (using an extension of Milgrom and Roberts (1994)), and extends the results to more realistic settings (e.g., allowing the market risk-free rate to be stochastic).

Glenn W. Boyle, Richard B. Carter, Roger D. Stover, Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 291-304

One-period expected returns on futures contracts with different maturities differ because of risk premia in the spreads between futures and spot prices. We analyze the expected returns for futures contracts with different maturities using the information that is present in the current term structure of futures prices. A simple affine one-factor model that implies a constant covariance between the pricing kernel and the cost-of-carry cannot be rejected for heating oil and German Mark futures contracts. For gold and soybean futures, the risk premia depend on the slope of the current term structure of futures prices, while for live cattle futures, the evidence is mixed.

We develop a dynamic game-theoretic model of a futures market in which prices can be manipulated by corner and squeeze. We investigate equilibrium trading strategies and the price dynamics these strategies produce. Price paths produced by our model can mimic observed prices for potentially comerable commodities and explain the volatility of certain prices even when no manipulations occur. Our model also generates occasional apparent price bubbles and accounts for the existence of normal backwardation in futures markets even when players are risk neutral.

The magnitude and determinants of credit and currency risks are topics of considerable importance. This paper uses data on peso- and dollar-denominated debt issued by the Mexican government to identify currency and country risk premia. We show that shocks in equity and debt market returns translate into long-term increases in the premium demanded by investors with respect to currency and country factors. Country and currency premia help explain equity returns and closed-end fund discounts. Additional evidence is provided showing that investors did not anticipate the magnitude or timing of the currency devaluation of December 1994 and the subsequent financial crisis.

The literature suggests two competing explanations for reincorporations: efforts at managerial entrenchment and attempts to improve contractual efficiency. The empirical evidence to date is inconclusive. To seek further evidence, we examine a large sample of firms that changed their state of incorporation over the period 1980–1992. We find that shareholder wealth is decreased by reincorporations that erect takeover defenses, but is increased by reincorporations that establish limits on director liability. Firms that claim they reincorporate to limit the personal liability of their board members and thereby attract better qualified outside directors do, in fact, expand the outside representation on their boards, whereas firms citing other motives do not.

George J. Jiang, Nonparametric Modeling of U.S. Interest Rate Term Structure Dynamics and Implications on the Prices of Derivative Securities, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 465-497

Arkadev Chatterjea, Robert A. Jarrow, Market Manipulation, Price Bubbles, and a Model of the U.S. Treasury Securities Auction Market, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 255-289

When shareholders have different plans to sell their shares, they will, in general, have different preferences concerning the firm's decision to pay out cash using dividends or share repurchase. We illustrate these different preferences and explore a model of payout policy that highlights the adverse selection costs of repurchases when managers have superior information about the value of the firm. We show that, in the absence of fixed costs to repurchasing shares, there is a separating equilibrium in which managers use taxable dividends to signal the quality of the firm, with better firms paying lower dividends, using repurchases for the remainder of the payout. With fixed costs to repurchasing, small payouts are made via dividend and large payouts are divided between repurchases and dividends, as in the no-fixed cost case. In both cases, the percentage of shares repurchased increases with the size of the payout and larger repurchases are better news.

Suppose the ICAPM governs asset prices and there is a total of S state variables that might be of hedging concern to investors. Can we determine which state variables are, in fact, of hedging concern? What does it mean to say that these state variables are priced, that is, that they give rise to special risk premiums in expected returns? The goal of this paper is to formulate this problem clearly and show when it can and cannot be solved. Ignoring estimation problems, it is possible to find the set of priced state variables when the state variables are identified (named). When we know the number of state variables, but not their names, confident conclusions about even the number of them that produce special risk premiums are probably impossible, unless the number is zero, so the ICAPM collapses to the CAPM.